Money, Sex, and God: The Erotic Logic of Religious Nationalism*

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God is once again afoot in the public sphere. Politics has become a religious obligation. For a new breed of religious nationalist the nation-state is a vehicle of the divine. This essay seeks to accomplish four things. The first is to argue for an institutional approach to religious nationalism in order both to interpret and explain it. Second, I argue that religion and nationalism partake of a common symbolic order and that religious nationalism is therefore not an oxymoron. Third, the essay seeks to explain why religion has become such a potent political force in our time. And fourth—the task that will take up the bulk of the text—it seeks a principle of intelligibility in the semiotic order of religious nationalism that can comprehend its preoccupation with both women's erotic bodies and monies out of national control.

THE INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM

Religious nationalism must be understood in terms of its own cultural premises, not simply as a mediation of forces from elsewhere, as a sublimate of economic grievance or a carrier of group identity, as a medium for old class politics or new identity politics (Foran 1993; Lawrence 1998). It is true that support for religious nationalism is centered in the urban middle class. That support cannot be interpreted in terms of material class interest. Its middle-class adherents sometimes hail from rising (professionals) and sometimes declining (bazaar merchants and artisans) components. Its supporters just as often are experiencing material gains as losses. In the United States, a majority of the Christian right base communities report that their economic situation has improved over the last decade (Smith 1998). In Iran, although the bazaar-based merchants faced competition from the modern industrial groups—particularly in the wholesale sector—and increased taxation and price-controls from the Shah's government, their incomes rose rapidly under the Shah (Bakhash 1984:190–91). Moreover, religious nationalism draws significant support from outside the middle class. Riesebrodt has shown that the pursuit of class-specific material benefits was a marginal part of the fundamentalist agenda both in the pre-WWII period in the United States and during Khomeini's revolution in post-WWII Iran (Riesebrodt 1993:195). In the 1980s in the United States, the Christian right's Moral Majority's 10-point agenda did not include a single economic issue (Iannaccone 1993).

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Nor is religious nationalism interpretable as a middle-class status politics, a classical interpretation of new right politics (Lipset 1963). Given its variable and often capacious class base, neither can religious nationalism be adequately grasped as a reactive defense of the prestige of the traditional middle class against a rising modern middle class based in technical expertise or corporate and governmental office (Riesebrodt 1993:86–87, 188–89). As Riesebrodt himself has shown in pointing to the material requirements for reproducing the traditional middle-class milieu, recognition and resources are too interdependent to decide where one begins and the other ends. And although the salaried and merchant middle classes are the demographic center of religious nationalist movements, these movements draw from all classes.

Religious nationalism cannot be explained and hence interpreted in terms of class-specific material or status injury (Simpson 1983:201–02). Neither can it be understood as a project of religious inclusion, of group representation. Nor is it merely a clerical power-play. Religious nationalist movements are often led by the laity, not the clerics (Arjomand 1995).

To understand religious nationalism, we must firstly situate it not in terms of the group bases of its support, but as an institutional project. Religious nationalism's cultural order derives as much from the institutional space it inhabits as from the social position of the individuals who become religious nationalists. To understand religious nationalism, we must begin not with the power relations between groups, but with an institutional architecture of the social. It is institutional, not cultural, autonomy that is of political consequence.

Modern societies are composed of a plurality of distinct institutions. Institutions are both cultural and social. They are transrational ways of organizing persons and objects in space and time (Friedland and Alford 1991). And they are themselves spaces and times, locations in which those persons and objects carry particular meanings. Just as we analyze the democratic state or the capitalist market in terms of its own categories of practice, categories that constitute the content of interests at stake within them, we must start from religious nationalism's ontology of the social, the cultural specificity of its powers. Such an approach not only affords hermeneutic adequacy but will help account for religion's political capacities and the organization of its project.

Within any institution, the relationships between persons and objects are organized through practices premised on particular ontologies, ontologies knowable only through these practices. These institutional ontologies specify or afford substances—state sovereignty, bureaucratic rationality, democratic representation, familial love, religious faith, capitalist property, scientific knowledge—whose reality is performed as much as revealed through routinized practices enacted by agents whose identity and interest are tied to those substances and the real relations both which they make possible and that conjure them into existence. These substances are known—made accountable and actionable—through the procedures by which they are produced and distributed. In the modern world, one "makes" or enacts love through practices of kinship and its sensuous bodily solidarities and exclusions, democratic representation through elections, profit through monetized networks of exchange between holders of different properties, themselves known only through the rights regulating these exchanges. Love, democracy, and profit are ontological "substances," necessarily immanent in institutional practice, done, but never truly had.[1]

[1] In philosophy, substances either are, à la John Locke, unknowable particulars experienced through their attributes or are reduced to a bundle of properties. My notion of institutional substance poses a conundrum. If love and property cannot be directly experienced, they cannot be identified as an attribute of relations. Yet neither is it a material thing that would allow it to function in the conventional sense as a carrier or support for attributes. There is a way in which my usage of the term for meaningful materiality corresponds to Locke's assumption of a substratum, which he called "something I know not what" supporting the properties of things. Institutional substances are not things, yet they are independent and unobservable particulars supporting tightly structured bundles of properties (Armstrong 1989).

An institution's specificity is located in the cultural premises of its production, in its ontological substances and the practices by which they are performed. Within any institution, the discursive organization of bodies and things in its space and time become signifiers for those substances. This choreography of practice is not, properly speaking, a form of social signage. The practices through which those substances, as well as the subjects they imply—voting, democracy or representation, and citizen, for example—are symbolizations, in that they have a nonarbitrary relation to the signified, democracy or representation in this case. Although ideas are critical to the imagination of practice, institutional practice cannot be understood as the social enactment of a cultural code. Not only is the code only thinkable through its practices, but these institutional practices all involve material objects, not just particular texts, but things—buildings, tables and beds, altars and icons, ballots and borders, monies, microscopes and laboratories—whose materiality is integral to the constitution of the institutional code. One cannot interpret institutions by relying solely on words or on things, but by both as they are deployed in practice, in the materialization of their metaphors. It is the conjunction of words and things—what science studies might call a network—that helps stabilize practice, that gives it a ritualized character, that is the basis of institutionalization (Latour 1987).

Institutions have logics that both must be made material in order to signify and must signify in order to materialize. Although both objects and discourses can be dissociated from each other and from the institutional fields in which they are coupled, every resource allocation is potentially a material semiosis, in which the categories, instruments, and agencies through which that object is produced or distributed are made real. Struggles over resources always contain the possibility of struggle over the discourses in which those resources are constituted because they expand the materiality, the efficacy of those agents and languages that thereby organize those resources. Resources are referents that signify; materiality is always meaningful. If resources are bound to institutions, useful because meaningful, then interests in resources cannot easily be dissociated from the institutional conditions that establish their value and use. Institutional theory is not about the leftovers of rational action, the ways in which cultural conventions rush in where means-ends relations are opaque. Rather, institutional logics constitute the cosmology within which means are meaningful, where means-ends couplets are thought appropriate and become the naturalized, unthought conditions of social action, performing the substances at stake within them.

Religion is not just a doctrine, a set of myths, or a congeries of rite; it is an institutional space according to whose logic religious nationalists wish to remake the world. Religion is a network of sacred sites and ritual spaces, as well as community centers, associations, schools, hospitals, courts, and charities. Religion offers not only a social space from which to mobilize, but also a concrete cosmos within which an alternative vision of the social can be imagined and prefigured. Religious nationalists seek to constitute the faith-based family, understood as a vehicle of divine creation, both as a model of the polity and as the elemental unit of which the nation is composed. Their practices of patriarchy and sexual regulation enact and enforce that cosmological understanding. Religious nationalist movements provide an alternative welfare state, whose services are offered and consumed within a context of community, unlike the distant, bureaucratic, and often officious state. Rather than a social problem or a recipient of rights, one is an intimate object of care. Religious nationalists locate the "ground plan" of their world in a constitution derived not from consent but from a divinely revealed text that they read and interpret together. Religious nationalists seek to transform the territoriality of their nation from sovereign into sacred space. Their political practices seek to make ritual spaces—particularly religiously sacred centers—into politicized public spaces identified with the nation (Friedland and Hecht 1998, 2000).

Institutional analysis requires us to move beyond the linguistic model in which the referent does not signify. Social practice is both referent and signifier; it is an ontological performance. It does things whose doing necessarily depends on a metaphysics, a cosmology, on a practical faith in the existence of substances that can never be directly observed, but whose existence must be assumed for the institution to function. This appears to be true even in science. Heidegger (1977) spoke of the metaphysical ground of science, its ungrounded and ungroundable ontology, the ground plan of its object sphere, whose revealability and revelation he derived from the solidarities of procedure, specifically procedures for producing certain representation (see also Mohr and Duquenne 1997).

Institutions operate through materialized metaphors beyond logical or empirical proof, on ungroundable premises, on nonobservable substances. Theorists of metaphor, Black and Ricoeur among them, have pointed to the ways in which metaphors cannot be reduced to similes, to the indexing of similarities, but, in fact, work through their interaction with extraneous terms, thereby actually creating new meanings, new orders of cognitive reality (Black 1978; Urban 2000). Metaphor, Ricoeur (1981, 1991) argued, could actually reconstruct the literal meaning of words, the ontology in which they are implicated, and thereby have the power to transform the world in which they operate.

An institution's metaphors—as Foucault understood too well—are available for export, for application elsewhere. Institutions, as theorists of societal differentiation have long underscored, tend toward the purification, to protect their logic and hence their ontological substances from heteronomous orders. Markets, for example, seek to insulate their workings from force, sex, and political power, which they would prefer to render without value, means that they would render meaningless and hence impotent or valueless. Democratic states seek likewise to circumscribe money's ambit so that decisions—the use of state authority—cannot be bought and sold. When agents attempt to expand the scope of a particular institution, they extend the reach of its metaphors, of the organizing capacity of its institutional substances.

The scope of reference of institutional metaphors is explosive because institutions depend on the unthinkability of their conventions, on the taking of institutionalized ontologies as inhering in the nature of things. Extending alternative metaphorical orders reveals that conventionality; their ontological challenge is the essence of profanation. Profanation, from a Durkheimian point of view, involves the breaching of the ontologically other, of a domain defined not by absence but by an alternative, heterologous presence. To its opponents, a government's voiding of private property or parental decision is a transgression. Or that a vote, a human life, an egg, a marriage partner, or a public service can be bought and sold as a commodity is experienced as profanation, immoral and inappropriate. For religious nationalists, that religiously forbidden sexuality is protected as a civil right is understood as a profanation of a higher law. Likewise, those that revere the democratic state view the prospect that religious communities can adumbrate the juridical content of universal citizenship as an obscenity. The boundary between institutions, and hence what metaphors will be hegemonic, is the single most important political issue facing a society.[2] Institutional boundaries pulse with energy.

Religious nationalism seeks to extend the institutional logic of religion into the domain of the democratic nation-state, deriving authority from an absolute divine writ, rather than a subjective aggregation of the demos. The nation's history is seen as a cosmic drama that pushes toward redemption, not progress. Agency is located in a disciplined self bound by faith in God, not a sacralized, self-interested monad. Society is constituted not by abstract, disembodied individuals in markets but through the gendered flesh of the family bound

[2] New commensurations are a sign that institutional orders are being challenged and are at risk (Curtis 2001).

together by faith. Religious nationalism posits an institutionally specific substance of the social, neither the procedures of self-certain reason nor the play of self-interest, but rather the communal solidarities of faith. The primary practices through which this faith is performed are prayer, religious ritual, pilgrimage, and, as we shall see, the investment and regulation of family life as a site of faith-based solidarity and of divine creation.

Institutions rest on ungroundable premises, on the essential quality of their nonobservable substances, on their incommensurability and inviolability. This incommensurability is occluded from view by homologizing across fields—by invoking, as in Bourdieu's theory of fields, positionalities in the distribution of generalizable capitals and powers (Friedland 2001). Institutional heterology is also a source of human freedom, an alternative basis for critique to Habermas's progressive transcript of communicative rationality located in the lifeworld or to the fuzzy logic linking habitus and habitat in Bourdieu.

We can see the import of institutional contradiction by returning to the classical materialist case, one with relevance here. Marx theorized the basis of working-class critique of capitalism in an interested difference, that between use value and exchange value. Use value speaks of a specific institutional location; it refers to an individual's membership in human families, into which one is born and gives birth, has obligations not only to be fed, but to feed and to care. While working-class politics are typically fought on a distributional plane, as the share of wages versus the share of profits, the formation of the working class as a collective subject had to do not only with the extension of citizenship but with the defense of the family, not only in the demand for a "living wage"—one that would support human life—but with protecting the family against capitalism, to put children—upon whom the early stages of industrial capitalism massively depended, hence the fear of giving women the vote—outside the labor force, to protect the time upon which domesticity depended, to establish a wage upon which a family could survive not only when its members worked, but when they no longer could. The assertion of human need—a term banished, as is "power," both in the capitalist market and its theorization—is a familial discourse. The family's central institutional tendency involves the materiality of love, which, like property, is known by how it is practiced, by the conditions of access to fingers, nipples, milk, eggs and semen, mouths and eyes, beds and bowls of hot cereal, to the warmth and work of bodies. Family life is organized around the solidarities of needful body-making.

There are those who would parse the social through a matrix of domination, understanding society as variations of abstract power relations among social groups. But groupness depends not just on an interest given by distributional position, but on an identity given by the logic of the institutions from which group projects are fashioned. Conflicts between groups over their respective powers within an institutional field are important to interinstitutional transformation. People, of course, live across institutions. Groups, as in the case of the working class, may deploy the logic of outside institutions in their distributional struggles within a given institution. And because institutions themselves are interdependent, dependencies with distributional consequences, group conflicts within a given institutional field may involve efforts to transform the interinstitutional configuration. In the case of religious nationalism, marginalized clerics seeking to transform the relation between religion and state have increased both their distributional position within the religious field and the hegemony of the field itself (Riesebrodt 1993). However, one can neither adequately explain nor interpret the project from the fact of marginality.

Institutional logic and collective representation are linked phenomena because groups form through particular institutional configurations and because institutions are defended and extended through group conflicts. Groups know themselves through their institutional projects, and by politicizing those projects they reshape the logic of collective represen-

tation, not just who is represented in the public sphere but the nature of the representation. Social movements are not just about inclusion and exclusion, domination and subordination, of social groups. The empirical question is the extent to which groups derive from and target particular institutional sites, and to which they draw on different institutional languages and their success in making those particular languages primary. The invocation of a particular institutional language is a political act, a performative claim that the institution to which it has most reference should have primacy, and hence the groups/agents who politically intervene from it should have power. Group political power is always also a question of institutional hegemony.

The ability to exploit institutional heterologies for political purposes depends first on their being there. Religiosity varies dramatically across the globe. The availability of religiosity as a worldview upon which to draw is a necessary condition for the emergence of religious nationalism (Keddie 1998). It is this pervasive religiosity that joins India and the United States. Its emergence is also conditioned by the autonomy of religious institutions from state control. Religious nationalism developed earliest in those places where religion was not controlled by the state. In Iran, the Sh'ite clergy, with their tradition of the *imam*, a nonpolitical religious authority, had been variously able to maintain their autonomy from the Shahs. In Israel, the rabbinate, although partially incorporated within the state, was not subordinate to it. In Palestine, the Islamic clerics under Israeli occupation in Gaza were free from Jordanian or Egyptian control (Friedland and Hecht 2000). In the United States, the state was constitutionally prevented from controlling the religious domain. In India, the state did not regulate Hindu religious institutions. Religious nationalism has been infrequent in Catholic countries, whose clerics are controlled by the Vatican. Nor did religious nationalism develop as early or as far in those countries where religion was not allowed an independent institutional space. In China, Korea, and Japan, among others, the state actually controls religious finances and appointments (Rudolph 1997a). However, even states that have sought to control religious institutions have not necessarily been able to prevent the politicization of religion, as the cases of Turkey, Algeria, and Egypt all make clear (Humphreys 1999).

RELIGION AND NATIONALISM

What is this nationalism to which religion claims a right of property? Nationalism is a state-centered form of collective subject formation, a form of state representation, one grounding the identity and legitimacy of the state in a population of individuals who inhabit a territory bounded by that state. The cultural commonalities of that population do not, in themselves, constitute the basis for the formation of a nation. Nationality is a contingent and contested claim, not a social fact (Brubaker 2002; Smith 1991). Nationalism—the political processes organized through the state in the name of nation—creates the nation, not the reverse (Calhoun 1998). Nationalism is a program for the co-constitution of the state and the territorially bounded population in whose name it speaks. That territoriality is both the nation's site and its collective representation. The cartographic image is critical to the imagination of this bounded, singular, and integral space in which one belongs and of which one partakes (Anderson 1991; Ramaswamy 2001). The territory is the mirrored body of the collective subject.

Nationalism is not merely an ideology; it is also a set of discursive practices by which the territorial identity of a state and the cultural identity of the people whose collective representation it claims are constituted as a singular fact. The state is central in the process, in that it is the direct relation between the state and individual, mediated through the organization of markets, armies, schools, and families that composes this national identity

(Rokkan 1975). The abstract citizen, then, is a prerequisite to the formation of a culturally specific national subject. That abstract citizen is institutionally premised on an abstract collective subject, the nation-state, which relates as an equivalent "actor" to other states, relations organized through a variety of inter-state institutions (Giddens 1984). Individual and collective subject-making operate in parallel.

Nationalism offers a form of representation—the joining of state, territoriality, and culture. It does not determine the content of representation, the identity of the represented collective subject. Indeed, there are a variety of nationalist discourses, each of which construe the citizen in a different way. The most common divide is that between civic and ethnic nationalism (Greenfield 1992; Hobsbawm 1991). Civic, or liberal, nationalism locates the nation as a group of citizens, each of whom bear, and have a history of exercising, the same legal rights vis-à-vis the state (Shafir and Peled 2001). Ethnonationalism, in contrast, locates the nation's identity in a group that imagines itself to have a cultural homogeneity and a common descent. Here scholars draw on Max Weber's treatment of the affinity between ethnicity and nationalism, both of which hold to "the notions of common descent and of an essential, though frequently indefinite, homogeneity" (Weber 1968:923). Weber understood nationalism as involving a pathos, a "pathetic pride in the power of one's own community" (Weber 1968:368). While Weber believed that the prestige of state power and of cultural values fused in the invocation, elicitation, and production of national group solidarity, he was acutely aware that the nation was "empirically . . . ambiguous" and that a "sociological typology would have to analyze all the individual kinds of sentiments of group membership and solidarity in their genetic conditions and in their consequences for the social action of the participants" (Weber 1968:925). While he did not develop such a sentimental typology, he did enumerate four media for that nationalist pathos: language, common custom, political memory, and religion (Weber 1968:398).

Religion offers an institutionally specific way to organize this modern form of collective representation, how a collectivity represents itself to itself, the symbols, signs, and practices through which it is and knows itself to be. Religion does not change the nationalist form of collective representation, only its content, privileging a basis of identity and a criterion of judgment that cannot not be chosen. The religious criterion of judgment—like human rights, racial purity, or technical rationality—is beyond the reach of popular voice or the compelling interests of the state.

Religion, with its universal claims, is not inherently inconsistent with nationalism; religious nationalism is not an oxymoron (Lawrence 1998:68, 189). Movements that cleave to transnational religions seeking to apply God's law to the state always center their energies on the nation-states in which they live and operate. This was eventually true for the first wave of premillenarian nonnationalist Christian fundamentalists. America's Christian right has been resolutely nationalist.[3] And even militant Islamicists, who have a historic transnational territorial ambit—indeed, a universal ideal—and the actual tradition of the caliphate upon which to draw, almost all seek to create an Islamic order within the existent nation-states (Humphreys 1999). This is the case with Sunni movements in places such as Turkey, Algeria, and Palestine. The transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood—the center of the Islamic movement in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, and elsewhere—into Hamas

[3] Most "fundamentalist" Christians in America are religious nationalists. In the American Protestant context, for example, Roof (1999) has studied the first post-WWII generation of Christians. He distinguishes between those who cleave to an evangelicalism oriented toward the spiritual needs of the self and those religiously drawn to fundamentalism, with its paternal and monarchical sovereign God who sets down strict moral codes. While one might expect religious nationalists to derive overwhelmingly from the second community as opposed to the first, the Christian right—those who believe that America was founded as a Christian nation and should, by law, remain that way—draws from both evangelicals and traditionally premillenarian fundamentalists. A majority of both communities actively participates in conservative Christian politics (Roof 1999; Smith 1998).

illustrates this nationalization (Friedland and Hecht 2000). It is also the case with the Shi'ite revolution in Iran. Indeed, at the end of his life, the Ayatollah Khomeini issued a *fatwa*, or theological decision, declaring that even the seven pillars of Islam could be superseded in the interests of the Islamic republic of Iran (Wright 2000:181–82).

Even Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network, often portrayed as inimical to the nation-state with its support for the eventual construction of the caliphate, depended on the support of Islamic nationalist states to whose development it contributed—Sudan and Afghanistan—and sought through its organized violence to install appropriately Islamic national states in Chechnya, Egypt, Palestine, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia. Some argue that bin Laden's actions have been an operational extension of Iranian, Pakistani, and Saudi Arabian geopolitics (Bodansky 2001). Bin Laden was initially trained to build the Saudi state, receiving a degree in public administration from King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, and it is toward the restoration of a legitimate Islamic regime in Saudi Arabia—one not dependent on American military support and truly committed to the liberation of al-Quds—that his politics are aimed. Bin Laden's warriors are largely men who have been forced into exile for trying to bind their nation-states to Islam in countries such as Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia.

Drawing on the political theology and organizational network of the Muslim Brotherhood, bin Laden is part of a nation-state-supported transnational network seeking to Islamicize nationalist struggles in places as diverse as Kashmir and Palestine. Just as, in the 18th and 19th centuries, the counter-Enlightenment was a trans-European movement that sought to fashion Catholic nation-states, so bin Laden is a kind of Islamic Trotsky who seeks (or sought) simultaneously to institute Islamic law in a multiplicity of nation-states (McMahon 2001). Islam's universality facilitates transnational organization that operates through national states. Although Islam points to deferred structures, such as the caliphate, that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state, the tension between the transcendental, universalizing principle and its particular embodiment is not different from that which organizes socialism or democracy. These, too, were transnational movements that alighted in particular places. Religious nationalism makes religion the basis for the nation's collective identity and the source of its ultimate values and purpose on this earth. Religious nationalism fills existent state forms with new cultural contents, new sources of authority; it does not necessarily displace them (Casanova 1994)

THE STATE OF RELIGION

Religious nationalists attempt to extend the institutional logic of religion as the basis of legitimacy of the national state, the content of the identity of the collectivity upon behalf of which it speaks, and as the criterion of judgment by which the state seeks to regulate its behavior. Religious nationalists make politics into a religious obligation. Many scholars interpret this politicization of religion as a contradiction of religion's essential qualities, whether of its universal ethical regulation or its other-worldly orientation. The religious nationalist project is seen as a retreat from modernity. The Enlightenment philosophers made the separation of state authority from religion an essential condition for freedom, for "mankind's exit from its self-imposed immaturity," as Kant (1996:63) put it. In place of religion, the person and the polity would now assume sacred status in the modern Western world, nationalism donning the trappings of a religion.

These are modernity's terms for the satanization of public religion. In the resulting formation, which for so long seemed our inevitable terminus, religion was to operate in the interior of the believer's soul, within the walls of the family and the church or mosque, not in the public square and the state house. Religion, whose transcendence and absoluteness

used to bolster the rule of the state, to set states into conquest and war, to spark civil wars, and to establish the ethical habits conditioning the accumulation of productive wealth, was sequestered, made safe and platitudinous. We have come to equate secularity, the disengagement and differentiation of the public sphere from religion, with modernity.

Religious nationalism appears as the public return of religion. Durkheim argued that God is a symbolization of the social. He also argued, however, that symbolization of divinity or transcendental power was integral to the constitution of the social. If scholars have prodigiously exploited the first insight, they have largely ignored the second. We have pursued a sociology of religion, but shied away from Durkheim's more daunting intimation of a religious sociology. Derrida writes that religion "is prescribed, not chosen freely in an act of pure and abstractly autonomous will" (Derrida 1998:27). Rather than externalize religion from the social world, a social to which religion is typically understood as a response, Derrida makes it immanent in the social bond itself, in the miraculous qualities of the relationship between every self and every other, in the logic of the response, the action elemental to all social relations. Derrida locates religion not in religious institutions, but in institution itself, in the unengendered, unnamable, unproducible conditions that precede and are immanent in social being. Religion both marks and draws from the conditions that must exist for the community to exist. Determinate religions, then, are refractions of a universal structure of experience, of the mystical bases of collectivity, its authorities, its values, its knowledges. In the very logic of address, of linguistic interaction with another person, there is both a promise to respond and a promise to tell the truth.

> Presupposed at the origin of all address, coming from the other to whom it is also addressed, the wager (*gageure*) of a sworn promise, taking immediately God as its witness, cannot not but have already . . . engendered God quasi-mechanically. *A priori* ineluctable, a descent of God *ex machina* would stage a transcendental addressing machine. One would thus have begun by posing, retrospectively, the absolute right of anteriority, the absolute "birthright" (*le droit d'ainesse absolu*) of a One who is not born. (Derrida 1998:27)

The faith demanded in bearing witness always exceeds both the order of proof and the limits of knowledge. For Derrida, the logic of the address contains both sources of religion, the faith that must undergird the promise to respond, the promise to tell the truth, that presumes an absolute witness guaranteeing iterability and truth, and the sacred, or the unscathed, in which the singularity of both self and other, which presumes an abstract space of inscription, which he calls a desert in the desert, in which the finite, embodied self and other and the events of revelation take place. If the first operates as an uncertain, temporal event forever repeated in the performative conventions of institutions, the second operates as a singular impassible space upon which all territorialities—both bodily and national—are premised.

The religious figures the secret of sociality, of address, of authority. The state, like all forms of authority—indeed, of collectivity—depends upon a faith, on an unproducible and unnamable "other," an absolute, present-absent witness, that guarantees all address, testimony, all nomination. Derrida declares that there is an "abstract messianity" in the institution of the institution, of the founding of the law, "a 'performative' event that cannot belong to the set that it founds, inaugurates, or justifies. Such an event is unjustifiable within the logic of what it will have opened" (Derrida 1998:18). Faith, beyond reason and proof, thus undergirds the performativity of authority, the saying so that makes it so. Religious nationalism is a response to the failure of what was always already there.

That religion affords the cultural materials for a nationalist project is not surprising. Both state and religion are models of authority, imaginations of an ordering power, and understandings of how one should relate to forces upon which one depends, but over which one does not exercise control. Riesebrodt characterizes the distinctiveness of religious practice as those involving "superhuman or extraordinary personal or impersonal powers" that control human life and to which one can gain access (Riesebrodt forthcoming). The social composes such extraordinary powers, its gravities and eruptions no less overwhelming and magisterial than a spring rain or earthquake. Religion, like the state, affords a metaphysical basis of collective order, a basis irreducible to the natural world. Like the state, religion, too, is a totalizing order capable of regulating every aspect of life. (This is much more true of religions other than Christianity, which began as a stateless faith.) And like the state, religion tends to centralize in the master text and/or the singular or dominant god. Collective political claims are immanent in the divine, in a society's imagination of suprahuman powers and the practices that relate to them. It is no wonder that premodern states sought to harness religion's powers, to suppress and control heterodoxy, and that modern states have sought to severely circumscribe religion's temporal powers, to confine religion's ambit to the believer's soul.

Religious nationalism was integral to the formation of many modern nation-states. Many modern national identities and nationalist movements were suffused with religious narrative and myth, symbolism and ritual—Iran, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Israel, Palestine, England, the United States, Brazil, Serbia, and Croatia, to take just a few examples. Even the secularizing "Young Turks" legitimated their constitution in 1876 by reference to Islamic precedent that the Prophet was commanded by the Qur'an to consult with his followers, and that the first caliph, Abu Bakr, had been chosen by acclamation of the Muslim men who assembled after the Prophet's death (Humphreys 1999:165). Just as religion had been critical in the anticolonial struggle, it is now deployed against the secular elites ruling the nation.

Not surprisingly, religious nationalism has been more likely to emerge in nations with a civil religious tradition—in the United States, Iran, Turkey, India, Israel, Palestine, and Japan, to name just a few. In such societies, religion has been historically integral to the legitimization of the state and vice versa. Religious nationalism often appears against a backdrop of efforts to strip such states of their religious content, whether the Supreme Court's forbidding of school prayer in the United States and the unhinging of the state from Protestantism, the Shah's displacement of Islam as the mandate for rule in Iran, the displacement of religious by civil law, and the push toward equality before the law for members of all religious communities, or the concerted effort by the Congress party to dissociate job allocation from caste purity in India and to provide preferential allocations to non-Hindus.

If a history of nationalism sedimented with religion provides legitimate tracks for religious opposition to a regime, religious nationalism must also be understood in terms of the decomposition of alternative bases of collective organization, as a successor to modernity's dominant ideological binaries. Juergensmeyer, who has heralded the West's struggle against religious nationalism as the birth of a new cold war, argues there has been a loss of faith in secular nationalism (Juergensmeyer 1993). The very structure of discursive opposition has come undone. Modernity has its own eschatologies, posits its own faith in the laws of the universe and their historical unfolding. If, during the 20th century, the dominant powers grounded their authority in the narrative of progress, those outside who sought to reach the levers of state power tended to mobilize and motivate through socialist cosmology, a narrative of justice. Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the marketization of China, socialism was losing its material and moral—let alone utopian—capacity to compel. Religious nationalists reject the cosmologies of both capitalism and socialism.

GLOBALISM AND COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION

The territorial nation-state is, among other things, an instrument for collective voice, claiming to speak in the name of and in the interests of the people. Aligning name and interest is the nub of the problem. The capacity of the nation-state to represent the collectivity has been eroded by those who do not want to be named, affirming loyalties to particularistic communities of all sorts—whether racial, regional, linguistic, or ethnic—and by those who are disinterested because their interests can no longer find expression in the nation-state. Religious nationalism offers an alternative set of materials out of which to organize collective representation. Pakistan's decision, for example, to support radical Islam at a geopolitical level—including the Islamic networks in which bin Laden was inserted—was intimately related to its desire to prevent its own decomposition along ethnic lines (Bodansky 2001:24).

With the end of the Cold War, one might have expected a surge in class politics given that domestic redistributive politics would no longer be freighted with such awesome geopolitical significance. The opposite has occurred. The unregulated capitalist market is both more extensive and more legitimate than at any time in human history. Capital now turns on a dime, its flows increasingly impervious to frontiers. The new cosmopolitans are either very rich or very poor; everybody else remains uneasily in place, aware that the forces shaping their destiny are moving beyond the horizon.

As multinational corporations increasingly become like states, with welfare benefits and life-chances tied to employment within them, states become increasingly like firms, making competitive deals to trap investment and employment within their boundaries. There is a growing gap between the facility of capital and labor to respond to differences in wages and profits, a gap widened by electronic transfer, multinational organization, and complex contracting networks. The result is a growth in income inequalities within nations and an inability of states to do anything about them due to continuous downward pressure on the taxes governments can impose on capital and an inability to sustain a welfare state more advanced than one's trading partners or competitors (Fligstein 1998; Goesling 2001). The conditions for working-class voice have eroded (Alderson and Nielson 1999; Hicks 1999a, 1999b; Hicks and Zorn 1999; Huber and Stephens 2000; Krugman 1995). The republic does not care because it cannot.

If we understand working-class politics as a struggle not simply for resources but for recognition as well, where the money and authority granted by the state are also marks of membership within the collectivity, of face value, then it is no wonder that as the conditions for class organization decline, people without means seek out alternative meanings around which to organize for resources and respect (Fraser 1997). I do not mean to suggest that religious nationalism is a sublimate for class conflict. It is not. Rather, the closing off of conditions for politicized class conflict eliminates a medium, or grammar, for the organization of collective representation and hence the terms in which solidarity is to be fashioned. As the state weakens and the public sphere empties of sense, other sources of solidarity—in which membership does not depend on marketable value—grow: ethnicity, on the one hand, and religion, on the other.

Growing inequalities in life chances within nation-states are not just a problem of the political physics of pleasure and pain, of resentment by those who feel relatively disadvantaged or insecure within the income distribution. They are also what Weber called an ethical problem, in which the "distribution of fortunes among men" required meaning, justification, sense, an "ineradicable demand for a theodicy" (Weber 1958b:275). There is no doubt that the unkempt category of the middle class has been the sociological center of religious nationalism. For the middle class, caught between unspeakable poverty and unimag-

inable wealth, the theodicy problem must be particularly acute. It is not, however, theodicy that compels their participation. Through religious nationalism, the middle class seeks not to critique a distribution, but to displace the ethical value of the object distributed. Weber was acutely aware of the religious indeterminacy of what he called the "civic" strata: "artisans, traders, enterprisers engaged in cottage industry, and their derivatives existing only in the modern Occident" (Weber 1958b:284). Given their dependence on technological and economic calculation, they did, however, show a marked affinity for "practical rationalism" (Weber 1958:284). Religious nationalisms all involve an active, rationalized asceticism

This can perhaps be explained not by their position within an income distribution, but by the bases of their economic life and its affinity with religious nationalisms' interpretive practices. Technocrats, professionals, merchants, and artisans: the only thing these disparate groups within have in common is that they can read. Religious nationalism represents the return to text, to the fixity of signs, the re-narrativization of the nation in a cosmic context. It returns us to bodies and souls, a zone to be defended against things on the one side and beasts on the other. Religious nationalism is literally about the collective plumbing of a text for its timeless truths, as a basis for the narration of contemporary history. Islamic fundamentalists look to the Quranic history of the community founded by Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century as a template by which to gauge and goad the present order. Their Jewish counterparts locate their foundation and *telos* in the ancient Temple-centered kingdom that was the culmination of God's territorial promise to Abraham, Moses, and David, documented in the Torah. Christian fundamentalists read the prophetic books of the Bible as a road map by which they interpret contemporary social realities. Hindu nationalists derive their reading of the Indian state from the Hindi Ramayana, a narration of the foundational kingship of Ram, the avatar of Vishnu.

Religious nationalists read and perform these books together. This collective reading, whether literal or dramatic, is the core of their collective solidarity. The middle class is a class of the word. It owes its life, its earnings, to its ability to read books, from words and numbers that have a clear meaning and a certain use. That those who live off the book should seek to live by the book as a foundation for a new social trust is, as Bourdieu might say, part of the middle-class *habitus*, an unconscious disposition, an autonomic routine. In the Islamic world, the newly educated youth read and discuss a popular Islamic literature written in colloquial Arabic rather than the classical Arabic of the traditional scholarly Islamic elites. In the al-Qaeda, it is striking how many of their activists had memorized large sections of the Quran (Rohde and Chivers 2002). Protestant evangelicals and fundamentalists understand how God wants them to live by their reading of the Bible, not by what the church teaches them (Smith 1998). In India, the Ramayana and its vernacular version, the Ramcharitmanas, are both performed ritually in month-long festivals and dramatized on television (Rajagopal 2001). Latin American Catholicism moved into liberation theory, not only because of the message of social justice contained in Vatican Council II but also because of the post-WWII translation of the liturgy into local languages and the encouragement of lay Bible reading (Levine and Stoll 1997). In a pattern that replicates Protestantism's birth process, this collective interpretation of words by the people themselves feeds a diffuse associational network—a popular religious civil society—that is very difficult for the state or organized religious hierarchies to control (Rudolph 1997b).

Part of religious nationalism's appeal is the increasing inability of the nation-state to establish the conditions for collective solidarity, given its insertion in increasingly global markets and production systems. Religion provides an alternative basis of solidarity. Religious nationalism responds to the evisceration of the traditional bases of collective sub-

jectivity, of which the rise of transnational natural discourses—the rights of species, human and nonhuman—is symptomatic (Procacci 1999). Organizing to defend dolphins and trees on the one side and mere human life—literally, physical being—on the other has become easier and more legitimate than to defend collective subjects within national states. As against both capitalism and socialism, religious nationalism offers another way to formulate and organize collective representation, the signs and procedures through which a collectivity is and knows itself to be.

Religion is perhaps the only language in which ordinary people can reach the public sphere. This is not a small thing in those one-party and personalistic praetorian states that are ever more intrusive in people's daily lives. Religious institutions often constitute the closest thing to a civil society, an arena for sociality, collective organization and the provision of services outside state control. While religious nationalists offer no room in the public sphere for a godless discourse or for believers of other faiths, they can be relatively democratic when it comes to contests within the community over practical interpretation of revealed texts. The Egyptian *da'wa* movement to Islamicize the public sphere, for instance, has promoted intra-Islamic debate not only about appropriate interpretations of the Quran, but over the applicability of its teachings to modern life. These discussions, made possible by widespread reading of sermons among an increasingly literate society, as well as their diffusion through cassettes, occur not only in the mosques but in every domain of life, whether places of work, education, the home, or in the streets and public settings of all sorts (Hirschkind 2001).

In the face of limits and retrenchments of the welfare state, religious communities seek to fill the gap. When, for example, Cairo was hit by an earthquake in 1992, the Islamic network was more effective in bringing aid to affected areas than was the government (Humphreys 1999:41). Long before the formation of the Bharatiya Janata Party—the Hindu nationalist party—the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swyamsevak Sangh (RSS) had created an entire alternative civil society—the *Sangh parivar*—with its own schools, social-work centers, hospitals, hostels, banks, and work projects (Hansen 1999). The civil society out of which bin Laden has drawn his fighters is likewise composed of mosque-centered educational, medical, and social services (Bodansky 2001:52). Islamic, Jewish, and Hindu nationalists all built their movements by offering things as simple as cooking oil and well-water, places to sleep and learn, as community acts of care, not the governmental management of a social problem. One receives care as a doorway into membership in a community, not as an instance of a social problem.

At a time when civil society is being reconstituted in racial, ethnic, and linguistic communitarian pieces, religious nationalism has a comparative advantage. For when particularisms of all sorts threaten the nation's unity, when neither socialism nor capitalism can generate the legitimacy of government authority, religion offers a cross-class, cross-race, cross-region bonding unavailable elsewhere. Against particularistic essentialisms, religion offers a nonessentialist basis upon which to construct a collective identity and difference. Religious faith and moral practice are matters of choice, not birth.

Religious nationalisms have proliferated as national economies have become decreasingly national, when skeins of firms, contractors, subcontractors, divisions, and subdivisions cross the globe, when diaspora is displacing ethnicity, when residence and citizenship diverge, when macroeconomic policy becomes increasingly impotent, and when national accounts based on imports and exports no longer make sense. Even currencies, the representation of national value, are beyond the reach of the nation-state. Global commodity chains not only sever thing from place, but the images, sounds, tastes, forms, and words through which we express our distinctive lives and our location in the world, a location increasingly mediated through image and objects, not places and persons. In

the 19th century, the great capital cities bespoke the nation's distinctiveness; now each could be anywhere (Martinotti 1999). In our universal present, where global time has been urbanized and ever-larger swaths of collective experience are mediated through images and text rather than co-present voice, where memory diverges from history and both feed on commodified culture, the signifiers of nationality decreasingly mean anything particular at all.

The elite warriors around bin Laden, whose father's construction company did much to Westernize the Islamic landscape, sought to counter global capitalism as a carrier of a Western material culture, not as an economic system in itself. Defending the Islamic city against Western modernity set Mohammed Atta on his way. Atta, who, on September 11, 2001, orchestrated the planes' murderous trajectory into Wall Street, studied architectural engineering at Cairo University and then urban planning at the Hamburg Technical University. He hated the ways in which the architectural and urban modernism of the West was destroying the aesthetic and spatial logic of the Islamic city. In 1995, he left his planning job in Hamburg to make pilgrimage to Mecca and to travel to Cairo, to observe the restoration of two military gates, Bab al-Nasr (Figure 1) and Bab al-Futuh (Yardley with MacFarquhar and Zeilbauer 2001).



Figure 1. Bab al-Nasr. Reproduced with the kind permission of the Middle East Department, University of Chicago Library.

These military gates are charged with symbolic importance. Bab al-Nasr means "Gate of Victory," associated with one of the names for God, al-Nasir, the "all-victorious." Bab al-Futuh means the "Gate of Liberation."[4] "Al-futuh," which literally means an "opening" or a "bringing into light," refers to the "liberation" of non-Muslim lands and is particularly applied, for example, to the conquest of Crusader Jerusalem. These military gates signify Islam's conquering powers. Unusually made of stone, rather than brick, they were built between 1087 and 1092 by the Fatimid vizier of Acre, Badr al-Jamali, who had been charged by the Fatimid caliph with putting down a revolt by Turkish rebels. The two gates not only define an outer perimeter of the Islamic medieval city of Cairo but enclose Fatimid Cairo, a space identified with the territorial unity of the Islamic world in that the Fatimid caliphate claimed universal authority over all Muslims and—in political theory, at least—unified sovereign and religious authority in that office. They also stand for Islam's pan-ethnic reach, in that both the caliph who ordered them built and the vizier who built them were Armenians, not Arabs.

Atta was outraged by the way in which the Egyptians were restoring them. These gates, charged with Islamic significance, were being made into an Arab Disneyland for Western tourists, at the same time that the poor Islamic neighborhoods around them were being razed and the Muslim Brotherhood clinics and daycare centers were being suppressed. He was probably also disturbed that they were being restored in a brutal manner, with workers hacking away with picks and hammers at the gates' ancient stones, letting them—according to an Egyptian paper, *Al-Ahram*—drop to the ground and shatter, putting new white stones in their place (Hassan 2001). The Egyptian state was not husbanding its Islamic heritage.

It was after Atta returned from Cairo to Hamburg that he moved into an apartment with two other suspected hijackers. During the ensuing years, he both trained in the al-Qaeda camp and finished his thesis—with high honors—on the defense of the Islamic city from Western modernism. If you look at the Cairene gates whose restoration so upset Atta, they have an uncanny similarity to the target whose destruction he masterminded. When Atta flew the civilian jet into the north tower of the World Trade Center, it was an anti-architecture, destroying one twin tower to defend another.

The global commodity has, to a large degree, been an American totem. In his work, Andy Warhol made the visual argument that Coca-Cola, like Marilyn Monroe and the Statue of Liberty, was a reproducible totem that consumed Americans as we consumed it, an American sacred through which we experienced our consubstantiality, our equality. "You know that the President drinks Coke," he declared, "Liz Taylor drinks Coke, and just think, you can drink Coke, too. A Coke is a Coke, and no amount of money can get you a better Coke. All the Cokes are the same and all the Cokes are good" (Warhol 2002; see also Friedman 1992). As global cultural commodities become the new totemic measure of man, modernity's elemental measures of self-worth move out of reach for billions of people. And the media by which collectivities can construct difference untainted by deference, by lack, by their incompleteness, become ever more scarce. While some few can retreat to the borderlands and into hybridity, others search for ways to mark differences that can stand. Religion offers an autonomous cultural space—perhaps the only one—from which to bound the nation, to make it a powerful body in the community of nations. If God is a representation of collectivity, the politicization of religion—siting God at the center of public space—offers a way to represent, to prefigure, a collective power, a bounded subject, capable of acting in history, a history that begins outside itself. Religious nationalists seek a new ontology by which to bound the nation. The territorial boundary at risk is a figure

[4] I am indebted to Dwight Reynolds for these translations.

and foundation for all boundaries, constructing a physical boundary where we begin and they end, implicating the division between sacred and profane, good and evil, and—as we shall see—man and woman. Religious nationalism is not a return to the premodern, but an alternative modernity altogether.

THE EROTIC LOGIC OF RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM

A specific chain of four elements can be found in the symbolic order of all contemporary religious nationalisms. First, religious nationalism configures the territorial collectivity as a sacred space and a divinely invested subject. Religious nationalisms all focus on the penetration and permeability of the boundaries of that territorial space, whether by foreign investment, civil or foreign war, immigration, or a global commodified culture. The defense of the integrity of the territorial space, as in all nationalist projects, is the medium through which the coherence, identity, and power of the collective subject is known and narrated. In every case of religious nationalism, there is an acute sense that that boundedness is at risk. Second, religious nationalists direct the bulk of their attention to the bodies of women—covering, separating, and regulating their erotic flesh. Third, religious nationalists accord considerable symbolic importance to money, to foreign money, to money out of control. And fourth, religious nationalists submit lovingly to God.

Is there a principle of intelligibility that joins these four? Religious nationalisms invest the human body, its erotic and generative qualities, with enormous import. In the remainder of this essay, I will argue that remaking the collective territorial body and the individual human body are not only parallel discursive orders, but linked ones. The parallel can be not only located in the semiotic order of their discourse, but also derived from psychoanalytic theory. That derivation helps us explain both its symbolic architecture—the energies that animate its construction—and the primary object of its politics.

Human bodies are made in families. Unlike liberal nationalism, religious nationalists give primacy to the family—not to democracy or the market—as the social space through which society should be conceived and composed. They reassert the divisions of gender, particularly in school, the army, and the courts. They celebrate and seek to bolster legally the powers of the patriarch (Bendroth 1996; DeBerg 1990; Riesebrodt 1993; Roy 1994). Religious nationalists want to defend the patriarchal family against the incursions of the market, whose sex-mixing labor markets and eroticizing commodity markets are both understood to erode the gendered solidarities of the family and to reduce the family's capacity to discipline and contain sexuality.[5] Reversing or limiting state efforts to extend civil equality to women is part of every religious nationalist movement.

Reverend Jerry Falwell, leader of the Moral Majority in the United States, talked about the necessity of Christians to fight the enemy face to face, one on one, so as to "bring them under the submission to the gospel of Christ, move them into the household of God, put up the flag and call it secured" (Capps 1990:31, 34). For Protestant nationalists like Falwell, the family is God's first institution on earth, the one from which all others derive. Through Christ, one joins the family of God. The polemic that today constitutes American funda-

[5] In his finely crafted comparative analysis of fundamentalism in early-20th-century United States and late-20th-century Iran, Riesebrodt points to the defense of a "traditionalist milieu" as the primary catalyst for fundamentalist political mobilization, for the transformation of largely pious premillenarians into politically mobilized believers seeking to force the pace of redemption in historical time. Personalized "patriarchal structural principles," he argues, stand at the core of this culture (Riesebrodt 1993:196–97, 57–58, 95). I think that Riesebrodt, whose work has shaped my own, is correct about the primacy of this structural principle, but wrong about its class-specificity. Contemporary religious nationalist movements often draw as much on the new middle class as on the old. Riesebrodt's own data on fundamentalist church attendance show that the working class (clerical, skilled, and unskilled workers) made up a majority of the membership (1993:79–81).

mentalist discourse is organized almost completely around familial issues: divorce, birth control, abortion, feminism, homosexuality, and sex education. In the United States, the Supreme Court's 1973 legalization of abortion, the gay and lesbian movement, and the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution were essential goads to Christian fundamentalist political mobilization. With the rise of middle-class divorce after World War II, the defense of the family became the central issue for the Christian right and the primal medium through which they sought to reconstruct the social order (Bendroth 1996, 1999).

Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front, which won national elections in 1991 but was prevented from taking power, has made the elimination of female employment part of its program. Since it was banned, fundamentalists have murdered hundreds of Algerian women for wearing Western clothes, for not wearing a headscarf, for working side by side with men. The Islamic Salvation Front promises to impose the death penalty on those who engage in sexual relations outside of marriage (Afary 1997).

In Iran, the very first national religious mobilization of the Islamic forces took place in 1961 after Khomeini spoke at Qum on Ashura, the day of atonement, attacking the Shah for having transformed the legal status of women, allowing women into the army, the police, and the judiciary, giving them the vote, and overriding Islamic law such that divorce required mutual consent (Lawrence 1998:112–15; Riesebrodt 1993:196–97). Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution forbade co-education, closed down the childcare centers, and made the veil obligatory first in government offices and then in every public place. Women not properly covered were subject to a punishment of 74 lashes. Women of any age had to obtain the permission of their fathers when they married for the first time (Nafisi 1999). Adultery was punishable by stoning to death.

The Egyptian case suggests it was not so much the failures of secular nationalism that led to Islamic entry into the public sphere as it was the modern nationalists' commitments, incomplete as they were, to gender equality (Lawrence 1998). In 1952, Gamal Nasser, who had just come to power as a result of a coup by the Free Officers, vowed to mobilize women as full participants in the project to modernize the country. This decision led the Islamists to break with him, eventuating in their repression. In 1954, Nasser supplanted the *shari'a* courts with a unitary secular state court, thereby expanding women's legal recourse, the immediate response to which was the first assassination attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood. Sadat's commitment to improving the legal, economic, and political status of women likewise galvanized massive Islamic opposition and led to his assassination.

The political programs of Islamic movements exhibit no consistent economic policy or form of government. The two pillars of contemporary Islamic politics involve, on the one side, a restrictive regulation of sexuality, eliminating it as a public presence and containing it within the family, and on the other side, the promotion of a welfare state that enables families to survive physically. Such a state is committed to care for those—orphans and widows in particular, as enjoined in the Quran—who cannot rely on families for support (Humphreys 1999). Although it might not be the kind secular Westerners find compelling, Islamic politics are a politics of love.

Hindu nationalism likewise makes the family the essential element of the nation, an organic element of a divine body. The family metaphor organizes not only its own political network, but also its ideal economic form, "occupational families" (Basu et al. 1993:44, 78). Family considerations, Hindu nationalists are instructed, should govern career choice and organizational involvement. Regarding the position of women, however, the Hindu nationalist case at first glance seems at variance with the pattern. The BJP has not opposed abortion or birth control, nor has it taken particularly conservative positions on adultery or widow remarriage (Basu 1999; Hansen 1999:98). The BJP has also been a strong advocate

of a universal civil code regarding family matters, a code giving women more rights than the corresponding religious laws.

However, a closer look indicates that Hindu nationalism is likewise committed to the defense of the patriarchal family. The Hindu nationalists' defense of a uniform civil code was animated by its desire to erode the communal rights of the Islamic community, not by its desire to protect the rights of women per se. At the same time that it fought against the legal force of Islamic family law, the BJP has ferociously defended the practice of *sati*, in which widows are burned alive on the funeral pyres of their husbands. It has also attacked feminism as a pernicious, Westernizing force that undermines the family and has sought to censor films and advertisements that display women's bodies. For Hindu nationalists, the marriage of Ram, the foundational sovereign god, to Sita, a goddess who selflessly serves him, provides the normative template.

The BJP depends for the core of its activists and electoral support on the RSS, a religious nationalist organization that has created the alternative civil society *Sangh parivar*. This community espouses an especially patriarchal worldview. Amrita Basu reports on the books espousing the proper role for Hindu women based on Hindu scripture, one of subordination to men. What should a woman do if her husband beats her? "The wife should think that she is paying her debt to her previous life," replies a religious authority, "and thus her sins are being destroyed and she is becoming pure" (Basu 1999:114; see also Hancock 1995). Although the BJP's women's organization has brought women into the streets as part of the Hindu nationalist campaign, the women have played subordinate, traditional roles—albeit in a public space. Although the women's organization of the BJP is independent, it has not campaigned against the physical violence to which Indian women are routinely exposed, such as dowry deaths, in which husbands and their families murder wives on the grounds that the dowry was insufficient, enabling the husbands to remarry and collect yet another dowry. Indeed, for the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a religious organization designed to unify all Hindu sects established in 1964 at the behest of the RSS, the traditional gender hierarchy is as important a tenet as the caste hierarchy (Basu et al. 1993:64–66.).

Some analysts argue that religious regimes such as those of Iran or Pakistan, because they have failed to reduce unemployment or redistribute wealth, center their attention on familial relations as though family politics were a substitute for, or sideshow from, the real business of state (Moghadam 1993). It is also tempting to interpret religious nationalism as sexist reaction, animated by male interests in masculine privilege. In accounting for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa, Mernissi (1987) has pointed to the rapid increase of educated and employed women who not only compete with men for limited employment opportunities but are able to choose when they will marry and to exert more influence within their families on account of the monies they bring home. Fundamentalism is then understood as a way for men to win back money and power, for potential rulers to reduce unemployment (Lawrence 1998:39, 84, 110; Mernissi 1987).

Male reaction alone, however, cannot explain religious nationalism's commitment to the patriarchal family. The evidence indicates that women, too, find fundamentalism compelling. In Iran, women were major public supporters of Khomeini in his struggle against the Shah, and after the revolution, delivered their support in the national referendum that secured clerical power over the technocrats managing the transition (Wright 2000: 151–52). Khomeini himself, who never disenfranchised them after taking power, actually praised their primary role. Indeed, the evidence so far indicates that despite a post-Khomeini wave of mobilization by women, not only at the polls but also for elected office, these women are pushing for social, civil, and political equalities within the framework of an Islamic republic. Not patriarchal power, but a moralized family order appears still to

organize their claims. It is the primacy of the family that has allowed them to promote birth control and more flexible working hours for mothers and wives.

In the United States, the followers of both evangelicalism and fundamentalism, the majority of whom are religious nationalists, draw disproportionately from women, not from men. In Islamic contexts, the remasking of the female body is not just imposed by men, it is chosen by many women. In Turkey, for example, women actively participated in the struggle against the government, which had prohibited female students from wearing the Islamic headscarf (Toprak 1994).

Women are attracted by the primacy that religious nationalists give to the family, its affirmation of male familial obligations as a religious duty, to the language of love. Although it is resolutely patriarchal, the religious nationalist community offers women a mechanism of social control of men, something that becomes increasingly important as the eyes, the invitations, and the opprobrium that circulate in extended families and long-lived neighborhoods attenuate with geographic migration, the rising incidence of divorce, and the investment of social energy in friendship networks having nothing to do with kinship. Women turn to fundamentalism in hopes of finding men who will be good fathers and good husbands, men who will provide for their families, remain with their wives, and contain their sexuality within the family (Abu-Lughod 1998; Enloe 1989; Ong 1990). Religious nationalists do not necessarily seek a return to the premodern familial structure, with its extended networks of kin loyalties. In the case of Egyptian Islamicists, it is the idealization of a nuclear family grounded in love—an imported Western middle-class notion—which attracts so many Egyptian women to the movement (Abu-Lughod 1998). In the United States, while fundamentalist Christianity typically endorses wifely submission to her husband, it also sacralizes women's role as mothers who have the time to care for and the will to discipline their children, as well as the passion to keep their husbands. As Kintz discovered in her sojourn among America's fundamentalist women, the chance to occupy the sacred status of motherhood was, for many, a refuge from the uncertainty and constant threat of worthlessness they faced in the market (Kintz 1997). While men from the Christian right dominate the leadership of the antiabortion movement in the United States, women have provided the bulk of its popular support. These women look to the movement as an integral part of their affirmation of a sexuality domesticated by monogamous marriage and gendered family roles (Luker 1985).

For religious nationalists, the patriarchal family bound by faith in God is both the normative family and the foundation of the national state. Patriarchal authority is understood to derive from the divinity upon which it is modeled. However, the faith-based family—not patriarchal power in itself—is the organizing principle of its discourses and practices. The reproduction of the family order is both an emblem and source of faith. And those two together—family and faith—are the constituents from which the social order is to be fashioned.

Making masculine power the explanation of religious nationalism gives primacy to an attribute of persons, rather than the practices around which its discourse is organized or the institutional sites in which it originates. Masculine interest does not allow us to distinguish religious nationalism from other social movements that are equally masculinist. To argue that religious nationalism is just masculine reaction or a cover for failed political economics is to miss religious nationalism's distinct ontology of state power, both its derivation of authority from divine sources and its constitution of society as a faith-based familial order. Familial discourse, with its particularistic logic of love and loyalty, is pervasive in religious nationalism. The elemental agents of religious nationalism are gendered and fleshy men and women, not the abstract individuals ordered through market exchange or disciplined by state force. It appropriates the space of family, governed by relations of consub-

stantiality and caring, not the external, instrumental space of geopolitics, the public sphere, or the market. Religious nationalism is about home.

Religious nationalism thus has an explicit eros. It is centered on the family's gendered structure of authority, on its erotic energies, its life-giving powers. Aligning human and divine creation and disciplining erotic desire within the confines of the family are central stakes. Hostility to abortion and homosexuality are almost always joined in the discourse of religious nationalism. Religion centers on the order of creation, locating humanness in the cosmos, replicating cosmology through ritual, a practical metaphysics that necessarily points before life and after death.

It is striking that two days after Islamic radicals attacked the United States, Falwell claimed on Pat Robertson's "700 Club" television show that those who had stripped God from the public sphere were responsible for God's lifting America's divine "curtain of protection," permitting the terror to take place. Falwell attributed particular culpability to those with aberrant reproductive and sexual practices. "The abortionists have got to bear some burden for this because God will not be mocked. And when we destroy 40 million little innocent babies, we make God mad. I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle . . . all of them—I point the finger in their face and say, 'You helped this happen' " (Harris 2001).

Mohammed Atta, Falwell's enemy, was equally concerned with sexuality, right to the end. In Atta's last testament, he asked that the man responsible for washing his body in preparation for his funeral wear gloves so that he would not touch his genitals (Shenon and Johnston 2001). He asked that no women be allowed to attend his funeral. And Atta's father, who had been concerned that his son might not reach the same level of professional achievement as his sisters, not only initially denied his son's culpability in the attack but both blamed Israel and pointed to America's toleration of abortion and homosexuality as explanations for the attack. What, after all, did America expect?

The family is the site of God's creation, the miraculous making of life. For religious nationalists, it is not the natural individual who is sacred, but human life understood as divine creation. It is the primacy of that divinity that is at stake for religious nationalists, a primacy to be secured in the making of life. Because the family is an order of creation, not merely an order of production or governance, religions all seek to stitch its transitions, its relations, into religious rite and discourse through which their transrational order is given concrete form. American fundamentalist hostility to the exclusive teaching of evolution and its embrace of the heteronormative, monogamous family are of a piece. Modern religion has ceded its territories, its soldiers, its courts and sovereign powers; but everywhere it has held fiercely to birth and burial, marriage and divorce. Religious nationalism, unlike the capitalist market or the democratic state, has the moral organization of sexuality within the family at its center. The gendered order of reproduction is understood to be a divine machine language, God's privileged code.

Religious nationalism politicizes eros because eros has always been political. The sensuous sources of compact, freedom's derivation from desire, the pleasures of domination—these have been deemed unobservable and hence untouchable within contemporary social theory. It is only through sexuality that one can make sense of religious nationalism. It is time that we begin to read power through sex and not, as in the Foucauldian program, sex through power.

At the same time that they seek to reinstall the patriarchal family, religious nationalists seek to masculinize the state and to strip the public sphere of heteroerotic energies. It is women's public body that is most explosive for religious nationalists. Pointing to the commonalities between Iranian and American fundamentalism, Riesebrodt writes that

> Fundamentalism is particularly occupied with the public display of the female body. In both the United States and Iran its themes are the immoral dress of women in public, the creation of a uniform type of decent women's clothing (veiling, national costume), the stimulation of male sexuality by women (dress, films, theatre, swimming pools), and unsupervised contact between the sexes and opportunities for meeting (dance halls, swimming pools, coeducation). (Riesebrodt 1993:179)

Religious nationalists are preoccupied with a return to public modesty, with cleaning the public space—both the city's and the televisual square—of naked bodies, particularly those of women. Maintaining the conjugal powers of men, covering female flesh, organizing sexuality within the family, and limiting the visible presence of women's bodies in the public sphere are critical elements of religious nationalisms.

DIVINE BODIES AND FOREIGN MONEY

Religious nationalists seek to masculinize the public sphere, to contain the erotic energies of heterosexuality within the family. Seeking to masculizine collective representation, to make the state male, a virile collective subject, the public status of women's bodies is a critical site and source for religious nationalist political mobilization. For religious nationalists, money out of national control is also an object of preoccupation. While religious nationalists do not have a consistent economic policy, sometimes abrogating private property rights and other times defending them, the Iranian Shi'ite movement, the American Protestant right, and the Hindu nationalists have all been concerned with who controls the nation's money. What exercises religious nationalists is money out of control, in the hands of those who do not represent the nation, whose first commitments are not to its welfare, and above all money in alien or foreign hands. The penetration of foreign monies—those moving with the authority of alien states—is understood to disfigure the nation's inner landscape, an improper penetration.

Islamicists, just like Marxists, understand the intrusive materiality of Western capitalism as a cultural medium, a meaningful thing, not use betrayed by exchange but the sacred profaned. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, through whose political and theological heirs bin Laden was recruited to radical Islam. Al-Banna, a young Egyptian teacher, despaired over the way young Egyptians spurned their parents' decency, scurrying after the material gadgets and the new wealth accompanying the British protectorate after World War I. He did not want to remake Egypt in the Western image. Western colonialism, he taught, was a structure of power whose objective was not simply the extraction of wealth but the "destruction of Islam." Atheism was both the means and the end of European domination. "The Europeans worked assiduously," he wrote,

> to enable the tide of this materialistic life, with its corrupting traits and its murderous germs, to overwhelm all the Islamic lands toward which their hands were outstretched. . . . They imported their half-naked women . . . together with their liquors, their theatres, their dance halls, their amusements, their stories, their newspapers, their novels, their whims, their silly games, and their vices. (Mitchell 1969:5)

The Iranian case exhibited the same orientation. Through the "White Revolution," the Shah had both integrated Iran into the multinational capitalist order and progressively stripped the monarchy of its Islamic foundation by grounding his regime in the pre-Islamic Zoroastrian past, replacing the Islamic calendar with the Achaemenidian, unveiling women,

introducing women's suffrage, and generally abrogating Islamic family law (Riesebrodt 1993:116–17). The Islamic nationalists understood Iran's insertion in the American-dominated capitalist order not just as economic exploitation, but also as a threat to Islam, an orientation that is diffused within the networks of radical Islam. The power of foreign money was understood to carry the influence of the infidel.

Khomeini linked three targets: American capitalist penetration, the corruption of the state, and the recent granting of full suffrage to women. In response to the decision of the national assembly, or *majlis*, to grant American personnel diplomatic immunity, he declared:

> Large capitalists from America are pouring into Iran to enslave our people in the name of the largest foreign investment. . . . The regime is bent on destroying Islam and its sacred laws. Only Islam and the Ulama can prevent the onslaught of colonialism. (Foran 1993:368)

Khomeini linked the Shah's secularizing moves with both American capitalist investment and the international Jew, Iran then being allied with the state of Israel (Bakhash 1984:28; Riesebrodt 1993:28–29, 130, 140). Iranian economic independence of foreign money and the Islamicization of Iran were understood as a logical and a historical contradiction. In 1963, in response to the Reza Shah's physical attack on the Faizieyh *madrash*, or Islamic seminary, of Qom for their resistance to granting women the vote and the effort to de-Islamicize political representation, Khomeini spoke at the Great Mosque:

> We come to the conclusion that this regime also has a more basic aim: they are fundamentally opposed to Islam itself and to the existence of the religious class. They do not wish this institution to exist; they do not wish any of us to exist, the great and the small alike. Israel does not wish the Koran to exist in this country. . . . It was Israel that assaulted the Faiziyeh *madrash* by means of its sinister agents. It is still assaulting you, the nation; it wishes to seize your economy . . . to appropriate your wealth. (Mottahedeh 1985:190)

Khomeini—who had written extensively on Islamic jurisprudence dealing with commercial law, including a two-volume work on "forbidden sources of income"—understood foreign capital's threat to Islam in bodily terms (Mottahedeh 1985:243). Not only was foreign penetration and de-Islamicization being played out on women's bodies, but Westernization was accomplishing the ruination of Iran's chaste women. The Islamic body in general was being profaned. In his speeches, Khomeini delineated the impure, which includes items that come out of the body (urine, excrement, sperm, bones, blood), as well as items that can go into the body (wine, beer, pigs, non-Moslem men and women). It is striking that in his most popular tract, this Iranian revolutionary who was seeking to cleanse the territory of Iran of the infidel made a point of declaring that "Every part of the body of a non-Muslim individual is impure, even the hair on his hand and his body hair, his nails, and all the secretions of his body" (Khomeini 1980:51). Unbelief renders a body impure, contact with which impurity requires ablution. "Any man or woman who denies the existence of God, or believes in his partners"—referring here to the Christian trinity—is impure, like urine or shit. The Islamic revolution intended to reverse the process of *Gharbzadigi*, or Westoxification. After the revolution, the new Islamic republic nationalized both the banks and almost all foreign trade. Foreign investment was forbidden until Rafsanjani's presidential terms in the 1990s. To the Islamicists, Western capitalism is a body politics, operating through and on bodies—an economy of sensuous excess, to be countered by bounding a moral territory.

Hindu nationalism likewise reacted against the liberalization of trade and investment, which have flooded India with foreign consumer goods and opened its markets to foreign capital. While the Ayodhya campaign was first broached by the VHP in 1984, it is striking that the confrontation processions began in 1990, coinciding with the acknowledged failure of Nehru's state socialism, and that Hindu nationalists actually destroyed the Babri Masjid mosque at Ayodhya in 1992 against the backdrop of the Indian state's unprecedented decision in 1991 to open the country to foreign investment (Mishra 1998:62). Hindu nationalists likewise understand foreign capital and commodity as bodily profanations. In 1991, for example, the RSS published a pamphlet listing 326 consumer products that Hindus should boycott: "Every morning we begin the job of cleansing our body with the help of products manufactured by these filthy companies which have a history of exploiting poor countries of the world" (Hansen 1999:171, 198–99). After the destruction of the mosque in Ayodhya, the RSS launched a campaign against the new General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade agreement intended to stimulate international trade in India. The fact that the Hindu nationalists targeted consumer and not investment goods has symbolic significance: consumer goods touch and enter the individual Indian body. Hindu nationalists politicized foreign investment and foreign aid while leaving the existent political economy largely intact (Lal 1993).

Religious nationalists seek to counter global capitalism as a carrier of an alien, profaning culture, not as an economic system in itself. This joining of God and nation-state against global capitalism is not a space to be occupied just by those states that must adapt to Western economic and military might. Tens of millions of citizens seek to push the American republic there as well. Here, too, the yoking of the state apparatus to God is understood to offer a way to protect the nation's powers from the invisible hands of supranational finance capital. Even fundamentalist Protestantism follows the money.

Transnational money is a medium of evil in these Christian politics. Robertson argues that a cabal of global financiers, their salaried agents, and the newspapers and foundations over which they wield great influence are systematically eroding the sovereignty of the nation-state, notably that of the United States. In their vision, it is not money per se that is noxious but money beyond control of the nation-state. In his 1991 bestseller, *The New World Order*, Robertson contends that the financiers of the West—families like the Rockefellers and the Morgans, the Rothschilds, Kuhns, and Loebs, the Lazard Freres—have plotted, first, the bankers' takeover of the creation of American money, and second, the construction of global institutions of governance, both the United Nations and transnational financial and monetary regimes such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Robertson 1991).

Politicized Christian evangelicals like Robertson make the national transubstantiation of word into value—the nation's creation of money—a critical entry point through which and a reason for which militant Christians must re-enter the public sphere. Modern money is created by fiat, "out of nothing" as Robertson remarks, its value carried by the people's word, its sovereign authority. Robertson argues that both the word, through the financiers' manipulation of elections, and the medium of value, through their creation of a private central bank, the Federal Reserve Board, have eroded that natural, national couplet, word and value. "Any nation," Robertson writes, "that gives control of its money creation and regulation to any authority outside itself has effectively turned over control of its own future to that body" (Robertson 1991:118).

The globalist agenda—ostensibly motivated by concerns to limit the possibilities of nuclear war, to protect the world's ecology and human rights—pushes inexorably, Robertson believes, toward the erosion of patriotism. He plumbs the interlocking layers of interest behind this ostensibly peaceful, munificent globalism. Financial capital's interest in

global hegemony is the apparently hard substrata of technocratic ideology, the notion that only knowledgeable elites can manage our complex biosphere and global economy. But within that alloy is something more sinister: the superceding of Judeo-Christian cosmology by a spiritualism that lodges the sacred in the nature we hold in common, a belief system that both renders us divine and erodes our particular moral and ontological distinctiveness vis-à-vis nonhuman species. And behind that is a drive to reverse the order of things, to make evil good and good evil. "The real danger is that a revived one-world system, springing forth from the murky past of mankind's evil beginnings, will set spiritual forces into motion which no human being will be strong enough to contain" (Robertson 1991:253). Robertson thus makes currency unhinged from the sovereign nation-state, and particularly those of the Judeo-Christian world, a figure through which and a force by which he imagines that the systematic deconstruction of the West's moral code, anchored in the Ten Commandments, is being accomplished.

COIN AND COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION

Religious nationalism is a strategy for bounding the collectivity, restoring the nation as a collective agency moving with purpose and power on the world stage. It is not a response to poverty, to an absence or even an uncertainty of money. In religious nationalism, money figures as symbol of collective power, a flow that must be captured and controlled, put in proper hands. Religious nationalists invest money's boundary crossings, its movement into and out of the nation-state, with great symbolic importance.

That religious nationalists invest the coin with such collective symbolic importance derives from money's generic and transhistorical qualities. To understand this, one must grasp money not as sign, but as symbol. Zelizer has shown the ways in which social relations impress their meanings on the movements of money, that, in fact, money can enter a host of nonmarket social relations without eroding their functioning or evacuating their sense (Zelizer 2001). Money's meaning varies with the kind of social relationship in which it moves, relations whose meaning shapes the ways in which compensation is organized independently of the objects/services compensated—tips, gifts, salaries, allowances, rights (Zelizer 1994, 2000). However, for Zelizer, money's meaning comes from the outside, from the social relations in which it circulates. The money itself does not mark social relationships. Money is a social fact, not a cultural one. Zelizer treats money as a sign, a neutral medium, without a semiotic charge, with no inherent relation to its predominant circuit, the commodified cash nexus.

Money can also be deployed as a symbol, not just of capitalist exchange, but of the national state and the collectivity in whose name it speaks. Money is not just a sign commanding the distribution of people and things; it is a symbol of the collectivity in which they circulate. This is not only because of money's increasing primacy as modernity's medium for establishing social relationships. Money's capacity to value hinges on the authority of the nation-state from which it issues. That relation is integral, not arbitrary. Money is a totem that participates in the substance of the collectivity through which it courses, a collectivity whose members array themselves in relation to that symbol. It is a nation's material language, a sacred media whose use must betoken, must invoke that collective subject in whom its users must practically believe. They cannot choose not to believe. That the medium of collective life might itself become a symbol of that collectivity should not surprise us. Controlling a nation's money is an essential project for religious nationalists, not as political economy, but as collective representation.

Bin Laden demonstrated this logic both in the positive and in the negative. He drew funds from a transnational network of Islamic charities, mosques, *hawala* or trust-based

remittance networks, Islamic banks, corporations and subsidiaries, and pilgrimage and covert state funding, circuits that both defined the Islamic community and largely defied regulation and even detection in their complexity (Eichenwald 2001; Bodansky 2001). Those monetary flows literally constitute an Islamic materiality from which bin Laden was able to live. (They have also derived profaning profits from a drug trade aimed at the United States and Europe.) On the other side, the airplanes his men hijacked hit America's sacred centers: the capitol of the nation-state, Washington, DC, and the capitol of its capital, New York City. For the forces bin Laden represents, the two are joined, the power of one backing that of the other. Bin Laden deployed the forces of one transnationalism against another, the power of Allah against American money and military power. The World Trade towers, which housed securities and government bond traders, are both sites and symbols of the global power of American money. "We—with God's help—call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded," his *fatwa* declared, "to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it" (World Islamic Front 1998).

Money's status as the collective representation of an infidel also informed the subsequent action of the Pakistani-based Army of Muhammad, affiliated with al-Qaeda, which chose a Jewish reporter from the *Wall Street Journal*, Daniel Pearl, to abduct and ritually behead. "Sell your dollars, because America will be finished soon!" yelled Ahmed Omar Sheik, one of the alleged accomplices, at his arraignment. Sheik had himself studied at the London School of Economics (Bonner 2002).

Bin Laden's warriors did not, like pirates, steal American money; they sought to render it lifeless, to stop its circulation, to vaporize it. America, bin Laden declared, had been "struck by God in one of its vital organs," its seed rendered lifeless (Burns 2001:B7). Both Americans and their money are perceived to profane the Islamic community, the *umma*, the vast territorial swath transformed by the word of Allah and the swords of his warriors in the seventh century. In 1991, for example, Hassan Abdallah al Turabi, a Sudanese Islamic modernist lawyer and intellectual luminary in political Islam, declared to the Islamic Arab Peoples' Conference—one of the networks of which bin Laden was part—that it was necessary "to work out a global action plan in order to challenge and defy the tyrannical West, because Allah can no longer remain in our world, in the face of the absolute materialistic power" (Bodansky 2001:36). It is God versus the brute matter of atheists and infidels.

That God is being fused to the territorial state might have something to do with the fact that money has become a global medium and store of social valuation over which the national state has increasingly lost control due to the multinationalization of finance and the deregulation of financial markets (Baker 1987). That nation-states seem weak and uncertain, that distinctive national cultures appear at risk, that the parameters for collective action appear severely limited, and that people's destinies seem beyond their control or even comprehension are condensed through the fearful symbolism of money has sociological foundation.

Instead of monies backed by the authority of states and tied to material goods, new proliferating global monies are now the preserve of the accounting conventions of international organizations and multinational banks. While trade, direct investment, and equity markets remain highly regionalized, a global market for currency and for government bonds has definitely emerged (Wade 1996). Currency traders now not only discipline those governments whose monetary policies are judged inflationary but can, in themselves, erode the value of currencies where the underlying economy is fundamentally sound (Fligstein 1998). Although national states may play a role in the process by which their currency's value is vaporized, the power of transnational money markets appears increasingly beyond the control of those national states, particularly the smaller ones.

There is less and less any locus of governmental authority that can regulate either the production or the circulation of monetary flows. At a moment when the dominant collective representation can neither be contained nor controlled by the territorial powers of the nation-state, is it surprising that God, that other totemic principle, might have such mass appeal? With the apparent collapse of the proletariat as a collective subject and the still halting gait of the *demos*, what else can match money's powers, its territorial and temporal reach?

Money is a modern god. Numinous money, traversing outside and in, grasped only in instants, has religious properties. In his unfinished text on money, *The Wealth of Nations*, Joseph Schumpeter wrote that a nation's money "reflects all that a people wants, makes, submits, is" (Schumpeter 1970:2). As representative money—as opposed to its commodity form—and thus unhinged from any "thing," the value of money rests openly on faith, on belief in belief. Money, like a transcendent God, has become an invisible numeric network of promises, pure abstraction. Money has become a force of social nature whose powers are unmasterable, whose identity is nonnational, the global economy seemingly beyond accounting or specification. The changeable flow of these bits, their erosions and secretions, bring down cities and erect states, move armies across the globe. To the ordinary mortal, these movements are unfathomable, yet they determine the conditions under which he or she will connect into its nervous network. God, an ineffable force, is now once again made a co-author of human history, an inhabitant of particular territories by contract, election, or grace, a counterfaith to the money illusion.

As money becomes the increasingly expansive, universal equivalent, capable of conversion into all things—things that are never identical to the money into which they are converted—the dominant populist counterdiscourse is that of God. God is also a representation of value, of a final purpose, a "notion," in which, Georg Simmel notes in *The Philosophy of Money*, "all diversities and contradiction in the world achieve a unity" (Simmel 1990:236).

> In so far as money becomes the absolutely commensurate expression and equivalent of all values, it rises to abstract heights way above the whole broad diversity of objects; it becomes the center in which the most opposed, the most estranged, and the most distant things find their common denominator and come into contact with one another. Thus, money actually provides an elevated position above the particular, a confidence in its omnipotence, just as we have a confidence in the omnipotence of a highest principle to grant us the particular and the base at any moment and to be able to transform itself into them. (Simmel 1990:236–37)

God is a universal currency, being in all things, but not identical to any of them, the transcendental signified.

When the Portuguese and Dutch traders first made contact with the Africans, they were astounded by the Africans' apparent inability to evaluate material trade goods, their tendency to undervalue them relative to the objects they considered sacred—a bit of cloth, an animal's limb, a bird's feather. The traders presumed this inability was integrally related to what the Europeans understood to be their absence of religion (Pietz 1985–1988; Chidester 1996).

God and money are both measures of the value of time, metrics for accounting, wherein sin, like waste, is expenditure without calculation with respect to these values. Both defeat death. Money is modernity's afterlife. Both equip time with a *telos*, an end, energizing a desire for identification with the transcendental power for which they stand, setting in

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motion the primitive logic of accumulation, to have more of what they signify, knowing that identification will always fail. Money and God both mark an absent presence, the really made-up center of our social universe. Capitalism is a materialist mysticism.

Religious nationalists convert a materialistic discourse of exploitation to one of profanation. The differences between God and money as symbolic orders are what make that possible. If capital is nervous and fickle, an uncertain guest, God is constant, always available, accessible. The teller never closes; the currency does not devalue. God provides the immutability that nations have sought in nature, including their nature as the institutional body of a collectivity defined by race. If money relativizes, God absolutizes, offering a foundation for a zone untouched by relative price. Religious nationalist tendencies towards terror express—indeed, mark—that pricelessness, value's absoluteness. If money is an abstract value, a common metric devoid of substantive rationality, God is known through the distinctive substantive values He represents. While religions express degrees of holiness in terms of relative values of materials or base metals—marble, brass, silver, and gold—the grammar of sacrality often demands an irreversible hierarchy of exchange. One can convert lower values into higher values, but not the reverse. If money is necessarily a medium of invidious individuality, among the faithful God is potentially a medium of equality and solidarity, a unifying representation (Mongardini 1994). If money is an object that appears to dominate the subjects who pursue it so diligently, God is a subject who guarantees the subjectivity of the men and women who submit to Him.

PLEASURE'S SIGN

What, then, joins the religious nationalists' obsessive efforts to control the erotic bodies of women and money's symbolic importance? How does money function in this body politics?

Money is itself part of an eroticized order. The association between money and bodily pleasure is ancient. In *Phaidon*, Plato wrote that "He who loves the body craves either money or recognition or both" (Weiss 1998). Aristotle likewise ascribed the source of moneymaking as an end in itself to the desire for "enjoyable excess" in terms of the "pleasures of the body" (Aristotle 1962:44–45). Marx, too, pointed to the importance of excessive pleasure, of the aesthetics of luxury, as the attribute enabling gold to serve as the "positive form of abundance and wealth" (Marx 1904, cited in Goux 1990:28).

Religious nationalism involves an outraged assault in the public sphere on the eroticized female body and its replacement by an ascetic masculinization. Commodity and woman are joined by a hermeneutics of dangerous desire. The capitalist market is powered by an unexamined, external term, an untranslatable aesthetic dimension, a pleasure principle. Women have traditionally carried the unacknowledged weight of male desire, sexual objects whose subjectivity is responsible for the violent excesses of men, often conjured with sexual appetites threatening to exceed the claims of sexual property and familial bounds. Money, too, is a signifier for desire without limit, an infinity of expansion.

Religious nationalisms are obsessed with the powers of feminine flesh, seeking to cloak the female body, to clear the public sphere of its exposed skin. Religious nationalism is deployed against the heterosexual powers of women, forces displayed in the spectral emporia of commodity culture that these patriots would redress and discipline in the family. Divided in production, we moderns are reunited in consumption, a sphere with domestic designs, a sphere whose allure is carried by women's desiring bodies, a feminized and feminizing zone. If the public voice is masculine, the body—the one always before our eyes—is that of woman. Iran's Islamic Republic not only forced Teheran's Museum of Contemporary Art to cover a bronze sculpture of a female form at its entrance with a

fiberglass *hejab*, a cloak that also veils the face (literally modesty in attire), but made it a crime to use women in any advertisement promoting any product (Wright 2000:135, 149).

Women are an ancient currency. Women, as Claude Levi-Strauss and Gayle Rubin both pointed out, are the elementary social currency, before kula shells and horses (Levi-Strauss 1969; Rubin 1975; see also Bourdieu 2001). If men strive to take women out of the public sphere—women who mark and carry the merchandise, who are yet the currency of exchange in the modern economy, the consumers and the consumed—then are they not taking out this doubly determined force? Khomeini was explicit about this. Once women were restored to their rightful place in the family, he argued, they would "no longer be regarded as a 'thing' or a tool serving consumerism and exploitation" (Riesebrodt 1993:145).

That religious nationalists concentrate their fierce energies and their forbidding voices on the bodies of women is more than a repudiation of eroticizing commodity markets. It is also, of course, a defense of patriarchal power, a power threatened by modernization, both by the entry of women into the capitalist labor market and, often, by efforts to extend civil and political liberties to women. It is a restoration of woman as primal property, as a noncirculating commodity, a secure possession. By cordoning off women, by draping and regulating their bodies and the exposure of their flesh, religious militants construct the perfect private property, an exclusive possession removed from the circuits of public visibility whose very eyes are denied to other men. Unlike a cell phone or a motorcycle, woman is an object potentially appropriable by all men. Woman becomes a property common to men.

Examples of female flesh as currency are easy to find. Writing in the Christian-right *Focus on the Family*, which offers a regular column on personal finance and particularly a discipline for getting out of debt, Sarah Hinlicky, a theology student, explains why young American men squander their sexuality before marriage, compromising their capacity to love truly. She writes:

> American men know that they're being pressured to score as much as possible. The ideal foisted on them is one of suave promiscuity, backed up by a blandly materialistic worldview. The trap is baited with money. It is reinforced by all the things guys are likely to get interested in: sports, vehicles, fraternities. The lure of luxury effortlessly translates into the lure of womanflesh. One kind of lifestyle naturally implies the other. The materialism of it allows men to shut down their hearts without even noticing. (Hinlicky 2000)

True masculinity, she argues, entails loving one woman, a love made by loving her alone. An indiscriminate spending of one's seed, parallel to the profligate spending of money, robs a man of his masculinity, debases the currency of love.

When religious nationalists proscribe pleasures of the flesh, it must be understood in the context of our eroticizing commodity markets. By their "no"s, they render valueless what they see on the television screens and at the movies, supplanting our forbidden possessions with their being, what we have with what they are. Their capacity to resist our pleasures becomes an alternative standard of value, the strength of the "no" a source of virtue. When demonstrations against America exploded in Pakistan in the aftermath of the American bombing of Afghanistan, the crowds burnt the banks and the movie theatres, terminals through which American dollars and the messages of pleasure circulate in the *umma*.

Religious nationalism joins God to the territorial nation, the fusion of two collective representations, a couplet of spirit and matter, a male spirit and a female territorial body. Religious nationalism works the universal binaries of gender, a structure rendered in crystalline form by Ortner. Men are viewed as closer to culture and women closer to nature

(Ortner 1996). Religious nationalism points to women's material bodies as a media through which the culture of the territorial state is constructed. As Ortner points out, with the rise of the state, in which fathers became delegated sovereigns ruling over their own households, households became miniature polities themselves, accountable to the state. A doctrine of woman's virgin purity arose. For the first time, patriarchal households emerged in which women were under the patriarch's "direct and systematic control" (Ortner 1996:50). Women went from being themselves a source of danger to being in danger.

Although Ortner does not mention territoriality, the purity of the bride is a question of bounded matter. Isaiah describes Israel's foreign servitude as the foreign sexual penetration of the female space of Zion. A state is known through its boundaries, through the continuous territory it controls, by its capacity to regulate the conditions for entry. A woman's bodily purity and state sovereignty are parallel symbolic orders. Although Ortner (1996) does not mention it, the emergence of states means the emergence of monies, a currency over which the state has control, a currency always threatened by devaluation, by debasement, by uncertainty over its properties and over whose property it is. Would it be so strange for the primitive currency, women's reproductive bodies, and the new currency, these two collective representations, to be figured in parallel? With the rise of the state, women's bodies—once material media for political alliances between groups—now become material representations of the territoriality of the state itself. Women come to stand for the timeless traditions of the territory—a culture rooted in the ground, in nationalist discourse—whereas men stand for the historical temporality of progress, the first located in domestic space, the second in public space (McClintock 1996).

Religious nationalisms are boundary politics, emerging in contexts of partitions and penetrations. Religious nationalisms emerge in the context not only of economic globalization, but also of uncertain territorial integrity, whether secessionist movements, massive in-migrations, or the threats of war. Woman's body as a token of national territoriality is common in nationalist discourse.

At precisely the uncertain moment of bounded territoriality, we find this identification of female body with national territory in the case of the Israelites moving under the guidance of Moses from Egypt into the Promised Land. If the flesh of a nation's women represents its territoriality, here the flesh of foreign women is a figure for a foreign country, for the dangers of exile, for the prospect of perfidious dispossession. In our day, at a moment of prospective territorial partition, this identification provided the theological basis for the first assassination of an Israeli prime minister by a religious nationalist. In November 1995, a devout Jewish nationalist, Yigal Amir, pumped two high-velocity, hollow-point bullets through the chest of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. In 1993, Rabin had signed the Oslo Accords with Palestine Liberation Organization chief Yasser Arafat, accords that would lead to the ceding of territory and ultimately sovereignty over a huge chunk of the lands God had covenanted to the Jewish people.

In 1994, after Dr. Baruch Goldstein, a devout doctor from Kiryat Arba, murdered scores of Muslims as they prayed in Hebron, the Labour government seriously broached the idea of removing Jewish settlers from the center of Hebron. From this city, King David, 2000 years ago, had launched his drive to unify the 12 tribes under his leadership; it is the city in which the originary patriarchs and matriarchs of Israel are buried. This prospect pushed Amir into action. Seeking to defend Israel's territorial body, to prevent it being passed to foreigners, he killed the Jewish prime minister out of love of God.

Amir found the biblical rationale for his assassination in the Book of Numbers, specifically the 25th chapter, in which the text explains that Moabite women were sexually luring the men of Israel into idolatrous rites, into the worship of Ba'al, the Canaanite god of storm and fertility.

> While Israel dwelt in Shittim the people began to play the harlot with the daughters of Moab. These invited the people to the sacrifices of their gods, and the people ate, and bowed down to their gods. So Israel yoked himself to Ba'al of Pe'or. And the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel. . . . (Numbers 25:1–3)

God instructs Moses to have the judges slay those men who have "yoked themselves to Ba'al." While this was transpiring, an Israelite man, a certain Zimri, brought one of the foreign women, a Mid'ianite named Cozbi, to his family in the sight of Moses and the community. Whether or not he actually made love with her in plain view, the prospect of intermarriage was evident. Pinchas (Phin'ehas), without obtaining legal authorization, took up a spear and killed both the Israelite man and the Mid'ianite woman. To kill a Jew without authorization by a judicial process violates the Torah. Yet here, God stops the plague with which he was punishing the people and makes of Pinchas's line a "perpetual priesthood." The Talmud records that while the elders condemned Pinchas's act, God not only forgave the act, but rewarded it, for Pinchas "was zealous for my sake among them" (Sprinzak 1999:102). It is significant that it is immediately after this moment, this punished penetration of a foreign woman, that God directs Moses to take a census of the "congregation" in order to divide the covenanted lands. Just before assassinating the prime minister, a man who would give the land of Israel to foreigners, Amir read precisely this passage (Sprinzak 1999:281). In Amir's view, one is obligated to kill a Jew who would give up his country, in the same way that Pinchas killed a Jew who, moving homeward, chose to enter the body of a foreign woman.

To take another example, Indian nationalists have always understood the territorial nation as the body of a woman, Bharat Mata, or "mother India." Since the late 19th century, the *gau mata* or "mother cow" has been understood as a symbol of the nation. Before independence, the movement to protect the cow from slaughter was a critical component in the struggle for an independent Hindu nation-state. In Brahmanical ritual, the cow is identified as the nourishing mother of life, whose products—including dung—have purifying powers. Krishna, the most popular god, is known as the "butter thief," who, as a child, stole butter and curds from his mother. Van der Veer writes: "It is within the logic of religious discourse that the protection of the cow became the foremost symbol of the Hindu nation-state. Sacrifice of the cow signified simultaneously the illegitimacy of British rule and an insult to Hindu patriarchy" (van der Veer 1994:90) Secular nationalist Jawaharlal Nehru sought to re-dress this village woman, to "give her," as he noted, "the garb of modernity" (Nehru 1994:50; Komenda 2000). For Gandhi, "mother India" was a barefoot widow, a renunciant.

Today's Hindu nationalists understand India as a woman who requires protection from her virile sons (Bacchetta 1999:129–30). One of the few leading women in the Hindu nationalist movement, Sadhvi Ritamba, conjures the Islamic dismemberment of India as rape. "In Kashmir," she declared, "the Hindu was a minority and was hounded out of the valley. Slogans of 'Long live Pakistan' were carved with red-hot irons on the thighs of our Hindu daughters" (Hansen 1999:180). Hindu nationalists have ridden to power by politicizing the communal divisions between Muslims and Hindus, by staging ritual confrontations over sacred space (Friedland and Hecht 1998; van der Veer 1994). The Muslim as rapist of Indian woman is integral to the Hindu nationalist imaginary; indeed, it was integral to the formation of the women's organization of the RSS. Stories of gang rape circulate widely during these communal confrontations, as do stories of decapitation and the poisoning of food (Hansen 1999:204). In the Hindu nationalist imaginary, one of the things that makes Muslims a national threat is, in fact, their food habits, most importantly that they eat beef. The Muslim, then, is understood to literally eat mother India.

Sumathi Ramaswamy shows how the struggle between India and the would-be Tamil nation has been played out as battle of two virginal mothers: one, Bharata Mata, originating in Bengal, representing India, and the other, Tamilttaay, "Tamil mother," representing the non-Brahmanical Tamil nation (Ramaswamy 1997a, 1997b). Tamil patriots experience an erotic longing for this virginal mother. In a typical expression, Mudiyarason, a popular Dravidian poet, declares: "If you reject me, how can I endure this life? Is it not your sweet passion that drives me crazy?" (Ramaswamy 1997b:14). As Ramaswamy points out, the virginal quality of these fecund female collective representations is meant to stand for the inviolability of the language and the land (Ramaswamy 1997b:17). And, indeed, violent struggles between the Tamil and Hindi-speaking communities coincided with images of the body of Tamilttaay on the verge of being disrobed, dishonored. The unfulfilled and unfulfillable eroticization of the relation between male nationalist and the national figure is thus displaced onto actual Tamil women, who are understood to be embodiments of this untouchable nation.

The Turkish case is also illustrative. Throughout the 1990s, the Turkish state—the first Islamic state to create a secular constitution—faced both a growing Islamic political challenge and a territorial challenge from the Kurds, concentrated in southeastern Turkey, bordering Iraq and Iran. The Islamic offensive has been fought over the bodies of women, with the government forbidding young women from wearing headscarves to school, a normative sign of modesty given the erotic associations of female hair. With some measure of state complicity, and with Iranian backing, the violent wing of an Islamic militant group, naming itself Hizbullah, whose goal is to create an Islamic republic in Turkey, unleashed a reign of terror against the followers of the Kurdistan Workers' Party. The Hizbullah are believed to be responsible for up to 2,000 unsolved murders over this period, particularly those of Kurdish businessmen who were kidnapped and then tortured to death. The violent Islamicists not only targeted Kurds—and separatists in particular—but also directed their violence against Muslim women who challenged the gender divisions they believed are inscribed in the Quran. In January 2000, among the graves of the tortured Kurdish bodies, the police discovered the body of Konca Kuris, one of those rare feminist Islamicists who had argued that the Quran requires neither that women cover their heads nor that men and women need be separated physically in schools (Kinzer 2000; *Turkish Daily News*.com 2000).

If religious nationalism is a way to mark the land, to defend or redefine a nation's boundaries, then we might interpret religious nationalism's obsessive control of women's bodies as a parallel figuration, the policing of a bodily frontier. The land is feminine substance, fecund matter. Religious nationalists draw their lines on feminine flesh, on the land and on the bodies of women. Both are bounded sites of reproduction, physical and cultural, one through the other.

Religious-nationalist hostility to abortion, at least in the American fundamentalist context, can be understood in this context. De Hart shows the discursive parallels between two efforts to criminalize abortion in the United States, one between 1840 and 1880 and the other after 1973, and the historic *Roe v. Wade* decision of that year. In both, abortion was targeted as a threat to the family and to the nation (De Hart 1999). In both, the woman was linguistically reduced to a "container"—not a person with civil rights, enabling her to control her body as her property, but an incubator, nurturant ground in which grew a separate living being. Although the agents attacking abortion were divergent—professional doctors in the first case, Christian fundamentalists in the second—it is striking that at both times the boundaries of the nation-state, its territorial integrity and its racial purity, were at risk, the first time as a result of the Civil War and the second as a result of unprecedented immigration and the defeat of the American military in Vietnam. Mass politicization of the

organized religious right against abortion began after Saigon fell to the Communist forces in 1975. The restoration of a strong national military and the ending of legal abortion have been associated issues on the American religious right (Heinz 1983:134).

Control over the bodies of women assimilates easily to nationalist discourse. The word "nation" derives etymologically from *natio* and *natus*, "birth" and "born," respectively. Nations are seen as living creatures, collective subjects. They are drawn out of female flesh, flesh that must be controlled and cordoned off by men. If the nation is a female substance, a womanly materiality, its form is of another order altogether.

THE EROS OF MONEY

How does money fit within this symbolic order? What is the relation between the desire to control the reproductive powers of women's bodies and to control money?

As the universal equivalent, and hence as a pure form, money partakes of the masculine metaphysical pole, an ideal value whose form remains invariant whatever the materiality. If money is a masculine form, and if man—as Simmel (1990) pointed out—is the foundational measure of money, what is the form possessed by men for which money is an equivalent? Put another way, Bourdieu speaks of the body's properties as "analogical operators" that both establish and naturalize equivalencies in the social world (Bourdieu 1990:68). What property of the male body is money's analogue in the circuit of exchange?

The hard male member is a tool, an instrument that has achieved a fetishistic, phantasmagoric aspect in psychoanalytic theory. In fact, the penis is minimally informative, a vehicle of transport—a medium, not a message. It is its metonymic status that has allowed it to become the phallus, a contentless sign of power, plenitude, or presence in Lacanian and Derridean thought. It is not this form actually or impossibly possessed by men that is a measure of that value for which money is an equivalent, but man's very capacity to transmit his form. Man's measure is his capacity to produce men, to make life. Money, Moscovici has written, is "the metaphor par excellence of the pure life force. Acceleration in its circulation is simultaneously an acceleration of social life, of life itself. A sudden stop would be a death, matter becoming inert" (Moscovici 1998; author's translation). Is not the life force the force of life?

Man's capacity to make life, while mediated by his ability to produce the means of reproduction, rests primordially on his own reproductive force, his capacity to produce children, to generate seed, to spend himself productively between the loins of women. Man's capacity to produce man inheres in his seed, in semen. Like money, semen is a precious fluid to be saved, spent, and invested. Semen spent without prospect of product, whether through masturbation or through homosexuality, is profane and prohibited. Thus, like money—but unlike the phallus—the exchange of semen not only is joined to pleasure but is essential to material survival. Children mean workers, warriors, and wombs. Their absence spells collective death. God's covenant is marked by progeny. Seed produces members; impregnation is more important than erection. The selective investment of semen is the most elementary form of economic life. Semen, unlike the phallus, is informative, the word made flesh. These deep homologies, which make of money a token of male reproductive powers, accord with the fetishization of money, as a token not simply of all potential pleasure but of all potential powers.

Semen plays little role in the psychoanalytic symbolic economy. Libido has an economics; semen does not. Semen is mentioned only 17 times in the whole of Freud's collected works, compared to scores of references to excrement, blood, or milk. Feces is mentioned 81 times, while the word "excrement" is cited 22 times, "excremental" 11, "excreta" 14,

and "excretory" 23. Freud, writing to Wilhelm Fliess, equated excrement with a woman's reproductive process—with birth, miscarriage, menstruation—an idea that would later be incorporated in his analysis of the Wolf Man (Masson 1995:288). The neglect of semen becomes a stunning fact when you consider that Freud made infantile bewilderment at the source of children the generator of a child's inclination to systematically explore the natural world, and hence of science (Freud 1964). It is extraordinary that the fact of ejaculation has absolutely no significance in the psychosexual development of a man in classical psychoanalytic theory. Ejaculation is mentioned only six times in all of Freud's writings. Indeed, Freud references semen only to dismiss its accumulation as the source of sexual excitation and to put libido—a sexual current that has no necessary relation to reproduction—in its place.

Money as a spermatic analogue is not just an analytic possibility; within religion, it is a discursive fact. It finds its way into many traditions ranging from Hinduism to Japanese Buddhism to Protestant asceticism. Let me just invoke two: the equivalence of semen and gold in Khomeini's strictures regulating sexual intercourse with menstruating women. "During the time a women is menstruating," Khomeini writes, "it is preferable for a man to avoid coitus, even if it does not involve full penetration—that is, as far as the circumcision ring—and even if it does not involve ejaculation. It is also highly inadvisable for him to sodomize her during this time" (Khomeini 1980:91). Sperm of any kind—spent in coitus, in sodomizing a man or a woman, in involuntary emission, or in masturbation—is impure. There are no distinctions. Before performing ablutions, a man who has ejaculated must neither eat nor drink nor read more than seven verses of the Quran.

Khomeini's concern is not with the regulation of sexual acts as much as it is with seminal expenditure. He explicitly says that a man's sodomizing another man—even his wife's father or son—is not grounds for divorce. However, ejaculating inside a menstruating vagina—but not the anus—of a woman calls for payment of gold to the poor. Khomeini divides a woman's menstrual cycle into three parts. Intercourse during the first two days requires the payment of 18 *nokhod*s (a measure of gold), the next two days, 9 nokhods, and the final two days, 4.5 nokhods. Seed lost in this way to the community must be paid back to the community through gold offerings to the poor. This is hardly a loose analogy. Khomeini insists that "If the price of gold has changed between the time of coitus and the time of payment, the rate in effect on the date of payment will prevail" (Khomeini 1980:91).

Protestantism—with its independence from Rome, its vernacular liturgies, and its identification with and ultimate control by the state—was a necessary condition for the emergence of many of the first Western nation-states, including England, the United States, Sweden, and Denmark. Unlike France, these were religious nationalisms. In Weber's historical understanding of Protestant asceticism's importance in generating the psychological conditions for rational capitalism, we can see how the Puritans harnessed money's erotic powers in pursuit of the divine (Weber 1958a). Weber argues that Protestantism produced a rationalization of conduct within the profane world, and the marketplace in particular. The Protestant insisted on God's transcendent being, his utter absence from the world. For the Protestant, magic manipulation was impossible. Positing a world in which each man and woman had a predestined place after death, the Protestant believed that this destiny was only knowable—but not determinable—through the systematic and continuous manner in which each followed an ethical course, a course to which working in a calling, whether mason or manufacturer, was essential.

Making the best use of one's talents was not only an obligation of the believer, but a criterion for salvation. For the Puritan, the ardor with which one worked, the usefulness of one's calling, could be measured by the profitability of one's work, by the money it produced. The monetary flows captured inside one's enterprise as a result of one's work were

to be cut off from the pleasures they afforded. Richard Baxter, the renowned English Puritan upon whom Weber relied heavily to make his interpretation, put it this way:

> If God shows you a way in which you may lawfully get more than in another way . . . if you refuse this, and choose the less gainful way, you cross one of the ends of your calling, and you refuse to be God's steward, and to accept His gifts and use them for Him when He requireth it: you may labour to be rich for God, though not for the flesh and sin. (quoted in Weber 1958a:162)

Money was a mark of divine election to the extent that it was not converted into pleasures of the flesh. The ascetic Protestant needed to control, to possess, to save his money so that he could make more of it, not as an instrument for bodily enjoyment, but as an indicator of ethical rationalization. For the Protestant, work was a substitute for sex, an ascetic discipline to counter the lures of eros. Just as money was only legitimate as capital—that is, as money that could produce still more money—so a man's seed could only be spent within marriage on condition that it would produce more human souls. Protestants considered sexual intercourse—let alone masturbation—without prospect of human multiplication as eros, as sinful (Weber 1958a:158). The Protestant ascetics abhorred the erotic body, the richly costumed human form, the excessive sensualities of food or drink. The saving and disciplined expenditure of one's seed was—not unlike the case in Tantric doctrine—an indicator of grace, of spiritual power. The Protestant ascetics converted seed into money, stripping both of their pleasurable powers.

We have, then, to finish the syllogism. I have argued that God is deployed against foreign monies. Money is semen's symbolic equivalent, its analogue in this erotic logic of collective representation. What, then, is the relation between God and semen? Although semen has been banished in our cultural theories and in the modern Western imaginary more generally, the answer is, everything. That masculine divine forces are imagined as generating the world through semen is, in fact, pervasive. Mircea Eliade, the omnivorous comparative historian of religions, has written of the common experience of light understood as an expression of divinity (Eliade 1976). Emile Benveniste noted that while the Indo-European languages had no common word for religion, they concurred on the meaning of God as "luminous" (Benveniste 1973; Derrida 1998). The sun's emission of the living light, this primal condition of knowledge, is widely interpreted as the emission of sperm from the phallus (Eliade 1976). As the Stoics and all the emanational theologies—among many others—assert, God creates the world through seed. Could this be the "nocturnal light" that haunts Derrida's virgin birth story for religiosity—a story, he insists, without a virgin?

Money is a symbol of that first currency, an equivalence that points to the original logic of money's fecundity, its capacity to produce more than itself, to expand as it circulates without ever being identical to the materiality it commands. Money, seen as a fungible bodily fluid, has historically operated as a currency of the public sphere, exchanged from man to man, enabling men to accumulate the reproductive powers of women and to organize the productive forces of other men. It is an erotic fluid whose circuits have been predominantly homosocial. Its currents are dangerous, threatening to overrun the banks of instrumentality, to become an autonomous economy of pleasure. For Islamic fundamentalists, controlling the erotic powers of women's bodies and the powers of money are of a piece. Islamicists seek to introduce Islamic banking, formally displacing interest-bearing loans. Its advocates talk of the expansion of money through the charging of interest as an intoxicant. "Interest," wrote an Islamic economist, "inculcates love for money and the desire to accumulate money for its own sake" (Quran 1993:308). The danger is that money

might become an ultimate purpose, a final value. In 1939, when Hassan al-Banna, considered the father of political Islam, wrote an open letter to King Farouk demanding that Egypt become an Islamic state, he condensed his demands to three items: banning the consumption of alcohol, segregating the sexes, and abolishing the charging of interest. Al-Banna thus joined the regulation of pleasure and money, then largely in the hands of the British (Landen 1970).

We can begin to connect the preoccupation with women's sexual bodies with the control of money. In religious nationalism, women's bodies are men's sovereign property, a property possessed by men. Women, religious nationalists declare, have no right to make the nation's physical reproduction a womanly matter. The capacity to reproduce joins religious nationalist concern to control the wombs of women with the coincident desire to control its monies. Both are forces of reproduction, at once material and cultural. Robertson, for instance, links the two, pointing to the backing of the globalist financiers for the writings that supplied the philosophical justification for the constitutional right to abortion in *Roe v. Wade* and for Margaret Sanger's *Planned Parenthood* promoting both abortion and sterilization (Robertson 1991:190, 220). Likewise, Randall Terry, the founder of Operation Rescue, the radical antiabortion organization, opposed not only abortion and homosexuality but the government's devaluation of the nation's currency as well (Juergensmeyer 2000).

THE EROTICS OF COLLECTIVE BODY-MAKING

In the imagination of religious nationalism, physical reproduction is the central figure for cultural reproduction. The religious nationalist preoccupation to control the sexual bodies of women and the circulation of money can be read together as efforts to fashion a new collective subject, to restore the masculinity—the manliness—of the state. That religious nationalists center their attention on the sexual organization of family life derives, then, not only from their specific ontology of the social but also from the family's function as the primordial site of body-making. The body is our first place and the space of our subjectivity. Religious nationalists who would reimagine the collective territorial body organize their practices around and draw their energies from the eroticized human body. The human body is the material basis upon and through which individuals imagine themselves as unique beings, as bodily bounded beings, a boundedness essential to the bearing of identity, to the making of selves. The national collective body and the individual body are spaces imagined in parallel, because the body is the form of the self, the form through which the self is imagined as a unitary agent. The surface is the subject's most elemental substance.

Bodily practice is the mechanism by which we perform the social into existence through our existence not just as representation but as corporeal mimesis, an acting out that makes collective identity into flesh. Because the social takes form, gets written in and through the body, the body becomes a device through which individuals attempt to rewrite society, both to imagine it differently and to transform their position within it. The body is also the metaphorical ground for the sacred as an inviolable, unscathed space.[6] Traffic across the skin, the traversals of the bodily frontier, is the elementary form of boundary transgression. The skin, Taussig writes, "represents the mysterious line of transgression which has to (yet must not) be breached" (Taussig 1998:357). Through the body, one first figures a bounded sacred space. The body is the phenomenal ground for collective identity and sacred space, precisely the fusion religious nationalists seek to fabricate.

[6] See Derrida (1998) for a nonphenomenological consideration of the unscathed.

Embodiment is the basis of individual subjectivity. The nation is likewise a territorially bounded subject, a collective subject whose identity is imagined and organized through that bounded territory, an imagined morphology. That a nation's two bodies, collective and individual, might be imagined together, might draw their identity and their energies in tandem would not then be surprising, a parallel that has a warrant beyond my metaphorical reading.

In fact, if you examine the history of nationalist movements—whether or not they are religious nationalist—that have sought to form a more powerful collective subject, a stronger body able to protect its borders and project its strength, they have devoted considerable attention to the reformation of the physical body of their male members. One can see this, for example, in Japanese, Chinese, French, American, German, and Indian nationalisms. The nationalist subjects were imagined as disciplined male bodies, able on the one hand to defend the feminine territorial body and on the other to control their own spermatic powers.

During China's republican period (1912–1949), the disease of "spermatorrhea," an involuntary loss of semen, became an obsessive syndrome for which men sought various medical solutions, hormone replacements like Spermin among them (Shapiro 1998). Chinese nationalists took the rise of this failure of self-possession as an indicator of the effeminization of the Chinese male, which they associated with the valued art of female impersonation among men. The body of the Chinese man became a political problem. Was not the official cause of death of Guangxu, China's last adult emperor, spermatorrehea? The inability to possess one's semen was taken to be an indicator of the failure of manhood, which was understood to be responsible for the ability of the Japanese, the Europeans, and the Americans to penetrate China. Medical case-histories indicate that Chinese men living in areas occupied by the Japanese complained of the sperm-loss syndrome. Building a powerful nation required the reconstitution of hard male bodies able to conserve their *jing*, or semen, the source of *qi*, or vital energy.

In Hindu cosmology, the conservation of one's seminal fluids has long been understood as a source of spiritual power. As Alter has shown in the case of India, the ideal of the disciplined, strong, and celibate male body—the men who conserved their seminal fluids—was central to the construction of a new national Indian citizen in response to British colonial understandings of the Brahmins as feminine beings (Alter 1992, 2000). Gandhi based his nationalist authority on his ability to retain his semen, including sleeping with naked young women without ejaculating, as a way to achieve the detachment and spiritual power necessary to confront the British in *ahimsa*, nonviolent resistance (van der Veer 1994:96–97). Male sexual asceticism was the path to national independence. Bounding a new national subject, Gandhi believed, could only be achieved by bounding the devout male body (Alter 2000).

LOVING GOD

And finally there is the fourth element in religious nationalist discourse—loving submission to God. In *Ego and the Id*, Freud argues that the self—the ego—is first constructed as a bodily form through the surface of an imagined human morphology, the image of a body (Freud 1962:16). The imagined body in whose image ego formation takes place has a sex, a sex that is not unrelated to the semiotic order of religious nationalism. The individual ego is constructed through a sexed bodily identification. This identification, Judith Butler (1997) argues, is founded on a primary dependency, on a subordination to which the child is passionately attached, a joining of power and erotics. The self is sexed as a resolution of this subordination by the inhabitation of or by authority's bodily form.

The constitution of the self involves, then, both a constructed gender and sexuality, exclusively male or female, exclusively heterosexual. The accomplishment of the gendered self, the masculine or feminine "I," depends on a disavowed yet internalized sexual object—namely, the body of the same-sex parent. A boy's identification with his father, Butler writes, "contains within it both the prohibition and the desire, and so embodies the ungrieved loss of the homosexual cathexis" (Butler 1997:136). Men want to have the femininity they can never be and want to be the masculinity they can never have. Becoming a man, learning heterosexual desire, requires that one prohibit the feminine embodied within. A boy's identification with his father is a way of preserving, of embodying, that ungrievable loss. The erotic charge between son and father—a charge that inhabits same-sex identification—must be foreclosed, disavowed, yet is preserved as a melancholic incorporation, a specter haunting the ego that, in fact, substitutes for that loved object (Butler 1997:132–50).

Not just deferred heterosexual pleasure, but disavowed homoerotic pleasure as well, is part of the constitution, part of the force of internalized authority. Both national and individual bodies are bounded, set in motion as reflexive subjects, through an internalized authority, a violent sovereign within. This goes without saying in the case of the state. But the psyche, too, as a topography, is constituted through ambivalent loss in which the potential negation of the loved object is taken inside as its own destructiveness in the form of the critical super-ego, the ego now substituting for the external object that is both loved and not worth loving (Butler 1997:179). For a boy, the ideal of authority is typically represented by the father. Authority, internalized as conscience, is thus constituted by ambivalent loss of a homoerotic object, the ego's "disowned rage" split off from its identification. Conscience, Butler (1997:191) argues, is the "ideality" of the state's power, "its disappearance as an external object," a dissimulation of the relation between self and authoritative other, a relation in which there is no loss, where loss is disavowed, yet preserved, through the demands of conscience and public self-reproach. These are the secret pleasures of power, of subordination, a having and a being had, in which the ego is not invaded but constituted by power. The embodied subject is a homosocial figuration, an identification whose homoerotic sexuality must be disavowed, a pleasurable subordination that offers the prospect of agency, of power as the property of the subject.

The father enters this mechanism as symbol, as an authoritative ideal, an ideal of authority. It is not surprising, then, that a collective subject—the collectivity that is an authoritative symbol—can easily enter this psychic economy. Freud himself introduces the collective subject to this eroticized individual subject-making mechanism. Freud makes the loss of the ideal of "country" a substitute for a lost person as well as itself a basis of melancholia, the loss of a collective symbolic object setting in motion the experience of ego loss (Freud 1962). Melancholia is a response to the loss of an ideal, of an individual or a collective subject, the one able to substitute for the other. This suggests that the two bodily egos, individual and collective, can each be a medium through which the other operates psychologically; that perceived threats to the individual subject, failures of the masculine self, can be acted out on a collective register, as efforts to masculinize the collectivity; and that perceived threats to the collective subject, incapacities of national agency, might be countered and redressed through attempted reconstructions of the sexualized masculine self. As we have seen, the transom of subject-formation works both ways in the Chinese and Indian materials.

Masculine and feminine identification and desire are haunted by homosexual desire. "[I]n a man," Butler writes, "the terror of homosexual desire may lead to a terror of being construed as feminine, feminized, of no longer being properly a man, of being a 'failed' man, or being in some sense a figure of monstrosity or abjection" (Butler 1997:136, 168–

71). In that masculinity, and thus the self that is masculine, always carries the trace of unavowed homoerotic desire—indeed, performs its repudiation—might a sense of masculine failure lead to both homoerotic terror and desire? If the masculinized self, either the individual or the collective, is perceived to be under assault, endangered, then within this structure it would not be surprising for homosexuality, the limit to both individual and collective identification, to emerge both as problem and as solution, a solution that must be ultimately disavowed, discharged, expelled from both the social and the individual body. If authority is decomposing, the internalized submission to which carries dissimulated homoerotic energies, it is psycho-logical for those energies to become more available, to shadow the self, to lose their ideality and haunt the flesh. The violent performance of masculinity, both individual and collective, against enemies inside and out and the subordinate segregation of women are comprehensible results.

It follows that the subordination and exclusion of women is driven not simply negatively by heterosexual interest in male powers, but positively by desires for homosocial pleasures. Clothing, controlling, and sequestering the female body, taking it out of the sites of collective representation, religious nationalists reassert the maleness of the public body as a muscular, virile, bounded body. It is striking that religious nationalists counter the feminine heterosexual other with male homosociality, the lures of sexualized women with the solidarities of men. Religious nationalism is typically centered around energetic, diffuse—indeed, erotic—forms of male bonding. Juergensmeyer points to the male-bonded center of the Christian militia in the United States, Hamas in Palestine, Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman's Islamic Party in Egypt, the Afghani Taliban, the Sikh Khalistani movement in the Punjab, and the Hindu Nationalist RSS in India (Juergensmeyer 2000:201–07). Sikh militants, for example, spoke of being joined together in a "bond of love" (Juergensmeyer 2000:203). And it is in this physical loving bond with other men that religious nationalists attack their enemies, terrorize and subjugate them, render them defenseless and womanly.

Religious nationalism is a homosocial affair. Homosociality, and the erotic energies that make it pulse, stands as a well out of which to reconstruct manhood, to place women apart. One returns to men for the energy to be a man, to be a self, which is the same thing; each helps fabricates a male collective representation, a collection of male bodies, in order to be represented as a man. In the company of brothers, one has and is a man. Religious nationalism re-eroticizes the public sphere, restores the male as the body language of agency.

For men, religious nationalism can be reduced to a triangular relation: men control women and submit to God, who guarantees the relation between them. The symbolic circuit of religious nationalism is animated and organized by an effort to rebuild the individual and the collective subject—the state's two bodies, its two polities—to convert lack into presence. Religious nationalism seeks to restage that primary dependency through both a passionate attachment and a subordination to God, a returning in which both individual and the collective bodies are reimagined and reinvested with energy. For men, loving God is a legitimate homosocial passion in which identification is forever deferred, foreclosed, unthinkable. This symbolic return to primary dependency, to pleasurable subordination, responds to a self under siege, a sense of failure of the masculine self, which must be experienced as a threatened feminization, a dissolution of the subject, which acts as a bar against the unacknowledged homoerotic loss that was integral to its very formation. Masculinity is at issue in both the problem and the solution. Religious nationalisms restore the sexualized binaries of gender as acts of God, deviations from which lead to cosmic death; they give themselves up to the ultimate masculine force; they perform the masculine collectivity through homosocial solidarities; and they seek out those perceived as failed or incomplete men—homosexuals and Jews—as objects of wrath, their own

misrecognized psychic detritus. Such are the parallels between collective and personal subject formation.

CONCLUSION

Religious nationalisms are responses to threats to the boundedness, the powers, and the identity of the territorial collectivity, a deployment of God in the service of the solidarities of the nation-state. That movements that seek to bound and build the collective body should seek to confine women to a womanly place and to regulate sexuality and confine it to the patriarchal family, and that they should imagine uncontrolled monies—foreign monies in particular—as forces endangering that national body is not surprising. These are semiotically joined as forces of reproduction, the elements by which the religious nationalists would restore and revitalize the masculine sex of state. God, like the nation-state, affords an order of life and death. Controlling the reproductive forces of women and men is one essential element in the project of creating the collective subject. Defending their bodies is the other. Disciplining sexuality is understood by religious nationalists as a way not only to bound the social order, but also to construct a powerful and inviolable state. Controlling these forces within enables one to subordinate them without. Durkheim argued that God is a representation of the collectivity. Religious nationalists show that God can be the ordering representation for the reconstruction of that collectivity. This phenomenon suggests that we should reconsider the extent to which religion is inherently political and politics inherently religious.

One could argue that this semiotic order—the symbolic logic—of religious nationalism is a displacement from political economy, that controlling women and reproductive sexuality is a substitute for their inability to control their placement in the global economy, that the homology derives from this substitution. This may be true, but it is an inadequate truth. There are materialist reasons for the failure of materialist political projects, whether those of economic growth or those of redistribution. But material conditions—conditions interpreted by religious nationalists—do not seem to neatly correlate with the ascendancy of the religious national project. One can only argue that religious nationalism is a displacement from within a cosmology that places democracy and capitalism as its institutional ground.

Although the factors that condition this choice still require comparative empirical investigation, I argue that religious nationalists start with the faith-based, patriarchal family as the institutional space through and from which they would constitute the collectivity. Its institutional logic, here the gendered erotic order of reproduction, provides not only the substance of their political project—their distinctive ontology of power—but also the basis from which they read that political economy and the organizing principles from which that semiotic order is constructed, that energizes it and makes it productive. It is this institutional logic that freights the political and the economic with erotic meaning, that converts political-economy into a divinely mandated re-creation story.

The question, of course, is, what difference does God make? For religious nationalists, faith is the basis of family solidarity, and reproduction of human bodies is understood as human participation in a divine order of creation. Religious nationalism aligns the creation of collective bodies and individual bodies. Nazism, whose semiotic print matches that of the religious nationalists, also eroticized the political economy as a project of body-making and pointed to the feminizing powers of global Jewish money. Although this comparison—its practices and symbolic order—is beyond the scope of this essay, the relative importance of personal decision, text, and divine plan as opposed to race, charisma, and historicity suggests them as axes of distinction. The political production

and productivities of political racialization and politicized religion require further investigation.

I have offered a semiotics, a delineation of homologies observed in religious nationalist discourse. At one level, it is merely an empiricist constellation of binary terms, a sign system. But the internal relations between the elements are not arbitrary, not by force of convention, but because the construction is not unfounded. It is a map of metaphors grounded in the material and psychic practices of sexualized body-making. The theoretical argument has a hermeneutic specificity consistent with the institutional site that is the religious nationalists' preoccupation. It joins cultural interpretation, phenomenology, and material practice. While I have suggested that money has an immanent erotic meaning, not unlike the ways in which the penetration of the penis is taken to be a mark of power and possession (Bourdieu 2001) or women are universally placed closer to nature than to culture (Ortner 1996), I understand it a universal possibility. Money can have a multiplicity of meanings, including that of collective representation. The question remains of when and why the national political-economy is imagined in these masculinist, heterosexual erotic terms, as a problem in the reproduction of bounded bodies.

My argument implies that one should find a psychosexual specificity within the consciousness and, more importantly, the unconscious of the religious nationalist community in response to the perceived failure of the idealized collective subject and/or the individual subject, one that should correlate with its bodily and political economic practices and preoccupations. This empirical question is beyond the scope of this study. I have argued from sociologically and psychoanalytically plausible homologies within religious nationalist discourse without evidence of familial behavioral and psychological mediations through which this discourse might be understood as sociologically ordered significations. Given the importance of the unconscious in this psychoanalytic interpretation, such significations and their behavioral consequences are, in any case, of a different order than those normally found in sociological studies.

My approach calls for the return to the sexual body in social theory, an immodest proposal given our generalized embrace of constructed gender and our fear of essentialisms. Social theory has become the ultimate ascetic Protestant discipline. There is, in fact, a perversity to it, an indifference toward the exhibition of pain, an unstated fear of bodily pleasure. It is easier for social theorists to depict torture and mass murder than orgasm and intimate touch. Anyway, the sexual body—the erotic body—must be incorporated into social theory. In his analysis of the structure of religiosity, Derrida makes language into body, not body into language. If the body only signifies by verbal appropriation, by its entry into language, then its parts can be linguified as imaginary organs, reduced to empty signifiers that signify independently of their phenomenological metaphoricity. Then the body can be de-sexed as a sign system and desire decorporealized, transformed into a passion for presence. One can use the body to point to nonontological structures of religious experience that cannot be experienced, but one cannot account either for religious nationalists' fierce energies directed overwhelmingly at women or for their attachment to homosocial bonding among men. Maintaining the sexuality of body-making, of subject-formation, allows us to align the privileged site of religious nationalism's practices, its ontology of the social, and its semiotic order.

It is time that we, too, restore the sex of state.

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