The rise of egalitarian values and associated egalitarian institutional reforms is a distinctive feature of modernity and postmodernity. This development, which dates at least to the Enlightenment, intensified throughout the twentieth century as formal legal rights were extended to previously excluded groups (e.g., women); wide-reaching institutional reforms were implemented to equalize life chances (e.g., bureaucratic personnel policies) and anti-egalitarian doctrines (e.g., racism) were challenged. These processes of equalization, dramatic though they are, obviously do not exhaust the story of modernity and postmodernity. As is well known, this story is replete with counterpoints at which the forces for egalitarianism have been resisted, sometimes violently (as with recurrences of eugenics and fascism) and sometimes in quieter but still profound ways (as in the persistence of residential segregation).

This chapter is about one of those quieter anti-egalitarian forces currently playing out in the domain of gender stratification. At first blush, the forces for equalization may appear to be straightforwardly triumphing in this domain, as evidenced by (a) the rapid diffusion of egalitarian views on gender roles, (b) the withering away of the long-standing gender gap in college attendance and graduation, and (c) the steady increase in rates of female labor force participation (see Figure 38.1). These developments, although spectacular and unprecedented, have nonetheless been coupled with equally spectacular forms of resistance to equalization, especially within the workplace. Most notably, women and men continue to work in very different occupations, with women crowding into a relatively small number of historically female occupations (e.g., teacher, secretary, nurse). If one sought, for example, to undo all sex segregation by reallocating women to less segregated occupations, a full 52 percent of the employed women in the United States would have to be shifted out of their current occupational categories (Jacobs 2003). This extreme sex segregation is typical of what prevails throughout the advanced industrial world. Because sex segregation is so

*This is a commissioned chapter that draws heavily on material in a previous publication (Maria Charles and David B. Grusky, Occupational Ghettos: The Worldwide Segregation of Women and Men. Copyright © 2004 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University.
extreme, and because it colors the life chances and life experiences of so many women and men, we characterize the contemporary occupational structure as “hypersegregated” (see Massey and Denton 1993 for a related usage).

Why is the occupational structure so resistant to egalitarian forces? It could be argued that fundamental institutional change is inevitably prolonged and that full integration will ultimately be achieved through ongoing reform efforts (Jackson 1998). Although we cannot rule out the possibility of full integration in the distant future, we would stress that this outcome is by no means inevitable under prevailing policies, practices, and commitments. That is, rather than viewing sex segregation as a residual that is destined to wither away under contemporary egalitarian pressures, it is best regarded as an organic feature of modern economies that is ideologically consistent with egalitarianism, at least as the latter is understood and practiced today. In this sense, there is a deep structure to sex segregation that makes it a viable long-term feature of modern economies, even as pressures for equalization mount in other domains of the social stratification system.

The foregoing interpretation is consistent with the relatively slow pace of integrative change, the failure of conventional egalitarian policy to reduce occupational segregation, and the long-term persistence of gender inequalities in the labor market.

Figure 38.1 Parameters of Gender Stratification, 1970–2000
of pockets of especially extreme segregation ("occupational ghettos"). We briefly review each of these pieces of supporting evidence in the following paragraphs.

**Slow Pace of Change**

The clearest evidence of resistance to egalitarian pressures emerges in comparing the rate of desegregative change with corresponding rates of change elsewhere in the gender stratification system. As indicated in Figure 38.1, the moderate declines in occupational sex segregation over the past thirty years stand in stark contrast to the more precipitous changes in (a) attitudes toward gender roles, (b) rates of female labor force participation, and (c) the gender gap in educational investments. These differences in the pacing of change suggest that the segregation regime has been shielded from the equalizing forces that have played out more dramatically in other domains.

**Unevenness of Change**

There is, to be sure, clear and substantial evidence of desegregation in many sectors of the occupational structure, yet any careful observer of this process has to be struck by its unevenness and by the persistence, in particular, of many female occupational ghettos (e.g., secretary, nursery school teacher). Moreover, when male-dominated occupations embark on what appears to be integrative trajectories, the influx of women often continues well past the point of gender parity and ultimately creates a new female-dominated ghetto (e.g., Reskin and Roos 1990). These results suggest that sex segregation, far from being a holdover, is actively advanced by dynamics that are part and parcel of modern industrialism.

We therefore present the following puzzle: Why has sex segregation proven resistant to egalitarian pressures even as other forms of gender inequality have given way? Although we return to this puzzle repeatedly, it is important to recognize that it is but one part of a larger complex of perplexing findings that scholars of segregation have recently reported. The following two puzzles might, in particular, be cited: (a) the common view that male power and privilege allows men to dominate the best occupations fails to accord with the typical pattern of contemporary sex segregation; and (b) the highest levels of segregation are often found in socially and culturally progressive countries (such as Sweden) rather than in their more traditional counterparts (such as Japan). Taken together, these findings seem to suggest a topsy-turvy world in
which males do not straightforwardly dom-
inate the best jobs, family-friendly policies
have a perverse segregating effect, and con-
temporary gender regimes continue to have
a highly segregated “1950s feel” even in the
twenty-first century.

We argue here that these empirical puz-
zles have emerged in the literature because
stratification scholars tend to treat sex segre-
gation in unidimensional terms and ac-
correspondingly fail to appreciate that a complex
amalgam of processes underlies gender in-
equality and renders some forms of segre-
gation more entrenched than others. Al-
though the tendency to represent segre-
gation unidimensionally is widespread, it
emerges especially clearly in classical theo-
rizing about long-term trends in inequality.
For example, structural-functional theo-
rists typically treat all forms of “ascrip-
tion,” including sex segregation, as a
generic residue destined to wither away ei-
ther because discriminatory practices are
inefficient or because bureaucratic forms of
social organization have diffused widely
and served to undermine discriminatory
practices (e.g., Parsons 1970). In similar
fashion, neoinstitutionalists assume that
egalitarian practices and organizational
forms will gradually diffuse and generate
across-the-board reductions in segregation,
although the main impetus for such diffu-
sion is not so much the intrinsic efficiency
of universalistic practices as the characteris-
tically modern commitment to cultural
stories about their efficiency (e.g., Meyer
2001). Finally, some early feminist scholars
(e.g., Huber 1988) conceptualized occupa-
tional sex segregation as one of the main
outcomes of “patriarchal” forms of social
organization, again implying that the fate
of sex segregation is simply a function of
the larger fate of patriarchal social relations
that “create solidarity and interdependence
among men and enable them to dominate
women” (Hartmann 1981, p. 14). This ap-
proach typically treats both patriarchy and
inequality in monolithic terms and thus
draws scholars into weaving stories about
the extent of segregation rather than its
many dimensions and their different re-
sponsiveness to egalitarian forces.

These various theories share the prejudice
that the explanandum of interest (segrega-
tion) may be represented in unidimensional
terms, but they differ in their claims about
the extent or pacing of change in this ex-
planandum. If segregation is seen as persist-
ent or ubiquitous, then reference is made to
the strength and durability of patriarchal
norms, institutions, or values (Chafetz 1988;
Hartmann 1981; Ridgeway 1997; Williams
2000). If segregation is seen as relatively weak
or declining in strength, this is attributed to
(a) the gradual displacement of traditional
gender roles and ideologies with universalistic
values, (b) the diffusion of bureaucratic forms
of organization, or (c) the discrimination-
eroding discipline of the competitive market
(Goode 1963; Ramirez 1987). These dis-
crepant interpretations are typically evaluated
by applying scalar measures of segregation
that likewise presume unidimensionality
(such as the index of dissimilarity). There is
accordingly a close correspondence between
classical unidimensional theorizing and
the methodologies that have until now
been adopted to describe and compare sex
segregation.

We argue, then, that various puzzles have
emerged in the literature because conven-
tional theories and methods blind us to the
multidimensional structure of segregation.
By advancing a two-dimensional conceptu-
alization of sex segregation and a matching
methodological approach, we seek to solve
the puzzles and build an alternative understanding of the development of segregation regimes.

A New Multidimensional Model

It is useful to begin by asking whether the underlying structure of sex segregation is consistent with unidimensional accounts of segregation. In many such accounts, it is simply presumed that the best occupations will be dominated by men, either because women have disproportionate domestic responsibilities that reduce their incentive to invest in demanding careers (e.g., Becker 1991), or because employers practice discrimination through “glass ceiling” personnel policies and other forms of male-biased queuing in the labor market (e.g., Reskin and Roos 1990).

This conventional account falls short because it fails to appreciate the distinction between vertical and horizontal forms of segregation and, in particular, the interaction between these two forms (see Blackburn, Jarman, and Brooks 2000; Semyonov and Jones 1999). The model in Figure 38.2, which underlies all our analysis, builds explicitly on this distinction: the “nonmanual slope parameter” governs the extent to which men dominate the most desirable classes in the nonmanual sector; the “manual slope parameter” governs the extent to which men dominate the most desirable classes in the manual sector; and the “horizontal gap parameter” governs the extent to which men are disproportionately allocated into the manual sector rather than the nonmanual one.

The horizontal axis of this figure arrays the nine major occupational categories defined by the International Labour Office (ILO) on an approximate socioeconomic scale ranging from high (professional) to low (agricultural). Following convention, the first five categories in this list may be characterized as nonmanual, and the second four may be characterized as manual.
The vertical axis of this figure, labeled “female representation,” indicates the extent to which women or men are overrepresented in each of these nine categories. In the interior of the figure, the slopes of the two lines reveal the strength of vertical segregation, with a steep positive slope indicating that men are much advantaged in the competition for desirable occupations, a moderate positive slope indicating that men are only weakly advantaged in this competition, and a negative slope (which is logically possible but empirically unlikely) indicating that women are advantaged. The extent of horizontal segregation (the “horizontal gap parameter”) is given by the vertical distance between the manual and nonmanual lines. The foregoing three-parameter specification, which serves to summarize the aggregate structure of segregation, allows us to resolve long-standing empirical puzzles in the field that arose because most scholars have defaulted to a unidimensional view.

The two vertical slope parameters in Figure 38.2 are partly consistent with a unidimensional queuing formulation (whereby men secure better occupations than women), but our specification may be understood as a revision of this formulation because queuing theory does not allow for a “horizontal gap” expressing the tendency of women to be disproportionately allocated to the nonmanual sector (even though nonmanual occupations are, on average, more desirable than manual ones). Moreover, we allow the vertical principle to be stronger in some regions of the labor market (i.e., the manual sector) than in others, and we also allow the vertical principle to be stronger at the aggregate level than at the level of detailed occupations (which are not represented in Figure 38.2). Although queuing theory thus motivates some aspects of our parameterization, it cannot provide a complete account of segregation (see Reskin and Roos 1990; Strober 1984).

The deficiencies of queuing theory and other unidimensional formulations arise in large part because the cultural underpinnings of segregation are fundamentally two-dimensional. Under the parameterization of Figure 38.2, it is assumed (a) the cultural tenet of male primacy undergirds vertical segregation, and (b) the complementary cultural tenet of gender essentialism undergirds horizontal segregation. The tenet of male primacy represents men as more status-worthy than women and better suited for positions of authority and domination, and the tenet of gender essentialism represents women as more competent than men in personal service, nurturance, and social interaction. In the modern context, these two cultural tenets tend to coexist with one another, thus giving segregation systems a hybrid character. We review these two tenets below.

**Essentialism**

Why do women crowd into the nonmanual sector and men crowd into the manual sector? In addressing this question, one has to be struck by the strong correspondence between (a) the traits that are regarded as distinctively male or female (gender essentialism) and (b) the task requirements of manual and nonmanual labor. Although prevailing characterizations of male and female traits are complex and multifaceted, a core feature of such characterizations is that women are presumed to excel in personal service, nurturance, and personal interaction, and men are presumed to excel in interaction with things (rather than people) and in strenuous or physical labor. These stereotypes about natural male
and female characteristics are disseminated and perpetuated through popular culture and media, through social interaction in which significant others (parents, peers, teachers) implicitly or explicitly support such interpretations, and through micro-level cognitive processes in which individuals pursue and remember evidence consistent with their preexisting stereotypes and ignore, discount, or forget evidence that undermines those stereotypes (Fiske 1998; Reskin 2000). The main claim we wish to advance is that horizontal segregation is maintained and reproduced in large part because nonmanual occupations embody characteristics (such as service orientation) regarded as prototypically female, while manual occupations embody characteristics (such as strenuousness and physicality) regarded as prototypically male (see, e.g., Crompton 2001; Lorber 1993; Milkman and Townsley 1994; Tilly 1998). This linkage is converted into durable horizontal segregation because (a) employers internalize these essentialist presumptions and allocate occupations to men and women in accord with them (i.e., essentialist discrimination), and (b) workers internalize the same essentialist presumptions and aspire to occupations that satisfy them (i.e., essentialist preferences). It follows that horizontal segregation has both demand-side and supply-side sources.

**Male Primacy**

Why are men disproportionately allocated to the best-paid and most desirable occupations in both the nonmanual and manual sectors? In accounting for such vertical segregation, we again understand the main forces at work as being cultural in form, but now the relevant cultural principle is the long-standing belief that men are more status-worthy than women and accordingly better suited for positions of high pay or authority. Despite the rise of universalistic ideals, there persist deeply rooted and widely shared cultural beliefs that men are better suited than women for all forms of labor outside the family, and that men are, in particular, better suited than women for labor involving the exercise of authority and power (Deaux and Kite 1987; Ridgeway 1997). We argue, then, that vertical segregation is maintained and reproduced in part because it is consistent with the cultural value of male primacy. The main proximate mechanisms by which beliefs in male primacy are translated into vertical segregation are (a) the recognition among men that, because they are regarded as primary breadwinners, they should make substantial investments in human capital (i.e., supply-side sources), and (b) the recognition among employers that, because men are regarded as primary breadwinners, their commitment to the labor force will be greater and hence there is a greater payoff to investing in them rather than in women (who may exhibit intermittency). Moreover, employers reward men with better jobs not just because they assume that men have a greater commitment to the labor force, but also because they regard men as intrinsically more competent. Because such assumptions about intrinsic competency are internalized by everyone, male workers will also come to believe that they are more competent at high-status tasks than females and hence more likely to succeed in those tasks, thereby motivating them to make the requisite investments in human capital. The premise of male primacy, like that of gender essentialism, is therefore expressed in supply-side as well as demand-side processes.
The Dynamics of Gender Segregation

This two-dimensional understanding of segregation casts light on the processes by which the spread of egalitarian commitments will affect the structure of gender inequality. Within the cultural domain, the diffusion of egalitarianism is an extremely important development, one that will likely continue apace unless some unforeseen catastrophic event has a recalibrating effect. Although the future of egalitarianism appears bright, one should consider the limits of the particular version of egalitarianism that has taken hold and that continues to diffuse. Among the many competing egalitarian visions, it is clear that “liberal egalitarian” strands remain dominant, implying that our collective commitment to gender equality mainly takes the form of developing procedural guarantees of equal opportunity. This commitment to liberal egalitarianism is quite compatible with the essentialist presumption that men and women have fundamentally different tastes, skills, and abilities (see Charles and Grusky 2004). That is, the liberal egalitarian vision of women and men as autonomous agents entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and treatment allows for the persistence of fundamentally gendered outlooks and identities. For a liberal egalitarian, it is enough to defend the right of women to fairly compete for any occupation to which they aspire, without in any way questioning how those aspirations were formed or why they may differ from the aspirations of men. It follows that liberal egalitarians embrace an “equal but different” conceptualization of gender and social justice.

Insofar as this version of egalitarianism continues to diffuse, the push toward complete equality may be slowed. This suppressive effect occurs through proximate mechanisms on both the supply and demand sides. On the supply side, we cannot expect liberal egalitarians to pay much attention to individual aspirations and self-assessments, meaning that the persistence of gender differences in these outlooks and identities will not be scrutinized or challenged to the extent that they would be under more radical egalitarian commitments. On the demand side, the liberal egalitarian commitment delegitimates all forms of pure discrimination, but it does not as directly challenge statistical discrimination that rests on essentialist presumptions. In a world in which women have disproportionately “invested” in nurturance and service, essentialist presumptions about gender differences in capabilities have ample room to flourish, and employers may well reason that gender provides a good signal of capabilities in nurturing and service. The main argument we would make, then, is that liberal variants of egalitarianism serve principally to undermine the presumption of male primacy rather than gender essentialism; and, consequently, horizontal forms of segregation may prove to be quite resistant to egalitarianism.

Is the Argument Supported?

This argument can be addressed with the international data archive described in Table 38.1. We apply a cross-nationally harmonized classification of sixty-four detailed occupational categories to census segregation data from ten industrial market economies. The data are organized in the form of a three-dimensional, 1,280-cell matrix with sixty-four occupations, two sexes, and ten countries. For most of our
analyses, we examine segregation principally in terms of nine major classes, each of which is an aggregation of a subset of the sixty-four detailed occupations in the full array. We report results based on “self-weighted” data in which the actual sample size in each country is preserved. Because large-sample countries (such as Italy and Japan) have much leverage on our estimates, we have reestimated many of our models after standardizing sample sizes to an arbitrary constant (N = 10,000), but such standardized results have proved to be much the same as self-weighted results and therefore will not be reported here.

We have measured horizontal inequality at the aggregate level by distinguishing the five nonmanual categories (managerial, professional, associate professional, clerical, service/sales) from the four manual categories (agriculture, craft, operative, laborer). We measure vertical inequality with the internationally standardized socioeconomic index (SEI) published by Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996). This index, which is constructed as a weighted average of the educational attainment and income of occupational incumbents, is highly correlated with an international occupational prestige index. We apply two variants of this scale in our analyses: (a) the aggregate variant (V1) assigns average SEI values to each of the nine major categories, and (b) the detailed variant (V2) assigns SEI values to each of the sixty-four detailed occupations. The aggregate variant of this scale is used to examine the extent to which aggregate segregation is vertically organized, whereas the detailed variant is used to examine the extent to which detailed segregation is vertically organized.

The key question that arises is whether the between-category component may be explained in vertical terms. In its purest form, a queuing model implies that men are disproportionately allocated to the most desirable major occupations, thus suggesting the following specification:

\[ m_{ijk} = \alpha_k \beta_{ik} \gamma_{jk} e^{Z_i V_1 j}, \]

where i, j, and k index gender, occupation, and country respectively, \( \alpha_k \) is the grand mean in the kth country, \( \beta_{ik} \) is the country-specific marginal effect for the jth gender, \( \gamma_{jk} \) is the country-specific marginal effect for the jth occupation, \( Z_i \) refers to the effect of socioeconomic status on female representation (at the aggregate level), \( Z_{ij} = 0 \) and \( Z_{ij} = 1 \), and V1, refers to the aggregate version of our socioeconomic scale. We
have identified this model by imposing standard constraints on the parameters.

The test statistic for this model, $L^2 = 16,081,116$ with 629 df, implies that only 2.5 percent of the total association at the aggregate level can be explained in vertical terms. Moreover, our estimate of $\alpha$ under this model is .008, meaning that female representation increases by a factor of 1.008 for each unit increase in socioeconomic status. This estimate, which indicates that women are (slightly) overrepresented in high-status occupations, is of course inconsistent with simple queuing perspectives (see Blackburn, Brooks, and Jarman 2001; Charles and Grusky 1995; Roos 1985). Although such a result is counterintuitive, it is consistent with the long-standing argument that socioeconomic scores overstate the desirability of routine nonmanual occupations and hence create the (misleading) appearance of female advantage (e.g., Acker 1980; England 1979). We have no quarrels with this long-standing account, but it may not be complete. The queuing model fails, as we see it, not only because socioeconomic scales are flawed or because the vertical dynamic is weak but also because this dynamic is obscured in the absence of controls for horizontal segregation. The structure of segregation is in this sense fundamentally multidimensional.

We can test this argument by examining whether the vertical coefficient reverses sign and strengthens in the context of a multidimensional model. When vertical and horizontal effects are simultaneously fit, the following model is generated:

$$m_{ijk} = \alpha_k \beta_{ik} \gamma_{jk} e^{(Z_i V_{1j}) + (Z_i H_j)}.$$  

where $H_j$ is the horizontal term (i.e., $H_j = 1$ if $j$ is a manual occupation and $H_j = 0$ otherwise), $\omega$ is the effect of horizontal status on female representation, and the remaining terms are defined as before. The explained association under this specification increases dramatically from 2.5 to 80.4 percent, and the vertical coefficient further assumes the expected negative sign and becomes quite strong (-.050). The horizontal coefficient is likewise very strong: The estimate of $\omega$, $-1.96$, implies that female representation is 7.10 times greater in a nonmanual occupation than a corresponding manual occupation of the same socioeconomic status. This effect, which is equivalent to that associated with a downward shift in status of nearly forty points, is surely strong enough to suggest that scholars of gender stratification should move beyond their long-standing focus on vertical inequality and begin attending to horizontal forms of stratification.

We might also allow the strength of the vertical effect to differ across sectors. This model may be represented as follows:

$$m_{ijk} = \alpha_k \beta_{ik} \gamma_{jk} e^{(Z_i N_j V_{1j}) + (Z_i M_j V_{1j}) + (Z_i H_j)},$$  

where $N_j$ is an indicator variable for nonmanual occupations (i.e., $N_j = 1$ if $j$ is a nonmanual occupation and $N_j = 0$ otherwise), $M_j$ is an indicator variable for manual occupations (i.e., $M_j = H_j$), and $\psi$ and $\epsilon$ express the strength of vertical segregation within the nonmanual and manual sectors respectively. With this specification, the explained association increases modestly (from 80.4 to 85.3 percent), and the vertical effect is revealed to be slightly weaker in the nonmanual sector (-.040) than in the manual sector (-.047). The modern segregation regime thus takes on the three-parameter form represented in Figure 38.2: The horizontal gap parameter captures the dramatic overrepresentation of women in the nonmanual sector, and the two slope para-
meters capture the tendency for men to dominate the best occupations within the manual and nonmanual sectors.

It follows that our three-parameter specification effectively exhausts the structure of segregation at the aggregate level. Is disaggregate segregation equally amenable to a parsimonious account? Although we shall not attempt any elaborate modeling here, we can at least test the simple claim that segregation across detailed categories assumes a simple vertical form. This hypothesis can be tested with the following model:

$$m_{ijk} = \alpha_{ik} \beta_{jk} \gamma_{ek} e^{(Z_{i}V_{2j})+\rho_{c}(Z_{i})},$$

where $\rho$ refers to the scale values for major occupational categories (indexed by c), and $V_{2j}$ refers to the detailed variant of our socioeconomic scale. This model explains a mere 3.3 percent of the total disaggregate association; and the vertical coefficient, estimated at -.034, is only 68 percent as strong as the corresponding vertical coefficient (-.050) at the aggregate level (under the model of equation 2). We can conclude that the forces of patriarchy do not operate all that efficiently in allocating men to the most desirable occupations within each major category. It is possible, of course, that the vertical coefficient is suppressed because various types of essentialist effects (such as a nurturing effect or service effect) have been improperly omitted from our model. It is surely worth exploring this possibility in future research. Without explicit evidence of such bias, our provisional conclusion is nonetheless that disaggregate segregation does not have a clear vertical character to it, again calling conventional queuing models into question.

We next ask whether our three-parameter specification suffices to describe the structure of aggregate segregation in all advanced industrial countries. We have estimated single-country models analogous to the foregoing pooled models and reported the relevant parameters and fit statistics in Table 38.2. The main conclusions that emerge are: (a) a simple unidimensional model explains only a small minority of the aggregate association in each country (see panel A); (b) the vertical segregation coefficient from this unidimensional model assumes the same positive (and counterintuitive) sign in each country; (c) our alternative multidimensional specification explains more than 70 percent of the aggregate association in each country (see panel D); (d) the vertical segregation coefficients from this model become strong and negative in each country; (e) the horizontal segregation effect is likewise strong in most countries (except Italy and Portugal) and may therefore be regarded as an important, if neglected, source of contemporary hyper-segregation; and (f) the nonmanual slope coefficient is weaker than the corresponding manual coefficient in all but two countries (the United States and Japan).

We can now turn to the question of why countries with a comparatively deep commitment to egalitarianism, such as France, West Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have remained quite sex segregated. As shown in Panel C of Table 38.2, the average value of the horizontal segregation parameter for these five “egalitarian” countries is –3.20, whereas the corresponding average for the five less egalitarian countries in our sample is –2.07. There is accordingly no evidence that egalitarianism reduces the horizontal variant of segregation. To the contrary, it would appear to increase such segregation, an effect that may arise because egalitarianism has drawn women into the labor force at precisely the time when the nonmanual sector
Table 38.2  Single-Country Models of Vertical and Horizontal Sex Segregation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Aggregate Segregation Explained (%)</th>
<th>Vertical Coefficient</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Vertical Effect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>12.78</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>9.15</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Horizontal Effect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>43.48</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>40.41</td>
<td>-1.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>42.43</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>59.55</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>18.36</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>41.64</td>
<td>-1.53</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>42.01</td>
<td>-1.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>39.34</td>
<td>-1.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>55.44</td>
<td>-1.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>20.82</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Vertical and Horizontal Effect (Additive)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>75.08</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>-2.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>79.64</td>
<td>-.086</td>
<td>-3.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>84.82</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.027</td>
<td>-1.38</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-.034</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
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<td>-3.23</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>83.03</td>
<td>-.84</td>
<td>-3.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>75.02</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>-2.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>77.63</td>
<td>-.075</td>
<td>-2.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Vertical and Horizontal Effect (Ineractive)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>85.84</td>
<td>-.039</td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>-2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>87.99</td>
<td>-.066</td>
<td>-.110</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
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<td>-.017</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>-.101</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.045</td>
<td>-.027</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>77.94</td>
<td>-.078</td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td>-2.11</td>
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</table>
is expanding (see Charles and Grusky 2004 for details).

This counterintuitive result can be formalized by developing an explicit measure of gender egalitarianism and then asking how it varies with horizontal segregation. We may define “gender egalitarianism” as a commitment to gender-based equality of opportunity and operationalize it as the percentage of respondents in each country disagreeing with the statement that “men have greater rights to jobs during periods of high unemployment.” This survey item, which comes out of the 1990 World Values Survey (WVS), signals whether respondents accept the assumption of male economic dominance or reject it in favor of the norms of universalism and equal opportunity (see Table 38.3 for country-level values). If we then regress the coefficients for horizontal segregation (Panel C) on our measure of egalitarianism, we secure a coefficient of -.026. This coefficient implies that a 40 point increase in egalitarianism, a difference roughly equal to that between Italy and Sweden, raises horizontal segregation by a factor of 2.83. The “Swedish puzzle” is solved, therefore, by recognizing that the logic of egalitarian policy is not inconsistent with the persistence and even the growth of horizontal forms of segregation.

We of course appreciate that many other macro-level variables may well affect the extent of vertical and horizontal segregation. For example, we have argued elsewhere that service-sector expansion and economic rationalization are important structural forces affecting modern segregation, forces that can again perversely work to increase rather than reduce horizontal segregation (Charles and Grusky 2004). Although the effects of service-sector expansion and rationalization rest on complicated mechanisms that cannot be reviewed here, they are consistent with our larger argument that sex segregation cannot necessarily be expected to straightforwardly decline.

### Conclusion

The preceding discussion suggests that the future of gender inequality rests on a struggle between egalitarian and essentialist forces that is not quite as one-sided as modernization theorists have sometimes claimed (see, e.g., Jackson 1998; Parsons 1970). If gender segregation is especially durable, it is partly because it has a deep essentialist undergirding. The “first revolution” in gender inequality, which has generated important reductions in segregation over the past thirty years, has been driven in large part by declines in vertical inequality (see Weeden 2004). Will there be a “second revolution” that leads to an analogous decline in horizontal segregation? In answering this question, conventional functionalist and neoinstitutionalist accounts fall short because they fail to recognize that horizontal segregation proceeds from an essentialist ideology that can persist—even thrive—in the context of liberal egalitarian norms of equal opportunity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>51.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>58.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>58.46</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>47.66</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>87.93</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>58.62</td>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>71.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>25.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the contemporary context, men and women are presumed to have rather different tastes and aptitudes, and liberal egalitarianism works merely to ensure that such differences, however they might be generated, can then be pursued or expressed in a fair (gender-neutral) contest. The assumption that men and women have fundamentally different tastes and capacities is reinforced in various social settings, not just in families (with their gender-specific socialization practices) and work organizations (with their discriminatory hiring practices) but in other institutional contexts as well. By way of (trivial) example, consider the practice among American fast-food restaurants of providing gender-specific toys to children, a practice of interest only because it is widely diffused and evidently unobjectionable to all but a small minority of “gender progressives.” If these same restaurants distributed toys on the basis of racial or class standing, the practice would be deemed absurd at best and racist or classist at worst. This example suggests that, at least in the United States, it is less legitimate to interpret racial or class-based inequalities in essentialist terms than to interpret gender segregation and inequality in these terms.

In the long run, it is of course possible that a yet deeper form of egalitarianism will emerge and delegitimate (a) the tendency of males and females to develop different tastes, aspirations, and market capacities, and (b) the tendency of employers to make judgments about productivity through essentialist lenses. There are indeed many signs that just such a form of egalitarianism is developing. Most notably, conventional sociological understandings of the roles of socialization, social exchange, and power differentials in generating preferences have diffused widely in contemporary industrial societies, suggesting that preferences and choices formerly regarded as sacrosanct are increasingly treated as outcomes of unequal and unfair social processes. This deeper form of egalitarianism is reflected in attempts by some parents to minimize gender bias in the socialization of their children, at least in the early years of childrearing before the unremitting influence of societywide essentialism typically undermines their efforts. It is surely plausible that this deeper form of egalitarianism will ultimately take hold (see Ramirez 1987, p. 270).

For our part, we would merely stress that prevailing forms of egalitarianism do not fully delegitimate essentialist processes and that a true “second revolution,” one that establishes this new and broader definition of equality, will therefore be needed to eliminate essentialist segregation. There should be no illusions about how formidable the remaining barriers are. Far from being some “inevitable destiny” (Jackson 1998, p. 271), the second revolution will face many obstacles, not the least of which is an entrenched tradition of classical liberalism that celebrates individual choice and thus supports and sustains those forms of inequality that can be represented as consistent with it.

NOTES

1. If the two vertical segregation lines are parallel, the distance between them is of course constant. However, insofar as the slopes of these lines are allowed to differ, the size of the horizontal parameter will depend on the implicit zero point of the vertical scale.

2. Under this specification, the two vertical parameters no longer generate parallel lines, meaning that the estimated size of the horizontal parameter depends on the implied zero point of the socioeconomic scale. We have fixed the zero point of this scale at 37 (which is the midpoint between the score for the lowest nonmanual cate-
The two vertical segregation lines are furthest from one another at this point (assuming that the nonmanual slope is weaker than the manual one).

REFERENCES


