Born in Turkey, Benali Kalkan entered France without regular papers in 1982. During the next few years he started his own business, worked in a legally declared enterprise, developed fluency in French, and married a Frenchwoman. But he did not acquire legal residence in France. Within a decade of arrival, as a consequence, he became a major player in a vivid political drama.

In 1989, the French government responded in a characteristic way to European Community (EC) agreements on immigration, to increased demands for asylum by immigrants from outside the EC, and to the right-wing National Front’s exploitation of anti-immigrant sentiments: the government declared it would expedite its processing of asylum applications and rapidly expel clandestine immigrants who did not qualify. That move threatened unauthorized residents such as Benali Kalkan. Immediately, leaders of an established network of associations concerned with questions of immigration and asylum began consulting, mobilizing, and agitating in favor of countermeasures. Rejected applicants for asylum came to association headquarters asking for help. In response, the associations in question collectively created services for the Rejected (démentis) and started to solicit public officials on their behalf.

Soon immigration activists and ethnic leaders were organizing a social movement in the French style: holding public meetings, drawing in trade unions, seeking media coverage, and above all addressing demands, public and otherwise, to agents of the national state. By 1991, their demands centered on wholesale acceptance of all the Rejected who had arrived in France
before 1990 as well as full review of dossiers for all later comers. Simultaneously, leaders organized immigrant constituencies by occupation and by national origin, with Turks and Haitians prominent among the activists. Local organizations formed national federations aimed at the government in Paris.

And Benali Kalkan? Threatened with expulsion from the country by Bordeaux police, he began a hunger strike—a strategy already familiar to imprisoned militant Turks as a way of putting pressure on their jailers. Soon twenty-four other Turks joined him. The archbishop of Bordeaux provided the city’s hunger strikers with a room, hence with symbolic and material support from the Catholic Church. Connected to the national federation of associations “in solidarity with immigrants” by a federation representative who was then vacationing in Bordeaux, the local strikers soon had counterparts in Ales, Avignon, Val-de-Reuil, Saint-Dizier, Mulhouse, Strasbourg... and of course Paris.

As Johanna Siméant (from whose detailed study of the movement I have constructed my story) says, resort to hunger strikes

seems to have been dictated by the meager resources and support to which the Rejected had access, and whose effectiveness they had to maximize. For the Rejected, with little money, rarely having cultural capital readily expendable in France, often living in marginal housing, their principal resources lay in support from associations devoted to solidarity with foreigners and refugees, which in general provided their chief contacts with members of the receiving society. (1993: 194)

Hunger strikes had multiple effects. They

- restored the then-faltering support of solidarity associations for the Rejected;
- provided imitable models for action elsewhere;
- defined a strategy whereby church officials could easily collaborate on humanitarian grounds rather than by making a declared political choice;
- drew sympathy and support from bystanders;
- attracted media attention; and thus
- publicized the cause on a national scale.

The choice of hunger strikes (as compared, say, with militant demonstrations, attacks on public buildings or officials, strikes at workplaces, or mass petition drives) also permitted tacit cooperation of public officials, both in day-to-day policing of the strikers and in a general redefinition of the problem as more humanitarian than legal.

When impatient Bordeaux city officials did try to break up the strike, the archbishop arrived in time to station himself inside as police broke down the door, strikers chained themselves together while refusing transfer to a hospital, and national television cameras filmed the whole episode. Soon the national government was agreeing to postpone all expulsions for three months and to improve screening procedures. On May 23, 1991, during the talks that produced the provisional agreement, about ten thousand demonstrators marched through Paris on behalf of—and including many of—the Rejected.

The focus on hunger strikes posed problems for negotiators at the national level. It involved association activists in monitoring and manipulating risky local events, gave exceptional leverage to a small number of strikers, and greatly limited national leaders’ room to maneuver. Hunger strikers understandably insisted on their right to decide the risks they would run, while their national spokespersons understandably claimed superior knowledge of what would actually move the government. Representatives of solidarity associations, negotiating with governmental officials and scenting victory, but fearing the consequences of a death among the hunger strikers, pressed the marchers to suspend their fasts pending the outcome of negotiations. Many strikers, however, held fiercely to the advantage and autonomy afforded them by sacrifice, at least for a few more days.

Finally national leaders prevailed; most local hunger strikes ended on May 28. But representatives of associations continued to bargain with the government. The result was a governmental decree on July 23, 1991. The decree fell far short of the associations’ maximum demands, especially for the majority of asylum seekers who had arrived beginning in 1989. But by the time of the decree, the movement was already disintegrating. As rearguard actions, new rounds of hunger strikes occurred from September to December 1991, in early 1992, then again in September 1992. None of them significantly affected governmental policy. By the last round, indeed, the government had acquired sufficient confidence to break up hunger strikes by force.

Benali Kalkan, his Turkish fellow strikers, the archbishop of Bordeaux, a variety of public officials, television reporters, self-selected members of the French public, and a network of activists extending across France were engaging in a recognizable social movement, a campaign for changes in the state treatment of illegal immigrants. Although this book concerns not causes but outcomes of social movements, there is no way to trace outcomes of
such complex social processes without having robust descriptions and explanations of their operations. I will try to show why this is true. I will also try to show what sort of explanation of social movement makes sense in the present very incomplete state of knowledge about cause and effect in social movements.

In order to describe and explain what was happening in the French solidarity movement and in social movements at large, we must clear away two mistaken ideas. For reasons that will turn out to be crucial to an explanation of the social action involved, social movement activists themselves promulgate these mistaken ideas more or less deliberately. The first idea is that social movements are solidaristic, coherent groups, rather than clusters of performances. The second is that social movements have continuous, self-contained life histories in somewhat the same sense that individuals and organizations have life histories.

Both ideas are false, or at least very misleading. Although social movements often activate existing groups and create agreed-upon stories about their pasts, no analyst should imagine that the groups and the stories constitute the movement, any more than someone who watches a soccer match should imagine it as a single team's solo performance, for all the stories she can tell about that team's glorious past or previous iterations of a given cup final. A match becomes a match through the interaction of two teams, the referees, and the spectators, not to mention coaches, reporters, and league officials. Social movements similarly consist of bounded, contingent, interactive performances by multiple and changing actors.

Social movements have not always existed. If we identify them with the forms of interaction that were visible in the French solidarity mobilization of 1889–1922—the formation of associations and federations, public displays of determination and connectedness such as hunger strikes and demonstrations, encounters with public officials via mass media and closed negotiations, appeals to uninvolved citizens for support, and so on—then no social movements occurred anywhere before the nineteenth century. Even if we insist on parallels in such mobilizations as the Protestant Reformation or rebellions against successive Chinese dynasties, we must recognize that social movements happened rarely before 1800, then became standard political performances in Western Europe and North America before spreading to other parts of the globe. Yet they rapidly took their place among ways of making collective claims in the expanding world of parliamentary democracy.

Social movements took shape in close conjunction with two other clusters of performances that likewise deploy groups and histories but do not consist of groups and their histories: electoral campaigns and interest-group politics. Indeed, social movements gain some of their effectiveness as modes of claim-making from their potential bearing on electoral campaigns and interest-group politics. Although the three differ in timing, organization, coordination, and participants, they all qualify as campaigns in the sense that they are socially connected, clustered performances oriented to the same set of collective claims.

While electoral campaigns, interest-group politics, and social movements do not consist of continuous, self-contained life histories in the same sense that organisms do, they do lay down coherent histories within their boundaries. In that regard, they resemble wars, revolutions, soccer matches, street fairs, and jam sessions. None of them is a self-generating group, and all of them involve complex encounters among changing actors, yet in all of them what happens early constrains what happens later. That chroniclers and theorists, then, sometimes cast their stories of wars, revolutions, and the rest as unfolding natural histories resembling the lives of violets, clams, or bacilli should not confuse us, the analysts of social movements.

How, then, will we recognize a social movement when we see one? It consists of a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that population's worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment. At a minimum, social movements involve continuous interaction between challengers and power holders. The claim-making usually engages third parties such as other power holders, represive forces, allies, competitors, and the citizenry as a whole. Such a definition excludes coups d'état, civil wars, insurrections, feuds, and many other forms of contentious politics. It includes some interactions that overlap with industrial conflict, electoral campaigns, and interest-group politics, but by no means exhaust these domains. Many an election, for example, proceeds without either sustained challenges to power holders or repeated public displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment.

No social movement is self-contained. None operates without involvement of at least three distinguishable populations: power holders who are the objects of claims, the minimum claim being to tolerate the movement's existence; participants, who range from minor contributors to leaders and are often connected by social movement organizations; and a subject population on whose behalf participants are making or supporting claims. The three can of course overlap, as when activists come exclusively from the subject population or when a populist power holder deserts his fellows to ally with popular claimants. But they can also remain quite distinct, as when antiabortionist activists claim to speak on behalf of the unborn. Most social
movements also involve additional parties: countermovement activists, competing power holders, police, sympathetic citizens. Sustained claim-making interaction among the three defining parties—power holders, participants, subject population—plus any other parties that involve themselves in the interaction constitutes the social movement.

By proposing such a definition, I am not claiming for a moment that its elements specify all aspects of social movements that one might find interesting or even crucial to their operation, including the sorts of public identities that people adopt, the place of social networks in recruitment, and the relationship of social movement programs to social change in general. I am instead making a strong analytic claim: that clusters of events that the definition identifies operate according to similar cause-and-effect relationships, differ significantly, with respect to causal processes, from adjacent phenomena that the definition excludes, and are empirically distinguishable from their neighbors. Definitions cannot be true or false, but they can be more or less useful. Useful definitions point to empirical means of grouping together phenomena that have common causal properties and of distinguishing phenomena that differ significantly in causal properties. I claim utility for my definition of social movements on just such principles.

Many social movement analysts will reject this claim on the grounds that the proposed definition is too broad, too narrow, or centered on the wrong features of social movements—in short, that it fails to coincide with what interests them. The very prestige of social movements as objects of analysis has generated two sorts of definitional struggles: proposed extensions of the term to analogous phenomena that another age would have called rebellions, intellectual currents, religious revivals, or something else; and shifts of emphasis toward phenomena that frequently overlap with social movements, such as ideological change and identity construction.

Consider a remarkable example of the shift to identity construction. Reporting on feminist activism in Columbus, Ohio, from the 1960s to the 1990s, Nancy Whittier declares:

In order to tap the full range of women's movement activity and to recognize its continuity over time, I propose to define the women's movement in terms of the collective identity associated with it rather than in terms of its formal organizations. We see the movement, then, not just through the organizations it establishes, but also through its informal networks and communities and in the diaspora of feminist individuals who carry the concerns of the movement into other settings. What makes these organizations, networks, and individuals part of a social movement is their shared allegiance to a set of beliefs, practices, and ways of identifying oneself that constitute feminist collective identity. ... A focus on collective identity underscores the constantly changing nature of all social movements and recognizes that struggle occurs, not just in confrontations with the State, but in culture and daily life as well. (1995: 23-24)

Social movements, to Whittier's eye, do not merely rely on structures and processes that promote collective identity, they consist of those structures and processes, rather than of claims or collective actions that the relevant structures, processes, and collective identities support. With such a definition, we are not surprised to find Whittier arguing that feminist movements center on successive generations of participants who reshape their shared identities through struggle and daily practice.

Whittier's definition of social movements as identity-creating structures and processes, however, confronts four analytical objections:

- It implicitly claims that "shared allegiance to a set of beliefs, practices, and ways of identifying oneself" constitutes a distinct causal domain, a debatable proposition that, at a minimum, deserves explication and defense.
- It lacks a criterion separating (1) the sorts of interaction Whittier describes in the case of Columbus, Ohio, feminist activists from (2) other situations such as household membership, religious affiliation, employment by paternalistic firms, or citizenship, all of which also involve shared allegiance to a set of beliefs, practices, and ways of identifying oneself, but which most analysts would reject as social movements; most analysts would deny, furthermore, that these other situations share strong causal properties with social movements.
- It allows a social movement to exist in the absence of any public challenge whatsoever.
- It makes Whittier's main argument—that social movements persist and evolve through periods of public inactivity—true by definition rather than an object of empirical inquiry.

Although (as will soon be apparent) Whittier is addressing a crucial problem that social movement theorists in my own political-process tradition have mishandled, I regard the four objections to her definition as insuperable. But, in any case, to propose a competing definition—Whittier's or someone
distinctive forms of popular contention, participants in social movements (including authorities, repressive forces, allies, rivals, and spectators) have implicitly adopted a standard scorecard for challenges according to the following formula:

$$\text{strength} = \text{worthiness} \times \text{unity} \times \text{numbers} \times \text{commitment}$$

If any of these values falls to zero, strength likewise falls to zero; the challenge loses credibility. High values on one element, however, make up for low values on another. As the French hunger strikes illustrate, a small number of activists who display their worthiness, unity, and commitment by means of simultaneous risk or sacrifice often have as large an impact as a large number of people who sign a petition, wear a badge, or march through the streets on a sunny afternoon. Relevant codes run something like this:

- **Worthiness**: sobriety, propriety of dress, incorporation of priests and other dignitaries, endorsement of moral authorities, evidence of previous undeserved suffering
- **Unity**: uniforms, marching or dancing in unison, chanting of slogans, singing, cheering, linking of arms, wearing or bearing of common symbols, direct affirmation of a common program or identity
- **Numbers**: filling of public space, presentation of petitions, representations of multiple units (e.g., neighborhood associations), direct claims of numerical support by means of polls, membership inscriptions, and financial contributions
- **Commitment**: persistence in costly or risky activity, declarations of readiness to persevere, resistance to attack

With variation in the precise means used to display these characteristics (e.g., the partial displacement of identifying banners by signs on sticks late in the nineteenth century), emphasis on WUNC has persisted from early in social movement history. The chief deviations from the code have occurred in pursuit of visibility and in deliberate assertions of difference, as when members of dissident factions have broken the façade of unity by resisting marching orders or when gay militants have violated conventional standards of worthiness by cross-dressing.

Why and how does WUNC matter? An initially puzzling feature of social movement activity provides crucial clues. As compared with attacking a
worthiness, unity, and/or commitment. The actual work of organizers consists recurrently of patching together provisional coalitions, suppressing risky tactics, negotiating which of the multiple agendas that participants bring with them will find public voice in their collective action, and, above all, hiding backstage struggle from public view. Organizers almost always exaggerate their coalition's worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment. Organizers of France's movement of solidarity with the Rejected faced just such difficulties in holding their coalition together.

Second, movement activists seek to present themselves and (if different) the objects of their solicitude as an integrated group, preferably a group with a long history and with coherent existence outside the world of public claim-making. Despite powerful evidence to the contrary, organizers of the French solidarity movement sought to represent the Rejected as a coherent category. In that regard, activists resemble state-seeking nationalists with their constructions of long, coherent, and distinctive cultural histories for their nations. Thus, feminists identify themselves with women's age-old struggles for rights in the streets and in everyday existence, civil rights leaders minimize class and religious differences within their racial category, and environmentalists present most of humanity as their eternal community.

The two varieties of mystification address several different audiences. They encourage activists and supporters to make high estimates of the probability that fellow adherents will take risks and incur costs for the cause, and thus that their own contributions will bear fruit. They also warn authorities, objects of claims, opponents, rivals, and bystanders to take the movement seriously as a force that can affect their fates.

Movements differ significantly in the relative attention they give to these various audiences, from carrying out self-absorbed tests of daring organized by small clusters of terrorists, to soliciting signatures on petitions from transient participants who wish some authority to know their opinion. These orientations frequently vary in the course of a given social movement, for example, in the transitions from internal building to ostentatious action to fighting off competitors and enemies. But the general effectiveness of social movement organizing as a way of making public claims depends on the constitution of credible collective actors that could disrupt existing political arrangements. Because the process of collective identity construction does often knit together existing networks and produce long-lasting organizations, many participants, observers, and analysts have drawn a mistaken conclusion: that social movements simply realize previously existing identities.

The distinctive relation of social movements to shared identities will become clearer if we examine the nature of political identities in general.
marks end points of a continuum. The collective identity “citizen,” for example, falls somewhere in between, typically shaping relations between employers and workers and strongly affecting political involvements, but making little difference to a wide range of other social routines. The embedded/detached distinction denies, however, two common (and contradictory) ways of understanding the identities that prevail in contentious politics: either as simple activations of preexisting, even primordial, individual attributes, or as purely discursive constructions having little or no grounding in social organization. From embedded to detached, collective identities resemble linguistic genres in entailing coherent interpersonal collaboration but varying contingently in content, form, and applicability from setting to setting.

Reinforced by convention, internal organization, or acquisition of privileges, detached identities sometimes become salient in everyday social relations as well, but they begin elsewhere. Through its various policies from 1903 to 1981, the South African state rife and ratified racial categories that came to loom large in social routines. Eventually, the state and its diverse agents mapped such categories as Zulu, Xhosa, Afrikaner, and Coloured onto the entire population with such force that the categories governed significant shares of everyday social relations (Ashforth 1999; Marks and Trapido 1987). Thus, initially detached collective identities became embedded ones.

Through sharpening of categorical boundaries and promotion of shared activities, social movement participation has likewise partially embedded detached identities in routine social life among women, ethnic minorities, and military veterans. The process also runs in the other direction, generalizing and detaching embedded identities, as when carpenters in one shop, machinists in another, and pipe fitters in a third band together as generalized workers. Nevertheless, the distinction matters; the degree to which political identities are embedded or detached strongly affects the quantity of widely available knowledge they draw on, the density of underpinning social ties, the strength of conflicting commitments, the ease of emulation from one setting to another, and therefore the effectiveness of different organizing strategies.

The distinction between embedded and detached collective identities corresponds approximately to the difference between local contention and national social movement politics in early nineteenth-century Europe, when a major shift toward the national arena was transforming popular politics (Tarrow 1994; Traugott 1995). In such forms of claim-making interaction as shaming ceremonies (e.g., donkeying, Rough Music), grain seizures, and burning of effigies, people generally deployed collective identities corresponding...
closely to those that prevailed in routine social life: householder, carpenter, neighbor, and so on. We can designate these forms of interaction as parochial and particularistic, since they ordinarily occurred within localized webs of social relations, incorporating practices and understandings peculiar to those localized webs. They also often took a patronized form, relying on appeals to privileged intermediaries for intercession with more distant authorities.

In demonstrations, electoral campaigns, and public meetings, however, participants often presented themselves as party supporters, association members, citizens, and similar detached collective identities. The labels national, modular, and autonomous for these types of claim-making call attention to their frequent fixation on national issues and objects, their standardization from one setting or issue to another, and the frequency with which participants directly addressed power holders they did not see in everyday social contacts. The difference signifies large contrasts in social relations among participants, mobilization patterns, and the organization of action itself. The shift from parochial, particularistic, often patronized forms of claim-making to autonomous, national, and modular forms was articulated in profound alterations in social structure.

To be sure, once national, autonomous, and modular forms of interaction were available as models, claim-makers could employ them on other scales: in the international arena (as with coordinated nineteenth-century campaigns against slavery), within particular regions or cities (as in many urban struggles from 1848 onward), and even within firms (as when workers have intermittently taken their strikes to the streets in bids for outside support). Modularity facilitated the transfer of claim-making routines from their proving grounds to distant social terrains.

These shifts in the predominant forms of claim-making in Europe took place in different versions and at different times and paces from one region to another. Altogether, they constituted a dramatic alteration of contentious repertoires. Repertoires of contention resemble conversational conventions linking particular sets of interlocutors to each other: far narrower than the technical capacities of the parties would allow or their interests alone prescribe, repertoires form and change through mutual claim-making. Like conversations, when operating well they feature incessant innovation that occurs closely enough to previously established patterns to achieve both drama and intelligibility; a completely stereotyped utterance or claim-making routine carries no conviction except as a joke, yet one that makes no use of existing cultural conventions fails to connect with its audience. Like economic institutions that evolve through interaction among organizations but significantly constrain the forms of economic relations at any particular time, repertoires limit possibilities for collective action and interaction (Nelson 1995).

Evolution of the demonstration as a means of claim-making, to take an obvious example, tilts activists, police, spectators, rivals, and political officials toward well-defined ways of organizing, anticipating, and responding to the claims made in this medium, in sharp distinction to claims laid by bombing or bribing (Favre 1990). Strikes, sit-ins, mass meetings, and other forms of claim-making link well-defined identities to each other, involve incessant innovation, and change configuration over the long run, but they accumulate their own histories, memories, lore, laws, and standard practices. Repertoires, in short, are historically evolving and strongly constraining cultural products.

Social movements incorporate a special version of national, modular, and autonomous repertoires, one including association and coalition formation, public meetings, demonstrations, petitions, lobbying, media presentations, and related forms of interaction. Despite recurrent talk of direct action, social movement activists generally avoid direct action in the strong sense of attacks, seizures, occupations, and other immediate implementations of stated claims. Instead, they usually concentrate their public efforts on

- announcing the presence in the polity of a mobile bloc, characterized as a worthy, unified, numerous, committed, and aggrieved population;
- broadcasting the contingent commitment of that bloc to a program requiring public recognition and/or action;
- moving authorities to forward that program against the (implicit or explicit) threat of actions by the bloc that would disrupt existing political arrangements;
- persuading authorities to recognize the bloc as a legitimate political actor and themselves as its authorized interlocutors;
- producing or altering connections both among movement participants and between movement participants and other political actors; and
- transforming shared understandings of political possibilities, both among movement participants and outside.

These activities, in turn, often have significant effects on the subsequent lives of individual participants in social movements, as well as on the networks that connect them. Yet analysts of social movements, commonly
drawn from participants and sympathizers, understandably follow movement leaders in preparing scorecards in terms of openly articulated claims. Marco Giugni's introduction to this volume and most of the chapters in it focus on just such questions: given a certain set of collective claims by activists, what determines the extent to which movement action produces results fulfilling those claims—or, for that matter, results impeding their fulfillment?

Although social movement leaders do generally organize their public accounting around their movements' announced programs, an enormous range of unanticipated effects qualify logically as outcomes of social movements. Even to participants, furthermore, effects other than collective increases in public power obviously matter. If William Gamson, a quarter century ago, rightly stressed acceptance and new advantages as the two most prominent goals publicly articulated by movement leaders (1975), we notice both that central claims concern the acceptance and welfare of others—families, prisoners, victims of dread diseases, nonhuman animals—and that, at least in retrospect, leaders and activists often argue that the crucial movement victories took place not on the public, political front but in reorientations of their own lives. At times movements have their largest effects not through advancement of their programs but through these other outcomes—transformation of participants' lives, co-optation of leaders, or even renewed repression.

Movements also leave political by-products that lie outside their programs and sometimes even contradict them: new police personnel and practices; the generation of rival movements and organizations; alterations in laws of assembly, association, and publicity; co-optation of activists and their organizations by governments or political parties; transformation of social movement organizations into pressure groups; the creation of legal precedents for subsequent challenges by other social movements. We begin to see why the tracing of social movement outcomes causes such difficulty and controversy. This range of effects far surpasses the explicit demands made by activists in the course of social movements, and sometimes negates them. By any standard, "success" and "failure" hardly describe most of the effects.

Further complexities in the tracing of social movement outcomes arise. Independent actions of authorities, interventions of other interested parties, environmental changes, and the grinding on of nonmovement politics all produce consequences in the zone of a given social movement's activity and interest. Multiple causal chains lead to a plethora of possible effects in a situation where influences other than social movement activity necessarily contribute to the effects.

Figure 1 schematizes the logical situation as three overlapping circles representing, respectively, (1) all effects of movement actions; (2) all public claims made by movement activists; and (3) all effects of outside events and actions. Space A, the common ground of public claims and effects of movement actions, represents the commonsense meaning of social movement outcome: movement actions cause fulfillment of movement claims or fail to do so; we caused an expansion of protections for abortion; we lost our campaign for an Equal Rights Amendment; we suffered the assassination of our leaders.

The diagram, however, makes an analyst's logical problem immediately obvious: spaces B, C, and D also exist. No inductive methodology—no multivariate statistical analysis, no yes/no comparison checklist, no narrowing of the outcomes considered—can possibly solve the problem, nor can mere second-guessing of movement activists through the specification of tried-and-true strategies that would have given them more of whatever they

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**Figure 1. The problem of identifying social movement outcomes**

![Diagram](image)
were demanding. Both an inductive and an empathetic approach will found in the complexity of the explanatory problem.

Only one response will work. That is (1) to formulate clear theories of the causal processes by which social movements produce their effects; (2) to limit investigations to the effects made plausible by those theories; (3) to work upstream by identifying instances of the effects, then seeing whether the hypothesized causal chain was actually operating; (4) to work downstream by identifying instances of the causal chain in operation, then seeing whether and how its hypothesized effects occurred; (5) to work midstream by examining whether the internal links of the causal chain operated as the theory requires; and (6) to rule out, to the extent possible, competing explanations of the effects.

This six-step approach breaks with conventional analyses of social movement outcomes, including William Gans's classic analysis, which search for correspondences between attributes of social movements and alterations in their environments called for by their programs. It entertains the possibility that the major effects of social movements will have little or nothing to do with the public claims their leaders make. The critical causal theories, in any case, will turn out to concern not effects alone but also the very dynamics of social movement interactions.

Do we dispose of such sophisticated causal theories? We do not. The sketches of social movement dynamics I offered earlier suggest some likely elements of valid theories: the formation of detached identities for which potential niches exist in the polity, the production of WUNC and its consequences, feedback from collective interaction that reinforces WUNC instead of undermining it, credible threats that a WUNC-organized actor will disrupt established political arrangements, innovation within existing claim-making repertoires that combines drama with intelligibility, and so on. This is not the place to review the history and present condition of explanations for social movements. But it is very much the place to insist that only well-validated theories of social movement dynamics will give analysts a secure grip on social movement outcomes.

Notes

Bibliography


