Hell and High Water: Learning Lessons of Katrina

Example/potential exam questions from today:

1. What on earth can sociologists contribute to understanding what *caused* the destruction from Hurricane Katrina?
2. How much benefit did “economic development” projects actually bring to New Orleans?
3. Could something similar lie behind other U.S. patterns of socioeconomic stratification?

Pickier questions (“background”):

1. Why is disproportionality important in understanding human uses of environment?
2. What’s weird about terrain of coastal wetlands?
3. How do hurricanes work?
Katrina: What went so wrong?

“Common wisdom”: Happened because

1. Unique – “inevitable city, impossible location”
2. Nature Struck People
Katrina: What went so wrong?

My argument: Happened because

1. Informative ("canary") location
2. People Struck Nature — only some people, "tragic"
Basic Background, #1:
Early theories saw “enduring conflict,” economy vs. environmental protection ("proportionality" hypothesis)
Basic Background, #1:
Early theories saw “enduring conflict,” economy vs. environmental protection (“proportionality” hypothesis)
Basic Background #2: High ground next to river
Basic Background #2: High ground next to river

(a) Before flood

Flood-stage water level

(b) During flood

Thickest and coarsest sediments deposited at channel edges
Thin and fine sediments deposited over outer parts of floodplain

(c) After many floods

Natural levees built up by many floods
Basic Background #3: Intro to Hurricane danger

*Energy* comes from warm water, earth’s spin; *Damage* caused largely by water, “storm surge” — most serious = “right hook,” near eastern “eye wall”

- Forward motion: ~10 m.p.h.
- Rotation: ~140 m.p.h.
- Net wind speed: ~130 m.p.h. (away from land)
  
150 m.p.h. (toward land)
Basic Background #3: Intro to Hurricane danger

Energy comes from warm water, earth’s spin; Damage caused largely by water, “storm surge” — most serious = “right hook,” near eastern “eye wall”

Storm surges
A large dome of water may sweep across a coastline as a hurricane makes landfall. Surge height is the difference between the sea level in the storm and what it would have been had the storm not occurred.


Doug Stevens and Mark Hafen Los Angeles Times
Katrina: Three Stories of Disaster?

1. Nature: Katrina was *major* hurricane
Tropical Depression Twelve
August 23, 2005
5 PM EDT Tuesday

NWS 1PC National Hurricane Center
Advisory 1
Current Center Location 23.2 N 75.5 W
Max Sustained Wind 35 mph
Current Movement NW at 8 mph

○ Current Center Location
• Forecast Center Positions
S Sustained wind 39-73 mph

Potential Day 1-3 Track Area
Blue Tropical Storm Warning

True at 30.00N
SH 125 250 375 500
Approx. Distance Scale (Statute Miles)

85W 80W 75W
The strangely deserted French Quarter experiences heavy rain and strong winds, but not the major flooding that was feared.
Katrina: Three Stories of Disaster?

1. **Nature:** Katrina was *major* hurricane
2. **Humans:** “Natural Disaster,” terrible destruction
CENSORING CENSURE

The Nation.

WHO IS KILLING NEW ORLEANS?

by MIKE DAVIS

30 YEARS OF MEMORIES IN ARGENTINA
Joanne O'Brien

THE RISE OF THE NEW EUROLEFT
Hillary Wainwright

THE NUTTY PROFESSOR
Russell Jacoby

APRIL 10, 2006

www.thenation.com
Katrina: Three Stories of Disaster?

1. **Nature**: Katrina was *major* hurricane
2. **Humans**: “Natural Disaster,” terrible destruction
   - Defenses/Responses Failed
     - Physical: Levees/Canals failed in New Orleans
     - Organizational: Emergency responses failed worse
• Defenses/Responses Failed
  – Physical: Levees/Canals failed in New Orleans
Defenses/Responses Failed

- Physical: Levees/Canals failed in New Orleans
- Organizational: Emergency responses failed worse
• Government’s “organized emergency response” wasn’t any of the three
Tulane Hospital:

- HCA chartered multiple helicopters
- Staff evacuated sickest first, selves last
- No power? Use parking garage, pickups
- When fuel gone, siphon more
- When all evacuated, donated helicopters

"the essence of disaster management is artful counterpunching"
EXTREMELY DANGEROUS HURRICANE KATRINA CONTINUES TO APPROACH THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER DELTA...

DEVASTATING DAMAGE EXPECTED...

MOST OF THE AREA WILL BE UNINHABITABLE FOR WEEKS...PERHAPS LONGER. AT LEAST ONE HALF OF WELL CONSTRUCTED HOMES WILL HAVE ROOF AND WALL FAILURE. ALL GABLED ROOFS WILL FAIL...LEAVING THOSE HOMES SEVERELY DAMAGED OR DESTROYED.

THE MAJORITY OF INDUSTRIAL BUILDINGS WILL BECOME NON FUNCTIONAL. PARTIAL TO COMPLETE WALL AND ROOF FAILURE IS EXPECTED. ALL WOOD FRAMED LOW RISING APARTMENT BUILDINGS WILL BE DESTROYED. CONCRETE BLOCK LOW RISE APARTMENTS WILL SUSTAIN MAJOR DAMAGE...INCLUDING SOME WALL AND ROOF FAILURE.
U.S. Coast Guard:

- moved equipment out of way in advance
- moved in immediately afterward
- evacuated hundreds to thousands
- promptness, perseverance, flexibility, heroism

“rescue first; ask for permission later”
FEMA? Homeland Security?

Quick! Form a Committee!!
HURRICANE KATRINA: PAINFUL AFTERMATH

LOUISIANA: Experts wonder if rebuilding is the right path to take
MISSISSIPPI: Life becomes a scavenger hunt for necessities
WASHINGTON: President Bush criticized for handling of disaster

‘National disgrace’

Desperate survivors lash out at government’s response to crisis

By JACK DOUGLAS JR., SCOTT DOED and MARTIN MIRZEE
KING FEATURES NEWS SERVICE

NEW ORLEANS — Carrying their children, a few wetter possessions and very little hope, some of Hurricane Katrina’s most desperate victims stranded a dying city Thursday as federal officials struggled to cope with the most sweeping natural disaster in American history.

For thousands upon thousands of people, time was running out. A Knight Ridder reporter saw three bodies in and around the Superdome. Critics of the federal relief effort mocked a fire pit — and not just in New Orleans.

“Um, no FEMA, no Food Corps, no help,” said James Gibson, 45, of tiny Lakeview, Miss.

“This is a national disgrace,” said Tony Zabroski, standing at New Orleans’ emergency operations center. “FEMA has been here three days yet there is no command and control. We can send massive amounts of aid to tornado victims, but we can’t bail out the city of New Orleans.”

The government accepted more than 11,000 Hurricane Katrina refugees, officials said the Astrodome was full and began sending buses to other shelters in the Houston area.

The total of 11,375 inside the Astrodome was less than half the estimated 20,000 people who were supposed to be there.

On Thursday, a man covers the body of a fellow flood victim who died at the convention center in New Orleans.
AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY

Without Help

Flood survivors at the Convention Center try to assist an elderly victim
The bodies of two people who died at the Superdome while awaiting evacuation remain near a door of the New Orleans landmark that was home to residents who fled there after Hurricane Katrina hit the city.
Friday, September 2, 2005

Left in the Streets

With the living finally starting to be evacuated, officials began to turn to identifying the dead.

ALL PHOTOGRAPHS BY ROBERT STOLARIK / POLARIS FOR TIME
As officials struggle to continue their search-and-rescue efforts and to evacuate and care for the storm’s survivors, the dead are left uncounted and unattended.
Honore, on a cell phone, has said that "the storm turned back technology 80 years" in the region by knocking out all communication systems.
A SWAT team drives past flood victims waiting for rescue in New Orleans. Officials had called for a mandatory evacuation of the city, but many residents remained and had to be rescued from flooded homes and hotels and now await a way out.
A young man walks through chest-deep flood water after looting a grocery store in New Orleans on Tuesday, Aug. 30, 2005. Flood waters continue to rise in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina did extensive damage when it

Two residents wade through chest-deep water after finding bread and soda from a local grocery store after Hurricane Katrina came through the area in New Orleans, Louisiana (AFP/Getty Images/Chris Graythen)
Guardsmen Arrive in New Orleans
Pace of Evacuations Is Stepped Up

The mayor hopes the stranded residents will be out of the sudden trouble in five days. Bush tours the devastated area, as supplies are trucked in.

BY SCOTT DAUGHERTY
ACAPULCO
AND STEVEN BEACH
TUCSON DISPATCH

NEW ORLEANS — New Orleans residents are getting a needed boost after days of uncertainty and fear. The city is slowly returning to normalcy.

Despite the chaos and destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina, life is beginning to return to what it was. The city is slowly recovering, with help from the National Guard and other emergency personnel.

As they begin to patrol the chaotic city, troops are surprised by what they don’t find.

As they shuffled through the roads, one soldier noticed something peculiar. He saw a man running, carrying a box.

"What’s in the box?" the soldier asked.

"Just some supplies," the man replied.

"Can I help you?" the soldier offered.

"No, just doing my part," the man said.

Met by Despair, Not Violence

As they continued their patrol, the situation remained chaotic, but people were beginning to come together. They were helping each other in any way they could, sharing what little they had.

"I’m just trying to help," one person said.

"Thank you," another replied.

The soldiers were impressed by the resilience of the people. They were determined to do what they could to help.

"We’re here to help," one soldier said.

"Thank you," another person replied.

The soldiers continued their patrol, helping where they could, and hoping that things would get better soon.
“Fear Exceeded Reality”:

Coroner:
• 30 bodies in freezer, Conv Ctr?  
  –no
• Evidence of rape?  
  –no
• Rampant murder, Superdome?  
  –no
Police Superintendent
• Marauding gangs, Slidell?  
  –no
to New Orleans
Katrina: Three Stories of Disaster?

1. Nature: Katrina was major hurricane
2. Humans: “Natural Disaster,” terrible destruction
   Earlier actions (by few) created much of damage
   - to environment
   - to humans in turn
Clue 1: Three Hurricanes
Camille, 1969:

• Most powerful ever
  – 205 mph just offshore
  – 190 mph onshore
  – reversed flow, last 125 miles of Miss. River

• Closest to Katrina track

• Most of damage to east
  – killed 143, Gulf Coast
  – killed 100 inland
Betsy, 1965, “should” have been more damaging

- Storm track just to west of city ("right hook")
- Higher wind speeds (125 vs 90 mph in downtown)
- Led to building of higher/stronger floodwalls, levees
- Flooded 20% of New Orleans
- Killed 76
Katrina flooded 80% of New Orleans, killed 1500+ What's the difference?
Clue 2: Three Failed Canals
The protection that never happened

A federal plan to build a levee and large storm gates at two crucial water passages near the Louisiana/Mississippi border would have protected New Orleans from huge storm surges like those from Hurricane Katrina, officials and experts say. A lawsuit eventually led to the demise of the proposal in 1977.

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**Existing levees**  
**Levee that wasn't built (approximate route)**  
**Unbuilt gates**

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*Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*
Floodwaters from breaches in two levees has cascaded into New Orleans, a city that lies mostly below sea level.
Clue 3: New Orleans isn’t on coast.
Clue 3: New Orleans isn’t on coast
“Industrial Canal” (finished 1923)

Miss. River

Lake Pontchartrain

Industrial Canal Lock: Length: 640 ft, Width: 75 ft, Depth: 31.5 ft
Lobbying for “Tidewater” (sea-level) canal

- claim: “Big increase in Commerce,” huge need
- outside (federal) funds
- ditch through wetlands, parallel to Mississippi
- wildlife managers: “irreplaceable fish and wildlife resources”
- officials: “not to be feared”
MR-GO – “Mississippi River Gulf Outlet”

• initial excavation, 1963-68
• more dirt than Panama Canal
• parallels last 120 mi./river
• “economy vs. environment” (?)
  – ~$200M, initial excavation
  – 2004: $19.1M, 12 round trips
MR-GO – “Mississippi River Gulf Outlet”

- > $1,500,000 per round trip
  - before Katrina
- “The real looting?”
What MRGO *DID* do well
What MRGO *DID* do well
Lower Ninth Ward

1952
Rules of thumb:
• 2.7 miles wetlands = 1’ storm surge
vicious cycle: plants die, soil slumps, Corps re-dredges, more plants die by 2004: 20,000-60,000 acres/wetland lost (~100 of 500 sq. mi. SE of NO)
Officially, Corps disagrees
In New Orleans, interstates across Lake Pontchartrain are battered, buckled and broken.
The protection that never happened

A federal plan to build a levee and large storm gates at two crucial water passages near the Louisiana/Mississippi border would have protected New Orleans from huge storm surges like those from Hurricane Katrina, officials and experts say. A lawsuit eventually led to the demise of the proposal in 1977.

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![Map showing the protection that never happened](source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)
Storm Protection
MRGO

Intracoastal Waterway

Lower 9th Ward
St. Bernard Parish
to French Quarter

Image © 2005 DigitalGlobe
© 2005 Sanborn
Image © 2005 Sanborn
Earliest known photo of breach approx. 10 a.m., Aug. 29

Top of floodwall

Vegetation, bottom of floodwall

Developing breach
More than water came flooding out
One disaster, two worlds

Storm reveals stark portrait of America's haves and have-nots

By JODI WILGOREN
THE NEW YORK TIMES

BATON ROUGE, La. — It was moving day for the families of Gaynell Porretto and Tracy Jackson, the first page of the next chapter in their Hurricane Katrina horror stories.

Ms. Porretto's four-car caravan, crammed with a lifetime of photo albums, a few changes of clothes and coolers of drink, pulled up to a yellow house with a wide front porch that she had just rented for $800 in the humble hamlet of Arnaudville, La. It is 125 miles from her storm-sacked home in the New Orleans suburb of Metairie, half the size for twice as many people: but she can see the church steeple from the yard and her son is signed up for football at the nearby high school. "I have a ZIP code!" she exclaimed. "It's the happiest I've ever been."

Outside the New Orleans airport, Ms. Jackson's four sickly and starving children, ages 1, 3, 5 and 7, were sprawled on a SkyCap's scart as she slugged through the sweaty, snail-like line, the baby stop a blue plastic bin filled with what they had scavenged from strangers. It is all they have, their $2,000 cash savings burnt up with their belongings — including birth certificates — in a post-hurricane fire at their uptown apartment, and even as they waited to board a plane, they did not yet know where they were going.

"I'm just hoping it's a better place," she whispered. "I've never been on an airplane before. I'm afraid of heights."

Two families displaced by the same disaster, both facing uncertain futures as they moved forward Saturday, but of completely divergent circumstances.
Wrong Terminology?

• *Dis* + *Astro*: “Bad Star”
  – from astrology, not science
  – no human control or role

• Hazard/Disaster not enough
  – why call them “floodplains?”
  – hurricane zones? earthquakes/Calif? Fires in west?
Wrong Terminology?

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  - hurricane zones? earthquakes/Calif? Fires in west?

- Aristotle: “Tragedy”: *Hubris* of “great person”
  - modern version: Triple Tragedy
    1. hubris of few strikes nature
    2. nature strikes humans
    3. major suffering is by innocent bystanders
DISASTER IN THE MIDWEST

The Mississippi River rushes through a broken levee onto farmland near Quincy, Ill. Though floodwaters were receding in Iowa, officials said as many as 30 levees in Missouri and Illinois were in danger of being breached. NATION, A25
Blame?

- Locals, usually, “our” levee not strong enough (state/fed gov’t)
Blame?

• DEVELOPERS?

If you like this, we've got some swampland in Florida we'd love to sell you.

Photo: Mark Hirsch

Mississippi flood 1993

Landsat images of the Mississippi River basin showing the St. Louis area before (top) and during (bottom) the 1993 flood. (http://gcrn.ccrn.org/OCF/ocpflood.html)
Towns too damaged to fight for

Residents are leaving and shops are closing in the aftermath of the floods. Some were just getting over a tornado.

NEW HARTFORD, IOWA — A small sign taped to the glass front door of the town's hardware store still pleas for donations to the victims of the tornado.

Less than four weeks ago, a funnel cut down the northern edge of this farming town of nearly 600 people. The wind flung tractors more than a mile, crumbled Civil War tombstones and killed two people.

Then, before the white roses had wilted in their cemetery urns, the rest of the town was destroyed — by a flood.

When Beaver Creek swelled June 8, the tributary of the Cedar River swallowed dirt levees and miles of rolling cornfields. Wave after wave rushed through the town's maple-lined streets. Even unpaid staff from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, in town because of the tornado, had to be evacuated.

RESCUING RALPHIE: Steve Coley of New Hartford, Iowa, carries his 13-year-old dog to dry land last week. Several of the businesses in the town of about 600 have decided not to reopen, and even the post office might close.
**Blame?**

- **DEVELOPERS?**
- After 1993, FEMA reduced targets:
  - moved 300+ homes
  - bought/razed nearly 12,000 more

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**Mississippi flood 1993**

Landsat images of the Mississippi River basin showing the St. Louis area before (top) and during (bottom) the 1993 flood. (http://gcr.io/gcr.io/OCP/ocpflood.html)
Blame?

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• After 1993, FEMA reduced targets:
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  – Valmeyer IL moved
  – wildlife habitat, parks, etc.
Blame?

• DEVELOPERS?

• After 1993, FEMA reduced targets:
  – moved 300+ homes
  – bought/razed nearly 12,000 more
  – Valmeyer IL moved
  – wildlife habitat, parks, etc.
  – Taxpayers invested $150 million +
Blame?

• DEVELOPERS?

...by 2005, St. Louis region ALONE, ADDED

- 28,000 new homes
- 6600+ acres new comm/ind devmt
- largest strip mall in country(?)
- $2.2 Billion+ new investment, land under 10’+ water
Developers

homeowners, businesses
Beware Section 702c

The obscure clause protects the government from suits by flood victims.

By Pierce O’Donnell

The tragic flooding in the Midwest is the latest episode in an endless cycle of American life: record rains, catastrophic flooding and doing nothing to prevent a recurrence. This drama has been played out for generations along the 2,350 miles of the nation’s longest river.

In 1927, the Mississippi River flooded seven states from Illinois to Louisiana, killing 246 people, displacing 700,000 residents and causing more than $400 million in damage—a staggering sum at the time. Swollen by months of heavy rains, the mighty river escaped its levee system in 145 places, inundating 27,000 square miles with up to 30 feet of water.

The Great Flood of 1993 flooded 30,000 square miles, ruined 10,000 homes, killed several dozen people and inflicted $18 billion in damages.

The latest installment features raging flood waters that have broken 20 levees along hundreds of miles of the Mississippi River’s overtopped banks. So far, 24 people have perished, 35,000 homes have been destroyed and tens of thousands of Upper Mississippi River Valley residents have been displaced. Preliminary estimates place property damages in the hundreds of millions of dollars.

When the flood waters eventually recede, the latest flood victims, like their Hurricane Katrina counterparts (who I represent in a similar case in New Orleans), will probably learn that levees built by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers failed catastrophically. They will probably also discover that the state, local and private levees along the Mississippi and its tributaries were not inspected by the Army Corps as mandated by Congress. Indeed, the federal agency is clueless as to where thousands of the nation’s levees are even located.

But the rudest awakening of all will be the realization that victims of official negligence in designing, constructing and inspecting flood levees cannot hold their government accountable in a court of law.

In the wake of the worst flooding in American history, Congress enacted the Flood Control Act of 1928. The Army Corps, the latest generation of public engineers and construction managers that is supposedly the master of flood protection — was charged in the new law with the responsibility of protecting the people and property of the Mississippi River Valley.

Buried in this historic legislation, however, were the following 25 words in Section 702c: “no liability of any kind shall attach or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place.”

Over the subsequent 80 years, this terse sentence has been used by Justice Department lawyers to defeat scores of lawsuits seeking compensation for loss of life and property allegedly caused by shoddy work performed by the Army Corps’ engineers. Federal courts have interpreted the provision as a blanket immunity for the government from any damage claims, including cases in which there is evidence of engineering malpractice or even gross negligence. The Supreme Court has ruled that if the project’s purpose is flood control, the corps can do no wrong.

Section 702c has been successfully invoked to defeat suits against the corps in cases ranging from drowning victims in improperly operated reservoirs, to ruptured levees that flooded 85,000 acres of land along the Feather River near Yuba City, to the destruction of an entire Oregon town that resulted in 14 deaths.

The most notorious application of this sweeping immunity statute occurred recently in one of the Hurricane Katrina class-action lawsuits. U.S. District Judge Stanwood J. Duval Jr. recently dismissed all flooding cases involving the Army Corps’ admitted negligence in building the flood walls along the 17th Street and London Avenue canals in New Orleans. At the same time, the judge exonerated the Army Corps for delerelion of duty, writing that it was guilty of “egregious myopia” and that it had squandered millions of dollars on a system known to be “inadequate” and “flawed from practically the outset.” (My case involves another class of Katrina victims suing the Army Corps for the flooding of New Orleans East, St. Bernard Parish and the Lower 9th Ward. Duval has twice held that in our case, because of the nature of the flooding, the Army Corps is not protected by Section 702c.)

Besides being a relic of a time before the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 repealed sovereign immunity for negligence by federal employees, this law does not serve the interest of the public. Immunizing engineering design errors, shoddy construction and inept inspections of flood protection projects creates a perverse disincentive. Without accountability, the Army Corps has little financial incentive to comply with accepted professional standards for building and maintaining protective structures.

If a private construction firm had designed and constructed the Greater New Orleans flood protection system, it would be held responsible, and victims would be entitled to just compensation. The perpetuation of this dual standard is unjustifiable. This is particularly true when the Army Corps must admit, as chief engineer Lt. Gen. Carl A. Strock did in 2006, that it was responsible for the levee breaches that drowned New Orleans and adjacent St. Bernard Parish.

In the wake of Katrina, not a single Army Corps official has been dismissed, disciplined or demoted. Nor has the federal government paid a penny in reparations. With more than 100 federal dams in this country and 15,000 miles of levees, it is only a matter of time before flood waters add to the expanding roll of victims of government incompetence and neglect.

By immediately repealing Section 702c, Congress can eradicate this archaic immunity law described by Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens as an “anachronism” and “an obsolete legislative remnant [that is] nothing more than an engine of injustice.” Otherwise, in the haunting words of Judge Duval, “it is certain that another tragedy such as Katrina will occur again.”

Pierce O’Donnell is the lead attorney for Hurricane Katrina victims in litigation against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

www.pierceodonnell.com
Developers → homeowners, businesses → FEMA (NFIP) → Congress (Flood Cont. act of 1928) → local governments → Developers
Developers

homeowners, businesses

local governments

Developers

Congress (Flood Cont. act of 1928)

FEMA (NFIP)
Schwarzenegger Fires Flood Control Panel

The state Reclamation Board had begun resisting development along vulnerable levees.

By Nancy Vogel
Times Staff Writer

SACRAMENTO — Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger on Tuesday fired all six members of the state Reclamation Board, an agency that oversees flood control along California’s two biggest rivers and had recently become more aggressive about slowing development on flood plains.

The Republican governor replaced the members — who serve indefinite terms at the governor’s pleasure — with seven of his own appointees, most with ties to agriculture and the engineering profession. One board seat had been vacant since spring.

Five of the fired members had been appointed by Gov. Gray Davis, a Democrat, and one had first been appointed by Gov. Pete Wilson, a Republican, then reappointed by Davis.

Fired board member Jeffrey F. Mount, chairman of the UC Davis geology department, said he was given no explanation for his removal. He said it was a surprise. "We were introduced to the governor at a social event," he said. "Then we met with him and he told us he was firing us."

Mount said he will continue to serve as an unpaid member of the California State Water Resources Control Board.

Mount was among the first to warn that development along the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers was putting the levees at risk.

DAMAGES: Chuck Walker of Delta Waterfowl Co., watches one of the company’s boats pass through a breach in a levee and enter the delta. (Photo by Rick Pedroncelli/Associated Press)

"The water supply to a major portion of the state is at risk from this kind of event," Mount said. "The odds are quite high that the anticipated will arrive, and like New Orleans, we’ll be dealing with a very interesting fort to reduce these risks with better planning, new investments and improved flood infrastructure." He added that "each one of these individuals shares my commitment to ensuring these lifesaving efforts are not ignored or postponed."

State law gives the Reclamation Board substantial power to review development in the extensive flood plains along the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers and their tributaries. The board can make recommendations that local governments cannot ignore without legal findings.

[See Reclamation, Page B8]

Skid Row Drop-Off Detailed

Sheriff’s Dept. report responds to LAPD claims that transients are dumped downtown.

By Richard Winton
NOT “enduring conflict,” environment/economy

- Not even rich vs. poor
- small fraction of politically connected elites
- current laws reward those doing greatest harm
  – to environment, also to other people and economy
- Instead, “economic development” of bank robberies
  1. small number make out like bandits
  2. everyone else (and environment) pay costs
  3. greatest costs usually to innocent bystanders