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Remapping development in light of globalisation: from a territorial to a social cartography

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ABSTRACT *This article assesses the state of development studies in the wake of the 'impasse' that the field reached in the 1980s and suggests that the way forward is to 'deterritorialise' the concept of development. The first part critically assesses recent new perspectives and middle-range theories and focuses in particular on neoliberal and institutional approaches as hegemonic discourses. The myriad of new approaches offers limited and competing explanations for social change in the current epoch. The second part argues that globalisation, by modifying the reference points of macrosocial analysis, is responsible for development studies' paradigmatic quagmire. A sociology of national development is no longer tenable. The way out of the 'impasse' is to break with nation-state centred analysis by reconsidering the relationship between space and development and by reconceiving development based not on territory but on transnational social groups. Drawing on critical geographies and recent political economy theories of flexible accumulation and globalisation, it suggests that transnationalised labour markets exhibit an increasing heterogeneity across borders and that differentiated participation in these transnational labour markets in each locale comes to determine social development. The article emphasises the political nature of development theory and calls for a critical globalisation studies.*

It may be an overstatement to say that the field of development studies is in a state of 'disarray'. But certainly social scientists have been unable to overcome the 'impasse' that, it is broadly recognised, the field reached in the 1980s, even though the social processes that we refer to as 'development' have certainly not ground to a halt.[1] The once great triad of paradigms that dominated the field—modernisation, dependency and world-system theory—although still influential, have largely run their course as explanatory theories in the face of their inability to account for patterns of socioeconomic and political change in recent decades. A myriad of new perspectives and middle-range theories emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. But these diverse new approaches offer limited and competing explanations for social changes that have taken place. I will argue in this essay that globalisation has thrown development studies into this paradigmatic

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quagmire by modifying the reference points of macrosocial analysis. Globalising processes are bringing about changes in social hierarchies in the world capitalist system which traditional categories and frameworks in development studies are unable to capture.

This essay has two objectives. The first objective is to critically assess the state of recent theoretical work in the sociology of development. I will review and evaluate recent conceptual, theoretical and methodological approaches and epistemologies, paying particular attention to two emerging paradigms that, taken together, appear currently to enjoy a predominance, despite disarray in the field. These are neoliberalism and institutional approaches. The second objective is to develop the argument that globalisation has exposed the limitations of extant paradigms that take nation-states as units of analysis for development and for social hierarchies in the global order, and that posit a territorial or geographic conception of the process. The way out of the 'impasse' is to break with such a nation-state centred framework of analysis.[2] Specifically, the way forward is a reconsideration of the relationship between space and development, and a new conception of development based not on territory but on social groups. This undertaking is predicated, in turn, on the development of a critical globalisation studies.

That development studies unfolded within a nation-state logic is not to be explained by any imminent limitations to social theory as much as by the historical development of the world political economy, particularly in the twentieth century, as well as by the struggles among social forces embedded therein and the inevitable political content that has infused development studies since its inception. Development theory needs to revert to the agenda of classical political economy and sociology, which both set out to historicise social forms and to theorise sets of relationships that were not self-evident in contemporary structures and practices. Moreover, I do not believe 'apolitical' development studies is possible, or for that matter desirable. The essential political character of development theory is a sub-theme that runs throughout the present article. The direction of development studies remains fundamentally shaped by social interests and political projects.

Indeed, as is well known, the rise of development studies in the social sciences was as much a political as a scholarly affair. 'Modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s popularized the notion of 'modernization' to denote the process conceived in the theory as replication of the Western experience of development'.[3] Development implied the spread and consolidation of capitalist economy and society into the underdeveloped regions (the unproblematised assumption was that capitalism would generate development). The relationship between intellectual production and actual power relations and political projects was never more clear than with modernisation theory.[4] It guided the thinking of Western governments, international development agencies, and many policy makers in the Third World. Modernisation theory came under sustained attack in the 1960s for its evident methodological deficiencies, logical and empirical inconsistencies, and ahistoricism. But what really brought down the modernisation paradigm, in my view, was not scholarly or political critique of the theory—although that did play an important role; rather, the political climate had changed in the Third

World. The classical versions of modernisation theory became discredited as the policy prescriptions that flowed from its theoretical presuppositions failed to bring about development, and as the links between the theory and the political interests of the core capitalist powers (and local Third World elite groups) became exposed. Mass popular and revolutionary movements throughout the Third World challenged oligarchic and exclusionary social orders, shattering the post-World War II consensus among international elites and inspiring alternative interpretations of underdevelopment and international asymmetries.

Dependency, world-system and other critical theories of underdevelopment of the 1960s and 1970s exposed the system-maintenance bias of modernisation theory in favour of the rich countries and local elites. The problematic posed by these theories was the formation of the nation-state and the possibility of a greater or lesser degree of autonomy achieved by these units *vis-à-vis* the world economy. In contradistinction to the dualism of modernisation theory, dependency and world-system theory contended that both underdevelopment and development were aspects of the same phenomenon, historically simultaneous, functionally linked and mutually conditioning.[5] International asymmetries in wealth and power were sustained, and the structures of underdevelopment generated and reproduced, through the very process of world accumulation that modernisation theory purported would achieve development. Dependency and world-system theories shifted the focus from culture and alleged national character as explanations of underdevelopment to structural forces shaped over time by the dynamics of the world economy. The appropriate unit of analysis became the larger capitalist world-system and its historical formation. The notion of movement within the world-system up or down the continuum of centre, semi-periphery and periphery, the emphasis on spatial and political changes over time in the configuration of uneven accumulation on a world scale, and insistence on historical inquiry, provided a powerful cognitive framework for the analysis of political economy and comparative development.

World-system theory (which eventually subsumed the dependency paradigm) remains a benchmark in the sociology of development and more generally in macrosociologies. But its tendency towards teleological and functionalist explanation, the rigid state structuralism associated with the model, its zero-sum realist interpretation of world political and economic dynamics and development potential, and its inability to explain more recent changes under globalisation, represent major limitations. By the 1990s the theory, at least as originally formulated, could not claim to provide an inclusive or consistent framework for understanding development.

New directions in development theory

By the 1980s the sociology of development had reached an 'impasse' in the face of changing world conditions. Among them were the demise of the Soviet bloc and of other socialist experiments in the Third World, increased awareness of ecological effects of economic growth, the rapid development of East Asian countries, the increasing differentiation among developing countries more generally, and the erosion (although not the supersession) of the great core–

periphery dichotomy—all this against the backdrop of a dramatic restructuring of world capitalism (as I discuss below). Above all, however, the impasse, is in my view a theoretical reflection of the impasse in development itself. The 'oil shocks' that reverberated throughout the world economy in the 1970s signalled the beginning of a global economic downturn. While some countries and regions experienced high growth, rates of growth in the world economy as a whole were significantly below those of the post-World War II decades. The 1980s and 1990s saw a heightened process of global social polarisation and a crisis of social reproduction. In most countries some sectors of the population experienced notable improvement in living standards. However, the absolute number of the impoverished—of the destitute and near destitute—increased rapidly and the gap between the rich and the poor in global society has widened since the 1970s. Broad swaths of humanity in the developing—and also the developed—countries have experienced absolute downward mobility. While global per capita income tripled over the period 1960–94, there were over 100 countries in the 1990s with per capita incomes lower than in the 1980s, or in some cases, lower than in the 1970s and 1960s.[6]

New research and theory formation in the sociology of development has been characterised by a certain theoretical anarchy since the onset of the impasse. Promising new lines of inquiry have led to changing assumptions about development, new perspectives and methods, and the elaboration of middle-range theories, including a host of 'post' theories. Some of these have proven tremendously useful in examining particular empirical questions and specific dimensions of development. Yet they have been unable to address the more looming questions of conceptualising development and social change in twenty-first century global society. In this section I review some of the more prominent (but far from all) of these new approaches, their assumptions and the topics they have taken up.

New international division of labour

In their landmark 1977 study, *The New International Division of Labor*, Frobel and his colleagues argued that the evolution of the world capitalist system involved automation, rationalisation, and a subdivision and fragmentation of production tasks in the core in response to declining profit opportunities. New communications, transportation and related technologies, together with a rising reserve of cheap labour, were leading to a 'new international division of labour' (NIDL) as core capital relocated low-wage phases of manufacturing to cheap labour zones in the Third World.[7] The study drew attention to the now-notorious sweatshop conditions of super-exploitation, labour repression, the degradation of women, child labour, Taylorist control and dehumanisation at the 'world market factories' (*maquiladoras*) as the counterpart to 'runaway factories' and rising structural unemployment in the traditional core. 'What this process means for those it directly affects is, first and foremost, unemployment and the devaluation of skills for workers in the traditional industrial countries, and the subjection of the populations of the developing countries to inhuman working conditions, with no hope for improvement in the foreseeable future.'[8] In fact, in the same year as

The New International Division of Labor was published in English (1980), the export of manufactured goods from the Third World for the first time surpassed that of raw materials.[9]

NIDL theory could be considered a precursor to more recent theories of economic globalisation. The Frobel *et al* volume generated a great deal of empirical research in the 1980s and set the basis for important new lines of theorising on development. NIDL theory, for instance, contributed to burgeoning studies on the spread of *maquiladora* production in different parts of the global South, such as along the US–Mexico border and in the Caribbean, and to the implications of the NIDL for the gender relations.[10] Despite these contributions, NIDL fell by the wayside in the 1990s as it became clear that the relocation of low-wage assembly to the Third World was more selective than the sweeping generalisations of the approach had suggested and that the significance of low-cost labour was overstated. Further, manufacturing has been restructuring and 'downsized' in core countries but has not disappeared. Low-cost immigrant labour has been imported into the core and corporate strategies have included investment in both developed and developing regions as complementary processes. It became clear that changes in the world economy identified by Frobel *et al* reflected a transition phase in an ongoing and more profound reorganisation of the entire world capitalist system.

Divergent development theories/new comparative international political economy

The increased diversity and differentiation among Third World countries and regions from the 1960s onwards eventually caught up with development theory. What most caught the attention of social scientists studying development was phenomenal growth and industrialisation in East Asia. A large body of work emerged on the NICs, and more broadly, on the developmental experiences of particular countries and regions in relation to the world economy.[11] Writing in the late 1980s Evans and Stephens argued that this body of literature 'combines the insights of dependency and world-system thinking with more recent versions of modernization and with studies on the international system based on the comparative historical method'. They suggested that a 'synthesis' or 'convergence' had taken place in development studies around a 'new comparative international political economy' (NCIPE) concerned 'simultaneously with both first and third world problems', and aimed at 'uncovering, interpreting, and explaining distinctive patterns of development'.[12] Despite their optimism, this apparent 'synthesis' in development theory was more a reflection of the disarray in the field and the tendency for development research to be limited to empirical questions, eclecticism and more limited middle-range theories in the wake of the decline of the once dominant paradigmatic umbrellas.

Although the NCIPE, or what we could call the divergent development framework, embraced a number of approaches, the unifying theme within the framework was the centrality of states to development outcomes.[13] This state-led development theory brought Weber back into development theorising in a big way, highly influenced in turn by the 'bringing the state back in' literature of the

1980s,[14] and by the state-centric theories that became popular in macrosociology in the wake of Theda Scokpol's 1979 study, *States and Social Revolutions*.[15] This literature characterised states as independent actors in themselves and placed geopolitics at the centre of analysis. Research into development from the divergent development framework emphasised the role of state policy in the experience of the NICs and the potential for appropriate state policies to generate development.

The divergent development literature was quite eclectic. Some of it overlapped with emerging institutional approaches to development (see below) and drew on public policy/public choice, rational choice and other sociological theories that became popular in the late twentieth century. Although the approach incorporated the structure of the larger international system into analyses, many studies reverted to a behaviour- or agency-level focus with their emphases on state policy as causal to developmental outcomes, the privileging of *public choice/ policy choice* over structural constraints to development, and a not very historical comparativism. Moreover, although the focus on the state contrasted with neoliberal prescriptions, many of these studies shared the neoliberal (and modernisation) assumption that the route to development passed through deeper integration into the world economy through export expansion ('export-led development' or ELD). Countries could develop through active, state-led and ELD development strategies.

Global commodity chains theory

Global commodity chains (GCC) theory was an important spin-off in the 1990s from the divergent development/NCIPE approach and from world-system theory. As a middle-range theory it has been particularly fruitful in terms of the scope of empirical research it has generated.[16] GCC theory addresses increasing diversification among developing countries based on 'geographic specialization', and identifies three key factors in this process: (1) 'world industrialisation', or the spread of diversified industrialisation to large segments of the Third World; (2) the rise of export-orientated industrialisation; and (3) increasing geographic specialisation or the carving out of 'export niches' by distinct countries and regions.

The GCC approach has attempted to incorporate economic globalisation into its focus by identifying the changing spatial organisation of production and consumption: in Gereffi's and Korzeniewicz's words, 'the detailed disaggregation of production and consumption across national boundaries, under the organizational structure of densely networked firms and enterprises.'[17] A GCC is defined as a 'network of labor and production processes whose end-result is a finished commodity'.[18] These networks are increasingly dispersed throughout numerous countries and regions; specific processes or segments in these chains (or 'nodes') are scattered about and linked together in networks that span the globe. 'The commodity chains perspective entails a fundamental departure from the development strategies approach in terms of its main units and levels of analysis, its chief substantive concerns, and its principal research method', according to Gereffi. 'From a GCC perspective ... firms and the economic networks that connect them are the essential building blocks of transnational production systems in which

countries play a variety of specialized and shifting roles'.[19]

Hence, each country acquires (or carves out for itself) a particular niche in the global economy based on what processes or segments of these GCC it comes to specialise in (eg low-skilled labour-intensive phase, high-skilled labour-intensive, capital-intensive, technology, marketing and design, etc). Each of these stages or segments in these GCCs have different value-added contributions to the final production (high value-added, low value-added, middle range value-added). Implicit in the theory is that development rests on the particular country in question attracting to its territory those phases or segments of GCC that are middle and high value-added ('exploiting the backward and forward linkages' in GCCs), an approach not unlike the 'competitive state' thesis in some globalisation theorising. Each country must compete to gain the most advantageous niche in the global economy, particularly through export expansion. But the approach also draws heavily on institutional theory in its policy prescriptions: development strategies should focus on creating a local institutional and infrastructural environment conducive to 'technological upgrading and integrated industrial production', eg increasing the level of labour's skills, providing adequate transportation and communications infrastructure, developing appropriate supporting industries, finding the right balance of government regulations, and so on.

I highlight here GCC theory because it underscores some of the underlying assumptions—and the limitations—of much recent middle-range theorising. Most important, global capitalism is not problematised; a hierarchical and stratified global system is not seen as a problem to figure into the theory. In contrast to critical approaches to development, the problematic is not the social system itself, or the need to bring about structural change in the system. Nor are social forces the locus of analysis (at times they do not even enter into the analysis). Development is reduced to the ability of local states to 'prime' their countries to attract most advantageous middle-contract stages of globally fragmented production, as in neoliberal and institutional approaches. Global corporations are seen as agents of development in the new global economy. But it is not clear that such integration into GCCs leads to developmental processes rather than to the reproduction of social hierarchies under new circumstances. And even if the former, the lack of development for others then becomes the condition of development for some.

The post-structural/postmodern turn in development studies

The post-structural turn in European philosophy and social science in the 1970s had by the 1990s influenced development theory and research in a major way, under the various appellations of post-structuralism, postmodernism, post-developmentalism and post-colonialism. The essence of the post-structural approach to development is a critique of the very notion of development. However, the post-structural approach also rejects the precepts of political economy, replacing them with 'discursive analysis'. In the post-structuralist view, at least as asserted by Baudrillard, the production of signs and cultural codes replaces material production as the primary constituents of social life.[20] Post-modernists see development theories as 'totalising narratives'. They emphasise

the subjective dimension of development, deconstructing the Western 'development discourse' and subjecting it to a scathing critique.[21] The term 'development' is seen as an invention, or social construction, and the concept has a discursive or a cultural (rather than natural or material) history.

Postmodernism became a much debated topic in the 1990s among scholars of development in the face of deepening economic and social crisis, reflecting rising disillusion with earlier capitalist and socialist projects.[22] Setting out to 'deconstruct' development, Escobar exposes how the 'development project' as a 'regime of representation' was constructed in the aftermath of World War II, decolonisation and the rise of the USA as the new hegemonic power, and how this project and discourse came to define the process in ways that prescribed certain modes of thought and practices and proscribed others. Escobar observes that this discourse of development resulted in the further deprivation and cultural colonisation of Third World peoples. Development in his view was 'successful' to the extent that it managed and controlled populations, that it created a type of manageable underdevelopment in a more subtle form than colonialism. 'Progress' represented the exercise of power. The application of postmodern views with respect to researching development themes has been largely limited to new social movements. Postmodernists generally see the new social movements as resisting modernity, or as leading opposition to development.[23]

If this type of analysis reflects the potential contribution of post-structural and postmodern approaches to development, it also indicates the limitations to the approach. Analyses that may account for 'manageable underdevelopment' or a deepening material and cultural deprivation of the population, such as critiques of capitalism, are themselves characterised and rejected by the approach as 'modernist discourse'. Since discussion of capital accumulation or similar concepts is itself seen as 'discourse/power' to be deconstructed and rejected as part of the modernist project, the post-structural/postmodern approach is unable to criticise the actual material reality or social system that generates the conditions they are examining. The critique of capitalism—as the actual social system that the Western development discourse promoted and defended—is replaced by the critique of modernity, whether the modernity associated with modernisation theory and neoliberalism, or that identified with neo-Marxist and other radical political economy approaches. 'What might we make of sweeping condemnations, that seek to undermine the knowledge basis of all established notions about development ... to denigrate the accomplishments of modern life, and construct an alternative which, in many cases, celebrates mystical rather than rational understanding', asks Peet. 'Postdevelopmental discourse must itself be deconstructed, not to synthesize its arguments in mild, sanitized forms into a recast conventional development model, but through critique to draw notions for use in a practice that might even retain some aspects of the idea of development.'[24]

Feminism, gender studies, and development theory

Feminism and gender studies helped reinvigorate the sociology of development in the late twentieth century with the very dynamic and still-burgeoning literature

on Women in Development (WID), Women and Development (WAD), and Gender and Development (GAD).[25] The differential effects of capitalist development on men and women were first underscored in the 1970s and 1980s in the WID literature, which argued that women were not integrated into development processes and had not benefited from them. But the WID literature became outdated on several accounts. First, as a number of its critics noted, it assumed that women were 'excluded' from development rather than integrated into it in ways that made their social and economic contributions invisible, such as their work in the non-monetised and unpaid sectors. Second, much of the literature shared the assumption of modernisation theory and of liberal feminism that integration into the capitalist market would bring about an improvement in the status of women, establishing as its problematic how women could be better integrated into market structures rather than how those structures and the power relations that adhere in them could be transformed.[26]

As a result, the themes of WAD and GAD arose as more critical approaches focusing on gender relations and capitalist development. While the WAD literature drew on the insights of neo-Marxist and radical political economy associated with Marxist feminist theory, the GAD literature tended to emphasise patriarchy in association with radical feminism. A Women, Environment and Alternative Development (WED) school also arose as a focus on the intersection of ecology, gender relations and development, including the theme of sustainable development. In addition, a Postmodernism and Development (PAD) approach to feminist development theory emerged in the 1990s as the different schools associated with post-structuralism gained in popularity within feminism.[27]

Placing gender at the centre of theorisation, feminist development theories have reorientated development discourse and practice. These theories have been crucial in exposing the 'invisibility of women' in earlier theories of development, and the uneven impact of development processes on men and women, as well as on sectors of the population differentiated by class, race and ethnicity. They have also broken new theoretical ground with exploration into a changing sexual division of labour and into the mechanisms through which production and reproduction are linked in such ways that they reproduce not only gender inequality but also unequal development and international asymmetries. However important, gender studies and feminist approaches to development do not in themselves constitute new development paradigms. Rather, they draw on one or another (or a combination) of metatheories in the social sciences and feminist theories more generally (not to mention here the theoretical fragmentation within gender studies itself, similar to that within development studies).

Neoliberalism

Globalisation had by the 1980s led to the breakdown of the old Keynesian projects of national economic development and paved the way for the rise of neoliberal policies and ideologies, as reflected more broadly in the social sciences in the turn from Keynesian to neoclassical economics. In the 1980s, as globalisation advanced, global elites abandoned earlier national models of development and charted a new transnational model.[28] The World Bank in 1980 redefined develop-

ment, no longer as national economic growth, but as successful 'participation in the world market'.[29] At the core of the new development model was a wholesale shift from production for domestic markets to production for the world market, signalling the subordination of local circuits of accumulation to new global ones. Later in that decade, the definition was extended to include a policy of broad liberalisation.[30] This new transnational development model was based on each country's rearticulation to world markets through the introduction of new economic activities linked to global accumulation, the contraction of domestic markets, the cheapening of labour through casualisation and social austerity to make it 'competitive', and the opening up of each country's public sectors, protected industries and natural resources to commercial exploitation.[31]

The new approach to development advanced by the International Financial Agencies (IFIs) and other policy-making circles found its intellectual grounding in the neoliberal paradigm. Here, neoliberalism as a development paradigm has achieved an almost perfect synthesis, much more so than modernisation theory ever did, with actual power structures and state policy apparatuses in much of the world. Neoliberalism is both a set of policy prescriptions and a paradigm of development with heavy ideological overtones. It is a doctrine of laissez faire capitalism grounded in neoclassical economic theory, the assumptions of monetarism, modernisation theory, and the doctrine of comparative advantage, legitimated by the globalist rhetoric of free trade, growth, efficiency and prosperity.[32] Although neoliberalism incorporates many of the tenets and assumptions of modernisation theory, it differs in several respects. Above all, the state is no longer seen as the promoter of development. Development is defined as economic globalisation. By the early 1990s neoliberalism had become a hegemonic ideology of development encapsulated in the so-called 'Washington consensus',[33] or what, more cynically—and probably more accurately—Toye has termed the 'counter-revolution' in development theory and policy.[34]

Global neoliberalism has involved twin dimensions, rigorously pursued by global elites with the backing of a powerful and well organised lobby of transnational corporations. One is worldwide market liberalisation and the construction of a new legal and regulatory superstructure for the global economy. The other is the internal restructuring and global integration of each national economy. The combination of the two is intended to create a 'liberal world order', an open global economy and a global policy regime that breaks down all national barriers to the free movement of transnational capital *between* borders and the free operation of capital *within* borders. Economic restructuring programmes designed in the 1970s and 1980s by the IFIs, and the think-tanks of the emerging transnational elites and accompanied by the new neoliberal development discourse,[35] attempted to harmonise a wide range of fiscal, monetary, industrial, labour and commercial policies among multiple nations, as a requirement for fully mobile transnational capital to function simultaneously, and often instantaneously, among numerous national borders. These programmes called for the elimination of state intervention in the economy and the regulation of individual nation-states over the activities of capital in their territories. Between 1978 and 1992 more than 70 countries undertook 566 stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes imposed by the IMF and the World Bank.[36]

These programmes become the major mechanism of adjusting local economies to the global economy. What took place through these programmes was a massive restructuring of the productive apparatus in these countries, and the reintegration into global capitalism of vast zones of the former Third and Second Worlds.[37]

In these programmes, stabilisation, or the package of fiscal, monetary, exchange and related measures, is the first phase and is intended to achieve macroeconomic stability. Stabilisation is followed by a second stage, 'structural adjustment', encompassing: (a) liberalisation of trade and finances, which opens the economy to the world market; (b) deregulation, which removes the state from economic decision making; (c) privatisation of formerly public spheres that could hamper capital accumulation if criteria of public interest over private profit are left operative. Grounded in the assumptions of neoclassical economics, the neoliberal model is justified by the need to generate a trade surplus to accommodate debt service payments and reduce trade deficits, the alleged 'inefficiency' of the public sector, the need to control inflation, to close budget deficits and restore fiscal solvency and macroeconomic equilibrium. Trade liberalisation and a reallocation of resources to the external sector are intended to increase exports and by definition result in a process of rearticulation and integration into the global economy. Fiscal solvency is to be achieved through austerity programmes involving expenditure reductions and revenue increases, which usually entail cuts in social programmes, regressive taxes on consumption, the elimination of subsidies, public sector layoffs and a rise in interest rates.

Notwithstanding the ideological claims of its adherents in the academic and policy-making communities, the neoliberal model is driven more pragmatically by the breakdown of the earlier Keynesian–redistributive, nation-state based accumulation strategies in the face of transnationalisation and the need for a renovated policy regime capable of facilitating the new global model. Indeed, in the larger context, disequilibrium itself is a consequence of the breakdown of earlier national accumulation structures. The neoliberal programme is rational *vis-à-vis* the *logic* of global capital accumulation. The model generates the overall conditions for the profitable 'efficient') renewal of capital accumulation; internal conditions of profitability are determined by compatibility of the local with the global environment and adjustment creates the policy environment and the market signals for a shift in resources to external sectors. Economic reactivation is achieved through the introduction or expansion of activities linked to the global economy and the integration of 'national' accumulation circuits into globalised circuits.

However, from the viewpoint of a broader *social logic* the model is irrational, and at best has generated widespread *maldevelopment.* With few exceptions, neoliberal adjustment results in a fall in popular consumption and social conditions, a rise in poverty, immiseration and insecurity, 'food riots', heightened inequalities, social polarisation and resultant political conflict.[38] Indeed, cracks in the Washington consensus had become apparent by the close of the century in the face of the deep social contradictions generated by the model. My suspicion is that we are arriving at the twilight of 'pure' neoliberalism as it was preached and practised in the 1980s and 1990s, that limited state and supranational regulation of accumulation may be introduced in the early twenty-first century and that an

emergent institutional theory of development reflective of limited modifications in the neoliberal project may be in the ascendent.

Institutional theories of development

In the 1990s and early twenty-first century a number of social scientists, particularly economists, began to develop a 'new institutional economics', or what like-minded political scientists called a 'new political economy'.[39] This theoretical work largely embraces the essential tenet of rational choice theory, so popular across the social science disciplines in recent years, that social behaviour (and hence outcomes) may be explained by the interplay of individuals pursuing their own best interests and 'preferences' on the basis of rational choices and available information. Rational choice theory is a nominalist approach deeply rooted in suppositions of early social theories which postulated society as a collection of atomised individuals (eg Hobbes, Locke and other utilitarian theorists) and in later Weberian-inspired 'actor orientated' assumptions. This *choice-theoretic paradigm* has become near-hegemonic in the social sciences in recent years, encompassing exchange theory, rational choice theory, public choice theory, game theory, and so on. I characterise this slew of choice-theoretic approaches as *market-orientated theories*, in that most accounts presuppose (as a natural state), rather than problematise, the existence of market society. This assumption opens the door to the behavioural reductionism, voluntarism, ahistoricism, and logical circularity of the choice-theoretic paradigm.[40] The new institutional economics and the new political economy are grounded in the choice-theoretic paradigm but also draw on institutional approaches in the social sciences. They inject into the paradigm analysis of 'institutional constraints' on individual action and seek out policy prescriptions to identify and overcome such constraints. The central—and quite Smithian—idea of the new institutionalism is that what makes for an efficient economy is a set of institutions that permits individuals to benefit personally from doing what will also serve the material interests of society as a whole.[41]

This is the backdrop to what appears to be an emerging institutional theory of development, not as a break with the dominant neoliberal paradigm but as an enrichment of it. This emergent theoretical school seems to bring into the choice-theoretic paradigm institutional and organisational theories in the social sciences in order to elaborate a theory of comparative development as well as policy prescriptions.[42] Its proponents take issue with certain assumptions of neoclassical economics, namely that information is perfect and that economic actors respond to price changes automatically. Rather, information and response to price change is effected through a vast web of transactions that have 'costs'. Transactions take place mediated not through free market exchanges but through all sorts of non-market institutions. Institutions are systems of rule that to a greater or lesser extent reduce or modify these costs; they may be more or less efficient. The new institutionalism studies these institutions through the assumptions of neoclassical economics, eg the results of the way different institutionalised rules affect the behaviour of rationally choosing individuals seeking to maximise their given material welfare preferences.[43]

In simplified terms, the institutional approach to development attempts to ascertain how institutional arrangements and their modification may constrain or enhance the economic behaviour of agents and hence impede or contribute to development processes. As the world technical division of labour changes and evolves, according to this approach, new institutions arise to manage and co-ordinate social activity to effect production. Development processes may be 'modelled'—a mathematical modelling of rule-governed behaviour—and institutional constraints identified and overcome by sets of appropriate policies. While the process of development becomes an outcome of 'policy choice', the focus shifts from the individual actor to the institutional actor. The constraint on development is located, as in the earlier modernisation theory, not in structure but in agency. The solution is the modification of social behaviour less at the individual than at the institutional level. 'Institutional change can be considered at the heart of the long-run process of economic development, providing the missing link between development and growth', argue Mustapha and Nugent. 'Indeed, it might be appropriate to define economic development as economic growth accompanied by "efficient" institutional change.'[44]

One popular approach to development studies stemming from the new institutionalism is 'path dependency', which sees change as flowing from the interaction between existing institutions and the organisations that individuals form to maximise their utilities within the framework of incentives offered by the institutions.[45] This approach has been used, for instance, for the comparative study of privatisation processes in Latin America and elsewhere.[46] It has also influenced recent neo-structuralist approaches to development. Moreover, the IFIs and international development agencies have begun to draw more heavily on institutional theories. The World Bank's *World Development Report* for 1991 and 1994, for instance, relied extensively on the theories of North and Bates in their discussion on infrastructure and legal structures, while the recent emphasis on the part of the IFIs on 'good governance' clearly reflects the influence of institutional thinking.

As with rational choice theory more generally, the new institutional approach to development is a useful heuristic tool for (at most) middle-level problems, such as analyses of state rent-seeking activities. But the core problem with the approach is that which Marx posed long ago with regard to classical political economy, namely the historic genesis of social forms. The approach does not, and cannot, amount to a theory of development, or even a significant addition to existing theories, because, as Leys points out, 'we cannot explain in terms of the "paradigm" how any particular set of institutions that existed in the past or exist today in a given country came into existence'.[47] However, to the extent that institutions are products of cultures and alleged national characters, as one recent work in this approach strongly suggests,[48] the approach has brought us back full circle to the focus of classical modernisation theory. Moreover, by expunging social forces from the analysis of development processes this approach is not capable of offering anything more, at best, than middle-range theoretical propositions orientated towards technical problem solving. It becomes less a theoretical project that an instrument for policy prescriptions from within the logic of the current global capitalist system.

Reconceptualising development in light of globalisation: beyond the impasse

The world economy has gone through far-reaching transformations since development studies were first launched after World War II. In particular, the regulated system of national economies formalised at Bretton Woods, which underlay the whole idea of 'development' as it was conceived from the 1950s onwards, has been progressively replaced by a new global economy. This process has been the focus of intensive research in recent years across the social science disciplines. In my analysis, globalisation as historic process represents a qualitatively new stage in the evolution of the system of world capitalism.[49] The core of globalisation, theoretically conceived, is the near culmination of a centuries-long process of the spread of capitalist production around the world and its displacement of all pre-capitalist relations ('modernisation'). Globalisation has involved a profound and comprehensive restructuring of the world productive apparatus, including the nature of the world production process and of work; the world division of labour; the worldwide circuits of distribution and exchange; the flow of values and consumption. Central to the process is the progressive globalisation of production itself; the global fragmentation and decentralisation of what were once national productive processes, the dismantling of national economies and construction of a single global production system. This implies a shift from a *world economy*, in which national production systems were linked to each other through trade and financial flows in an integrated world market, to a *global economy*, in which national circuits of accumulation are increasingly broken down and integrated organically into new globalised circuits.

There are three defining features of this process of relevance to the sociology of development. One is the rise of truly transnational capital, divorced from specific countries, and the increasing global mobility of this capital, freed from the confinement of nation-states. Changes in technology, particularly the communications and information revolution, and in transportation, marketing, management, automation, and so on, have made it possible for capital to achieve global mobility and to organise world production in accordance with the whole gamut of factor cost considerations. Transnational capital is carving out a new global economic space. Second is a new transnational phase of capitalism that is coming to supersede the national phase of capitalism as a social system. A key aspect here is the supersession of the nation-state as principal form of social organisation, as the organising principle of world capitalism. The nation-state is no longer the institutional framework or 'container' for such processes as capital accumulation, class formation and, of particular concern here, development.[50] And third, as the organic and internal linkages between peoples become truly global, the whole set of nation-state institutions is becoming transformed and superseded by an emergent transnational configuration of social life. Globalisation, in the process of creating a single and increasingly undifferentiated field for world capitalism, integrates the various polities, cultures and institutions of national societies into an emergent transnational or global society.

In short, development theory and development studies need to be recast in light of these changes; they need to be 'globalised'.

The impasse and nation-state centrism in extant macrosociologies

The new directions in development theory discussed above provided the basis for rich research in the 1980s and 1990s on development processes. But they did not seem to resolve the underlying puzzles of development theorising—as suggested by Leys' observation that this research came to be referred to as 'development studies' rather than 'development theory'.[51] Especially from the mid-1980s onwards, an increasing number of publications outlined the contours of what came to be known as the 'impasse in development theory'.[52] I have argued at some length elsewhere that the key to moving beyond the impasse is to expunge extant paradigms of macrosociology of their nation-state centrism.[53] Moving beyond this impasse requires, I believe, two conditions. First is a respecification of the relationship between space/geography and development, between accumulation and territory. The increasing disjuncture between the two has been revealed by globalisation. Second is a fundamental reconceptualisation of development, which can no longer be conceived as 'national development'. The increasing subordination of the logic of geography to that of production and the rising disjuncture between the fortunes of social groups and of nation-states, among other processes bound up with globalisation, demands that we reconceive of development.

As we have seen, the problem in the impasse is not a lack of theoretical and empirical work. But this work has been hampered by a tenacious nation-state centrism which holds that nation states are the appropriate unit of analysis in development studies. Even as these theories acknowledge the changes involved in the global economy, the territorial conception of development persists: what 'develops' is a nation-state. The process of development is seen as national development in an inter-national system. Distinct agents or actors—local states, class groups, social movements, international agencies, transnational corporations, etc—operate within this essentialist nation-state system. The formal object, or explanatory framework, and the material object, or what needs to be explained, remain, respectively, the nation-state and the international system, on the one hand, and variation among nations within the system as units of analysis, on the other hand.

A sociology of national development is simply no longer a tenable undertaking. Under globalisation national states have progressively lost the ability to capture and redirect surpluses through interventionist mechanisms that were viable in the nation-state phase of capitalism. Regulatory and redistributive mechanisms provided the basis for the post-World War II national economies, whether the Keynesian 'New Deal'/social democratic states in the First World, the developmentalist states of the Third World, or the socialist-orientated redistributive states of the Second World. By redefining the phase of distribution in the accumulation of capital in relation to nation-states, globalisation undermines the distinct redistributive and other mechanisms that acted in earlier epochs to offset the inherent tendency within capitalism towards polarisation. Neither 'socialism in one country' nor 'Keynesianism in one country' can be sustained any longer.

Expunging the theoretical work of nation-state centrism requires a change in

what needs to be explained as well as in how we explain it. For the sociology of development, this means shifting from a territorial or geographic to a social conception of development. Development connotes a social rather than a geographic, spatial or territorial process: we need to reconceive of development not in terms of nations but in terms of social groups in a transnational setting. But here transnationality is a *social* category. In the earlier epoch core and periphery were spatial co-ordinates. Core affluence and the attenuating effects it had on social polarisation were made possible by the core's relation to a spatially defined periphery. The empirical evidence of the growing gap between North and South is well known but so too is that indicating a dramatic widening of the gap between the rich and the poor within countries, which suggests that the processes of uneven accumulation are unfolding in accordance with a social and not a national logic. This social polarisation, the fragmentation of national economies, and the select integration of social groups into transnational networks, suggest that we may rethink development not as a national process, in which what 'develops' is a nation, but in terms of developed, underdeveloped and intermediate population groups occupying contradictory or unstable locations in a transnational environment. Here the focus becomes how accumulation processes that are no longer coextensive with specific national territories determine levels of social development among a global population stratified increasingly along transnational class and social lines rather than along national lines. As core and periphery come to denote social location rather than geography, affluence in global society is coming to rest on a peripheral social sector that is not necessarily spatially concentrated. Those who have the equivalent of US$5000 personal income are considered part of the world of 'consumers'. In the 1990s, for the first time in history, absolute numbers of these in the Third World surpassed those in the First World.[54] But the majority of humanity are not consumers.

How may we specify the changing relationship between space and development? Is the tendency for self-reproduction in the global division of labour countered by processes bound up with globalisation? The global economy is characterised by the dispersal around the world of specialised activities that are increasingly component processes in world production and whose distribution exhibits only in part a spatial or geographic significance. Critical geographies have drawn our attention to multi-layered relations between space, place and production over time. The drive to relocate to more advantageous spaces (the geographic movement of both capital and labour) periodically revolutionises the international and territorial division of labour, adding a vital geographic dimension to the permanent flux, disruption, commotion and redefinition of capitalism as a social system.[55] The geographers' focus on the dimension of space and territory in accumulation and changes in space over time needs to be more fully integrated into the debate on development. As time and space collapse in the current frenzied global reorganisation of capitalism, the territorial or geographic dimensions of accumulation become ever less relevant. The impermanence of production sites and the more fluid—even instantaneous—movement of values means that accumulation is not fixed (time bound) in geographic co-ordinates. We are left with the social dimension, which is the real essence and

subject matter of development as a process and as a condition.

In the current epoch the task is to develop a critical globalisation studies. I believe that the tools of political economy—understood in relation to its classical agenda, which involved historicising social forms and discerning *emergent* structures and relationships—and general research into the restructuring of capitalism provide an essential basis for the regeneration of development theory.

Flexible accumulation, the new capital–labour relationship, and the global division of labour

Several landmark studies of political economy in the 1980s began to identify more systematically the nature and implications of the changes in capitalist social production relations technologies and institutions in the latter part of the twentieth century.[56] Out of these studies the notion of a 'post-Fordist' world economy based on new form of flexible accumulation began to take hold,[57] and became associated with theoretical work and empirical research on the global economy in the 1990s and early twenty-first century.[58] In this approach, diverse new economic arrangements in the global economy have been associated with the transition from the Fordist regime of accumulation prevailing for much of the twentieth century, associated with a large number of easily organisable workers in centralised production locations and fixed, standardised production processes, to new post-Fordist *flexible* regimes. The global economy is made possible by flexible accumulation models, involving, as is well known, new 'globalising' or 'third wave' technologies based on the revolution in information technology, or the convergence of computerisation and telecommunications and the emergence of the internet, and include new transportation technologies, robotisation and other forms of automation, and so on. Novel organisation forms include, among others, new management techniques, vertical disintegration, 'just-in-time' and small-batch production, subcontracting and outsourcing, and formal and informal transnational business alliances. These changes make possible new subdivisions and specialisations in production. Different phases of production become broken down into component phases which are detachable and can be dispersed around the world.

The restructuring of work and labour in the context of the transition from Fordist to flexible accumulation is a constant theme in the literature on globalisation.[59] The ability of workers to consume the goods they produce was central to Fordism, whereas post-Fordism delinks economic growth from the expansion of consumer markets. In my view, this delinkage is a central condition for a new capital–labour relationship under globalisation because it implies that the reproduction of capital is no longer dependent on that of labour. In the larger picture, it suggests that capital is increasingly able to abandon reciprocal obligations to labour in the employment contract with the emergence of a new post-Fordist political regime of accumulation. And under the new social structure of accumulation (in which the political regime is subsumed), states, with their transmutation from developmentalist or Keynesian to neoliberal, no longer face the earlier structural imperative in their public obligations to poor and working majorities.[60] This is the backdrop to the general erosion of wages and it also underpins, at the

societal level, the erosion of what is known as the social wage. New transnational development processes, by removing the domestic market and workers' consumption from the accumulation imperative, contribute to the demise of the diverse alliances between subordinate classes and national ruling classes that characterised the old national development processes and pave the way for the new class relations of global capitalism.

The restructuring of the labour process associated with post-Fordist flexible accumulation involves alternative systems of labour control and diverse contingent categories of labour. Labour market reform is an essential component of the restructuring that has taken place throughout global society, centred around making labour 'flexible', rationalised with the argument that labour costs must be lowered in order to attract investment and increase the competitiveness of firms producing 'tradeable' (export) goods.[61] Deregulation frees up capital to hire and fire at whim and under conditions that allow it to utilise labour 'flexibly' so as to minimise the cost and maximise the control of labour. Labour reform often involves legislation designed to reduce the length and permanence of labour contracts and to substitute individual labour contracts for collective contracts. Such reform 'casualises' labour by allowing it to be hired for any amount of time (a day, a week, a month, etc) or for part-time work with no fixed commitment on the part of employers to provide benefits or security. 'Flexible' labour is also associated with de-unionized labour. Diverse new deregulated forms of work—'contract labour', 'temp labour', 'part-time labour', 'casual labour', 'home work', 'just-in-time labour', and so forth—are subsumed under the twin but not fully synonymous concepts of the *casualisation* of labour and the *informalisation* of work. Casualisation generally refers to the new unregulated work that labour performs for capital under 'flexible' conditions. Informalisation refers to the transfer of much economic activity from the formal to the informal economy. Within the labour market the core of formality is regulated work, while the core of informality is deregulated work.[62] The global labour force is increasingly subject to the conditions of deregulation, casualisation and informalisation, a process some refer to as 'harmonisation', meaning a downward equalisation of work conditions around the world.

Globalisation progressively erases the boundaries between formal and informal activity. The accelerated informalisation of the labour market has been accompanied by the increase of labour flexibility in what remains of the formal sector, with more frequent use of contract work and the use of contingent labour over permanent employment and collective contracts. As TNCs outsource specific production and service tasks to local subcontractors, for instance, the labour they continue to employ is subject to casualisation, while subcontractors draw on labour from the informal economy. Moreover, as the cost of reproduction is expunged from the capitalist sector, it is absorbed by the informal sector, which replenishes the pool of labour. The spread of informalisation becomes a condition for a new capital–labour relationship mechanism for the appropriation of surplus in new ways by capital.

However, the key point I wish to make here is that this transformation of the labour market under globalisation results not in a uniform process of downward mobility but in new patterns of social stratification that include new opportunities

for upward mobility. The increasing bipolarisation of labour into high-paid, high-skilled 'core' and low-paid, low-skilled 'peripheral' workers is an important theme in the literature on post-Fordism and globalisation.[63] The shift to flexible accumulation worldwide and from an international to a global division of labour—processes bound up with globalisation—result in an increasing heterogeneity of labour markets in each locale. Castells notes that 'there is indeed global interdependence of the labor force in the information economy. Such interdependence is characterized by the hierarchical segmentation of labor not between but across borders.'[64] Castells does not believe that this tendency indicates the rise of a unified global labour market, since labour does not enjoy free cross-border mobility. But I suggest such immobility may be seen as the political control of transnational labour by transnational capital. Central to the notion of a global labour market is the increasing heterogeneity of labour markets across borders simultaneous to the increasing similarity of the conditions of work and relation to globalised production for variegated segments across borders. Hence local and national labour markets are themselves increasingly transnationalised. These transnational labour markets are highly heterogeneous. As national labour markets integrate into a single global labour market, this heterogeneity becomes present within most localities. There is a selective and highly variegated integration into transnational structures through heterogeneous participation in the global labour market. Differentiated participation in transnational labour markets comes to determine social development. Transnationalised labour markets, I suggest, become determinant within the social, rather than territorial, conception of development advanced above. Forms of participation for individuals and groups in the global economy are more important than geographic location or nationality. It is the nature of participation in global production, through transnationalised labour markets, not through membership in nation-states, that determines the social development of groups.

Space is configured in diverse ways, only one of which is the nation-state. As David Harvey has observed,[65] the diminishment of spatial barriers gives transnational capital a new-found power to exploit minute spatial differentiation to good effect. Specific spaces or regions in the global economy acquire their own profiles, as I have explored at length in my own research on globalisation and development in Central America.[66] However, empirical evidence suggests that these profiles may just as easily correspond to sub-regions, even to local municipalities, as they do to countries. Spatial 'niches' in transnational production specific to regions and sub-regions, as Harvey notes, have been carved out in Silicon Valley, Los Angeles, the 'Third Italy', South Wales, and so on. These spaces present specific political, social, economic and cultural conditions not coterminous with the conditions of nations—including types of labour available and effective patterns of labour control—conducive to certain activities functionally integrated into the global economy. These profiles in the global economy are not fixed but fluid and are 'structured internal elements' of the encompassing logic of globalisation. Flexible accumulation makes possible a very broad diversity of participation in the global economy, and also the possibility that social groups structure their own distinct spaces as a function of their participation.

From a territorial to a social conception of development

We have seen in both centre and periphery the spread of 'polarised accumulation', in which an affluent 'developed' population, including a privileged sector among segmented labour markets who enjoy a high skills/high-income participation in new patterns of flexible accumulation, can exist alongside super-exploited secondary and tertiary segments and a mass of supernumeraries constituting an 'underdeveloped' population within the same national borders and within the same region. This is a shift in the historic tendency from the homogenisation of regional labour markets (spatially segmented labour markets) to labour market diversification (in-place labour market diversification). The world market seems, in McMichael's words, to 'standardize consumption but differentiate production'.[67] Marketing strategies by TNCs tend to segment consumers according to class-based income brackets, producing a narrower range of different products for these brackets which are then standardised and marketed globally to these distinct segments. But these segments are dispersed globally. Affinities of consumption and lifestyle cut across national boundaries and unite (or divide) different social groups in a cross- or transnational setting. Shifting the focus in the spatial or geographic dimension of development from the national 'downwards' to the sub-national space (even down to the local level, eg inner-city versus affluent suburban space within the same city) and 'upwards' to regional space may help us specify the relationship of space to a global totality and to development as a social category. A simple loop by car through Third World capital cities and principal urban areas reveals the vast gap between social and cultural worlds within the very same city. Glittering malls replete with the latest the global economy has to offer, fast-food chains, beckoning recreational centres and well-guarded residential neighbourhoods that would be the envy of any first world centre stick out as lagoons of wealth and privilege surrounded by oceans of poverty and mass misery, often divided only, and literally, by the very best security systems that social control technology can buy. One slips from 'development' into 'underdevelopment' without any geographic significance beyond urban geography. In an absolute sense the poor in the South are much more poor than the poor of the North. But the social dividing line is clearly not a national one.

The new locus of development processes is emergent transnational *social* space. The tendency is towards a dissolution of the historic affinities between capital accumulation, states conceived of in the Weberian sense as territorially based institutions, and social classes and groups. Class polarisation has progressed, as has uneven accumulation between regions characterised by hierarchies and divisions of labour, in which some zones are selected for global production activities, others assigned 'feeder' roles (eg labour or raw materials reserves), and still others marginalised entirely from the global economy (the so-called 'fourth world'). The persistence, and in fact *growth*, of the North–South divide remains important for its theoretical and practical political implications. However, at issue is whether the divide is something innate to world capitalism or a particular spatial configuration of uneven capitalist development during a particular historic phase of world capitalism, and whether tendencies towards

the self-reproduction of this configuration are increasingly offset by countertendencies emanating from the nature and dynamic of global capital accumulation, such as the search by mobile transnational capital to seek varied investment all over the world.

Development theory needs to move beyond neo-Kantian categoricals. Substituting the concept of the global and the local for the familiar binaries of core–periphery, developed–underdeveloped, and so on, may be useful since it is less concordant with spatial boundaries or geographic regions, is capable of encompassing unequal distribution *within* as well as between national and regional entities, and does not imply a fixed hierarchical division within the totality. Unequal exchanges—material, political, cultural—are not captured so much in the concept of the *international* division of labour than in the *global* division of labour. A global division of labour suggests differential participation in global production according to social standing and not necessarily geographic location, and accounts for sweatshops in East Los Angeles and Northern Honduras, as well as gaited communities in Hollywood and São Paulo. Social order is increasingly organised globally, not nationally. It follows that inequality —the permanent consequence of capitalist social relations—is similarly globally organised, and that poverty and wealth can take new forms in it. I suggest that the reconceptualisation proposed here may allow us to research new social cartographies and to identify in these cartographies relational dimensions and agencies.

A global—rather than an international—division of labour is characterised by labour hierarchies and the existence of developed and underdeveloped populations that cut across national boundaries. While different regions do acquire distinct profiles in the global economy, these profiles do not consign the different population groups in each region to underdevelopment by virtue of nationality or spatial location. We want to specify the relationship between regional profiles and the distribution of social rewards among a globally stratified population. On the one hand, participation in structures particular to specific regions may be a status in the same sense that gender and ethnicity are statuses that help shape the distribution of social rewards. On the other hand, geographic location (living in an 'underdeveloped country') does not necessarily confer this status on individuals and social groups. Globalisation fragments locally and integrates select strands of the population globally. The centralisation and concentration of economic power is accompanied by a disintegration of the cohesive structures of nations and their civil societies. Thus the effect of local economic expansion is often the advancement of some (delocalised) groups and deepening poverty for others. What accounts for the variation that social groups experience in their participation in a now-globalised collective labour process and in the distribution of social rewards? And what is the significance of space in accounting for this variation? These are questions for future research. However, the answers we develop will have great significance, in my view, for a renewal of the sociology of development.

Lastly, I believe that a renewal of development theory and studies requires a critical approach that takes up the task of theory formation from the viewpoint of the victims of global capitalism, the poor and marginalised majorities of global

society. There have been important new studies that point to an emerging globalisation school of development, such as the work of McMichael, Hoogvelt, Sklair and Robinson.[68] Whether such a school can compete with the dominant neoliberal and institutional approaches remains to be seen. But this probably depends more on what happens in the real world of the struggle among social forces than on what happens in the academy. A critical globalisation studies, including a regenerated critical development studies, must certainly be concerned with the relationship between development theory and political practice, between theory and emancipatory projects. To the extent that development is about the emancipation of peoples from the conditions that impede material and cultural realisation, about their empowerment against structures of domination, then by definition these processes have a subject as well as an object. The question is, which subject? Theory for and by whom? As we saw throughout this essay, development theory and studies are never divorced from competing social interests and political practices, and nor can they be. I concur with Colin Leys: 'Theory needs both a subject and an object, and the prerequisite of any new development theory that aims to be practical must surely be the analysis of the now deregulated global market and the social forces that dominate it, and then a definition of alternative social forces whose developmental needs cannot be met within this system and which can be expected to struggle against it.'[69] If the 'classical' development paradigms were informed by the 'development project' of the cold war era, emerging trends and directions have as their backdrop the current order of global capitalism. In this age of globalisation, a critical social science becomes self-knowledge of global society.

Notes

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[1] See, *inter alia*, Frans J Schuurman (ed), *Beyond the Impasse: New Directions in Development Theory*, London: Zed, 1993); 'Development theory in the 1990s'; David Booth, *Rethinking Social Development: Theory, Research and Practice*, London: Longman, 1994; Booth, 'Marxism and development sociology: interpreting the impasse', *World Development*, 13, 1985, pp 761–787; Peter Vandergeest & Frederick H Buttell, 'Marx, Weber and development sociology: beyond the impasse', *World Development*, 16 (6), 1988, pp 683–695; Leslie Sklair, 'Transcending the impasse: metatheory, theory, and empirical research in the sociology of underdevelopment', *World Development*, 16 (6), 1988, pp 697–709; Richard Peet, *Global Capitalism: Theories of Social Development*, London: Routledge, 1991; and Colin Leyes, *The Rise and Fall of Development Theory*, Indianapolis, London, Nairobi: EAEP/Indiana University Press, James Curry, 1996.

[2] William I Robinson, 'Beyond nation-state paradigms: globalization, sociology, and the challenge of transnational studies', *Sociological Forum*, 13 (4), 1988, pp 561–594; and Robinson, 'Transnational processes, development, and changing social hierarchies in the world system: a Central American case study', *Third World Quarterly*, 22 (5), 2001, pp 529–563.

[3] See, for example, Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1963; Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Glencoe, NY: Free Press, 1958; Samuel P Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968; Walter W Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960; and Myron Weiner & Samuel Huntington (eds), *Understanding Political Development*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1987.

[4] See, *inter alia*, Irene Gendzier, *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985.

[5] Osvaldo Sunkel & Pedro Paz, *El Subdessarrollo Latinoamericano y la Teoria del Desarrollo*, Mexico City: Siglio XXII, 1970.

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[7] Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs & Otto Kreye, *The New International Division of Labor: Structural Unemployment in Industrialized Countries and Industrialization in Developing Countries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

[8] *Ibid*, p 19.

[9] Philip McMichael, *Development and Social Change*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge, 1996, p 57.

[10] See, *inter alia*, June Nash & Maria Patricia Fernandez-Kelly (eds), *Women, Men, and the International Division of Labor*, Albany, NY: State University of New York (SUNY) Press, 1983; Diane Elson & Ruth Pearson, 'Nimble fingers make cheap workers: an analysis of women's employment in Third World export manufacturing', *Feminist Review*, Spring 1981, pp 87–107; Maria Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, *For We are Sold, I and My People: Women and Industry in Mexico's Frontier*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1983; and Leslie Sklair, *Assembling for Development: The Maquila Industry in Mexico and the United States*, San Diego, CA: University of California Center for US–Mexico Relations, 1993.

[11] See, *inter alia*, Richard Appelbaum & Jeffrey Henderson (eds), *States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim*, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992; and Frederick C Deyo, *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*, Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press.

[12] Peter Evans & John D Stephens, 'Studying development since the sixties: the emergence of a new comparative political economy', *Theory and Society*, 17 (5), 1988, pp 713–745 (quotation on p 715).

[13] See, for example, Robert Wade, *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.

[14] Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (eds), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

[15] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

[16] See the collection of essays in Gary Gereffi & Miguel Korzeniewicz (eds), *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.

[17] Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 'Introduction', in *ibid*, p 1.

[18] Immanuel Wallerstein & Terence K Hopkins, 'Commodity chains: construct and research', in Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism*, p 17.

[19] Gary Gereffi, 'The elusive last lap in the quest for developed-country status', in: James H Mittelman (ed), *Globalization: Critical Reflections*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996, p 64.

[20] Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations*, New York: Semiotexte, 1983.

[21] See the exemplar study of this genre, Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. See also Wolfgang Sachs (ed), *The Development Dictionary*, London: Zed, 1992.

[22] Douglas A Kincaid & Alejandro Portes (eds), *Comparative National Development: Society and Economy in the New Global Order*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994, p 6.

[23] Schuurman, 'Development theory in the 1990s', p 27.

[24] Peet, *Global Capitalism*, pp 153–154.

[25] See, *inter alia*, Irene Tinker (ed), *Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

[26] See, for example, Lourdes Beneria, 'Gender and the global economy', in: Arthur MacEwan & William K Tabb (eds), *Instability and Change in the World Economy*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989; Maria Mies, 'Gender and global capitalism', in: Leslie Sklair (ed), *Capitalism and Development*, London: Routledge, 1994; M Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, 'Broadening the scope: gender and the study of international development', in: Kincaid & Portes, *Comparative National Development*.

[27] Peet, *Global Capitalism*.

[28] See William I Robinson, 'Latin America and global capitalism', *Race and Class*, 40 (2/3), 1998–99, pp 111–131; Robinson, 'Latin America in the age of inequality: confronting the new "Utopia"', *International Studies Review*, 1 (3), 1999, pp 41–67; Robinson, 'Society theory and globalization: the rise of a transnational state', *Theory and Society*, 2001, 30 (2), pp 157–200; Robinson, 'Transnational processes, development, and changing social hierarchies; and Robinson, *Central America and Global Capitalism*, London: Verso Press (forthcoming, 2003).

[29] As cited in McMichael, *Development and Social Change*, p 111.

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