Aggression, hypermasculine emotions and relations: the
silence/violence pattern
THOMAS SCHEFF
University of California, Santa Barbara
Boys learn early that showing vulnerable feelings (grief, fear and shame) are seen
as signs of weakness. First at home, then at school they find that acting out anger,
even if faked, is seen as strength. Expressing anger verbally, rather than storming,
may be seen as weakness. At first merely to protect themselves, boys begin
suppressing feelings that may be interpreted as signs of weakness.
In Western cultures most boys learn, as first option, to hide their vulnerable
feelings in emotionless talk, withdrawal, or silence. I will call these three
responses (emotional) SILENCE. In situations where these options seem unavail-
able, males may cover their vulnerable feelings behind a display of hostility. That
is, young boys learn in their families, and later, from their peers, to suppress emo-
tions they actually feel by acting out one emotion, anger, whether they feel it or not.
I call this pattern Ôsilence/violenceÕ. Vulnerable feelings are first hidden from
others, and after many repetitions, even from self. In this latter stage, behaviour
becomes compulsive. When men face what they construe to be threatening situa-
tions, they may be compelled to SILENCE or to rage and aggression.
Even without threat, men seem to be more likely to SILENCE or violence than
women. With their partners, most men are less likely to talk freely than women
about feelings of resentment, humiliation, embarrassment, rejection, joy, genuine
pride, loss and anxiety. This may be the reason they are more likely to show anger:
they seem to be backed up on a wide variety of intense feelings, but sense that only
anger is allowed them. The phrase Ôbacked upÕ was first used by Tomkins (see selec-
tions from his work in the volume edited by Demos 1995, pp. 92–4, 57, 275–6).
Why did Tomkins use such an award phrase, rather than the more obvious
choice: Ôrepressed?Õ To understand his choice requires a brief digression into the
history of psychology during the period that he was writing, in the sixties and
seventies. There was little hard evidence for or against the concepts of repression
and the unconscious at this time, and not much more today. By and large, most
psychotherapists assumed it to be true and academic psychologists assumed that it
was not true. Indeed, academic psychologists ridiculed these ideas, especially the
idea that emotions exerted ÔhydraulicÕ pressure on everyday life.
In this context, Tomkins did not use terms like repression and unconscious,
perhaps in an attempt to avoid open conflict with the vast majority of his
colleagues. But his system assumes the repression of painful emotions to the point
that they become unconscious in everyday life. Although himself an academic
psychologist, he found it necessary to invent terms that would allow his theory of
emotions to involve repression and the unconscious emotions that result.
My own view of emotions is based largely on my experiences as a teacher,
marriage counsellor (1971–76), and my own personal life. For the last thirty-five
years of teaching, my classes came close to being forms of group psychotherapy,
even the large classes. Although I never called attention to the similarity, students
often did. Usually the comments they made in this regard were approving; most of
them thought it added to the value of the class. The format of my classes, whatever
their official names, basically involved having the students examine their own
experiences, to help them understand their emotional/relational worlds.
During the period of student activism against the Vietnam War, these classes
became intensely emotional. In a large course titled Interpersonal Relations, taught
many times over a period of three years, students underwent mass weeping and
laughing, both in the large meetings, small discussion groups, and in office visits
by groups of students. In 1979 I received the Distinguished Teaching Award from
the UCSB Academic Senate largely on the basis of these classes. Most of my views
on emotional/relational issues were formed by my close contacts with thousands
of students.
My personal life has also been dense with emotional/relational issues. Between
the ages of 14 and 40 I certainly fitted the pattern of male repression of vulnerable
emotions. I had learned to be a strong and silent male like my father, and that
expressions of fear, grief and shame at school made me prey to bullies. Although
I have no memory of my dad equating fear with cowardice, it was implied in his
comments and actions. Over the course of childhood, I seem to have gradually
numbed out feelings of fear. In my late 30s, during the Vietnam protest, I took many
risks that seem shockingly unacceptable to me now. Some of my colleagues compli-
mented me on my courage, but looking back it seems to me I was merely reckless.
Numbing out fear, particularly, makes men dangerous to themselves and others.
Fear is an innate signal of danger that helps us survive. When we see a car heading
toward us on a collision course, we have an immediate, automatic fear response:
WAKE UPSLEEPY-HEAD, YOUR LIFE IS IN DANGER! Much faster than
thought, this reaction increases our chance of survival, and repressing it is dan-
gerous to self and others. If the sense of fear has been repressed, it is necessary to
find ways of uncovering it.
Although the idea is only hinted at in Tomkins, it now seems likely that repres-
sion of emotions leads to a vicious circle. One represses emotions in order to avoid
painful feelings. At first the painful feelings have their origins in the reactions of
others, especially our parents and schoolmates. Certainly as a child I sensed that my
father saw expressions of grief or fear as indicating weakness. He often used a
Yiddish expression in these circumstances: ÔZai ayne menschÕ. At the time I took
it to mean ÔBe a manÕ(instead of acting like a baby). What was painful to me was
less the words (which actually mean ÔBe a real personÕ) than his signs of
impatience and even disgust at my behaviour.
In order to avoid pain inflicted by others, we learn to repress the expressions of
feeling that lead to negative reactions from others. After thousands of curtail-
ments, repression becomes habitual and out of consciousness. But as we become
more backed up with avoided emotions, we have the sense that experienced them
would be unbearably painful. In this way, avoidance leads to avoidance in an ever
increasing, self-perpetuating loop.
For a lengthy period as a teenager and young man, it never occurred to me to try
to identify and talk about the various feelings I might have had. I was angry much
of the time, and sometimes enraged. As my son later told me, my anger was unpre-
dictable. It was a problem in all of my relationships.
However, at the age of 40, both by accident and through various forms of
therapy, I began to learn how to cry and feel fear, rather than numb it out. My first
experience of intense crying at this age led to a solid year of crying every day,
without exception. It was as if I had a backlog of tears to deal with.
My experiences of fear were different, however. They were only two of them,
but they were profound, about six months apart. The first occurred as a result of
therapy, after intense episodes of crying and laughing. The second was triggered by
a death threat on the phone from an irate citizen. During this time I was both chair
of an academic department and an anti-war activist. This combination increased my
visibility, and it irritated a lot of people, both in and outside of the university.
Both fear episodes were quite similar in content and in duration. They each
lasted about twenty minutes, and involved what would have looked like epileptic
seizures from the outside. As I lay on the floor, my body went through convulsive
shaking with an earthquake-like intensity, and sweating that soaked my clothes as
if I had been swimming in them. Unlike my crying episodes, there was no mental
content associated with the two fits of fear. Also, unlike the crying, which occurred
so easily as to become commonplace, I felt utterly transformed after each fear
episode.
These fear experiences also had an immediately visible effect. After the second
one, I actually began to experience fear when I was in danger. Since I was still
deeply involved in the Vietnam protest, I began to be less reckless. Isla Vista, the
student community where most of my activity took place, was an extremely
dangerous place at this time. At times the student protesters and the police were in
open warfare. My change with respect to fear probably helped protect me and
other protesters from injury.
Surprisingly, neither the crying nor the fear episodes were painful. Indeed, they
were more pleasurable than painful. In the fear response, particularly, I felt some-
what like a child on a delicious roller-coaster ride. Apparently all of these changes
occurred at what I have called optimal distance (in my theory of catharsis: Scheff,
1979). That is, I was both in a state of grief or fear, but also outside it, looking on
like a member of an audience in a theatre.
Making the acquaintance of my own shame came later, with more difficulty. At
any rate, episodes of anger and rage became less frequent, briefer, and less intense
as I learned to identify and feel vulnerable emotions. Another decisive step in this
direction occurred as a result of marriage to my present wife, Suzanne Retzinger.
After we began living together, she would usually come home from her job as a
mediator in a child custody court, laden with talk. She would go on for what often
seemed to me an interminable time, reviewing events of her day at work. Sometimes
she would recount the same event several times. Listening to this daily drama, I
was rapidly becoming exasperated.
However, after several months of suffering in silence, I noticed that she usu-
ally seemed to feel much better after her marathon of talk. Anew thought occurred
to me: if it works for her, maybe it will work for me! So we took turns review-
ing the events of our day. At first I could hardly fill five minutes, much less the
45 that Suzanne usually took. But with some patient probing and questions
on her part, I learned how to go over the events of my day, finding and trying to
finish unfinished emotion-laden events. As I learned to do that, I began to feel
better. On the basis of my own experiences and as a teacher, I have come to
believe that everyone needs to experience the full range of their emotions if they
are to thrive.
Gender differences in emotion management
In my experience, most women express vulnerable emotions more fully than
most men. Certainly they express fear and grief more. The difference between
men and women with respect to shame is probably smaller, but with women still
more expressive of this emotion, if only obliquely. That is, women seem more
likely to review the events of their day, either to themselves or with another
person, than men. In doing so, they are likely to encounter one or more of the
vulnerable emotions.
On the other hand, more women are inhibited about expressing anger, whether
verbally or acting it out. Each year of teaching hundred students about emotions, I
would come across at least one female student who claimed never to have felt
anger. This student usually wore a continuous smile that was difficult to remove,
even on request. When such a student did hit upon the experience of anger during
the course exercises, she appeared both alarmed and delighted.
My impression is that the gender difference in these four emotions is slowly
decreasing, as women are being prepared at home and school for careers. This
change is clearest with respect to anger; more women are expressing anger either
verbally or by acting out. The change toward the masculine pattern of vulnerable
emotions is less clear, and may be quite slow. It seems that even career women
still cry much more freely than men and are quicker to acknowledge fear.
Studies of unresolved grief and of alexthymia (Krystal, 1988) indirectly sup-
port the different management of emotions by men and women. Alexithymia is a
recent addition to diagnostic categories, meaning absence of feeling and emotion.
Unresolved grief is an older diagnosis. Unlike most psychiatric diagnoses, there is
almost unanimous agreement that this syndrome is one whose, Ôcause is known,
whose features are distinctive, and whose course is predictableÕ(Parkes, 1998).
At any rate, although these studies do not comment on gender differences, in the
case studies reported, men outnumber women by a ratio of about four to one. A
patient who shows up in a psychiatristÕs office with symptoms of alexithymia or
unresolved grief is much more likely to be a man than a woman.
Doka and Martin (1998) have argued that menÕs grieving is not recognised as
such, because it is largely cognitive and behavioural, rather than affective. In this
and other publications, Doka has sought to back up his idea with empirical data.
But it seems to me that his data, based on paper and pencil inventories, hardly
touches the realities of grieving. However, his idea that grieving has cognitive and
behavioural, as well as emotional components is probably valid. And not just for
grief, but also for fear and shame also: talking about feeling has a role in reframing
trauma that is partially independent of feeling.
The difference between men and womenÕs attitudes toward violence can be
seen in the various polls that are relevant to the support of the Iraq war. No matter
which poll or the framing of the question, women always express less support for
the war. Women are much less keen on violence than men in its collective form. At
the level of families, women are also much less likely to commit violence than
men, especially physical violence.
A recent literature review of responses to stress (Taylor et al., 2000) finds that
women, much more than men, are likely to Ôtend-and-befriendÕ rather than fight-or-
flight. The attachment/networking response seems to be more alive in women than
in men. The tend/befriend pattern can be viewed as the default variant for females,
an important modification of CannonÕs idea of fight or flight.
This paper proposes that the silence/violence pattern is the corresponding
variant for males. The violence part obviously corresponds to fight. But the silence
part is equivalent to flight, if withdrawal includes not just physical flight, but also
withdrawal in its psychological sense. The Taylor et al. Ôtend/befriendÕ pattern for
women, when combined with the silence/violence pattern for men suggests that the
fight/flight response is crucially modified by culturally driven gender differences.
The way in which the US military continues its policy of discrimination against
gays, in defiance of court rulings, suggests the crucial role that hypermasculinity
plays in collective violence. But the evidence is indirect. The role of hypermas-
culine emotions in actual events is difficult to evaluate directly because of
inadequate reporting of the emotional/relational world.
Conventional reporting involves the behavioural/cognitive world, at best. But
the nature of the emotions involved, and relationships, can be inferred from these
materials if they are interpreted within the larger context. This method is first
applied to the case of William Calley, the Army officer convicted of ordering and
helping carry out the massacre at My Lai, and then to the much fuller accounts of
HitlerÕs life. But there is one dramatic difference between the two that makes
CalleyÕs behaviour seem almost as disturbing as HitlerÕs: even though he
organised the murder of millions, Hitler is not known to have to have ever killed
even one of those that he led others to kill. Calley not only ordered murder, but
killed many of his victims himself.
William Calley and the My Lai massacre
This account is based on several sources. The first is the online record of a PBS
broadcast: The American Experience: Vietnam (PBS, undated). The second is
based on a recent review of CalleyÕs conviction for murder, within the larger
perspective of the US military involvement in the Vietnam war (Belknap, 2002).
Other biographies are also cited: Hersh, 1970; Calley, 1971; Everett, 1971;
Greenshaw, 1971; Hammer, 1971.
Charley Company reached Mai Lai village on 16 March, 1968, led by
Lt. William Calley. Like some of the men serving under him, CalleyÕs back-
ground was unheroic. (The following account is an abbreviated version of the
PBS text.)
[His] utter lack of respect for the indigenous population was apparent to all
in the company. According to one soldier, Ôif they wanted to do something
wrong, it was all right with CalleyÕ. Seymour Hersh wrote that by March of
1968 Ômany in the company had given in to an easy pattern of violenceÕ.
Soldiers systematically beat unarmed civilians. Some civilians were murdered.
Whole villages were burned. Wells were poisoned. Rapes were common.
On March 14, a small squad from ÔCÕ Company ran into a booby trap,
killing a popular sergeant, blinding one GI and wounding several others.
The following evening, when a funeral service was held for the killed ser-
geant, soldiers had revenge on their mind. After the service, Captain Medina
rose to give the soldiers a pep talk and discuss the next morningÕs mission.
Medina told them that the VC were in the vicinity of a hamlet known as My
Lai 4, which would be the target of a large-scale assault by the company.
The soldiersÕ mission would be to engage the enemy and to destroy the
village of My Lai. By 7 a.m., Medina said, the women and children would be
out of the hamlet and all they could expect to encounter would be the enemy.
The soldiers were to explode brick homes, set fire to thatch homes, shoot
livestock, poison wells, and destroy the enemy. The seventy-five or so
American soldiers would be supported in their assault by gunship pilots.
Medina later said that his objective that night was to Ôfire them up and
get them ready to go in there; I did not give any instructions as to what to do
with women and children in the villageÕ. Although some soldiers agreed
with that recollection of MedinaÕs, others clearly thought that he had ordered
them to kill every person in My Lai 4. Perhaps his orders were intentionally
vague. What seems likely is that Medina intentionally gave the impression
that everyone in My Lai would be their enemy.
At 7:22 a.m. on March 16, nine helicopters lifted off for the flight to My
Lai 4. By the time the helicopters carrying members of Charlie Company
landed in a rice paddy about 140 yards south of My Lai, the area had been
peppered with small arms fire from assault helicopters. Whatever VC might
have been in the vicinity of My Lai had most likely left by the time the first
soldiers climbed out of their helicopters. The assault plan called for Lt.
CalleyÕs first platoon and Lt. Stephen BrooksÕs second platoon to sweep into
the village, while a third platoon, Medina, and the headquarters unit would
be held in reserve and follow the first two platoons in after the area was
more or less secured.
My Lai village had about 700 residents. They lived in either redbrick
homes or thatch-covered huts. Adeep drainage ditch marked the eastern
boundary of the village. Directly south of the residential area was an open
plaza area used for holding village meetings. To the north and west of the
village was dense foliage.
By 8 a.m., CalleyÕs platoon had crossed the plaza on the townÕs southern
edge and entered the village. They encountered families cooking rice in
front of their homes. The men began their usual search-and-destroy task of
pulling people from homes, interrogating them, and searching for VC. Soon
the killing began. The first victim was a man stabbed in the back with a
bayonet. Then a middle-aged man was picked up, thrown down a well, and
a grenade lobbed in after him. Agroup of fifteen to twenty mostly older
women were gathered around a temple, kneeling and praying. They were all
executed with shots to the back of their heads.
Eighty or so villagers were taken from their homes and herded to the
plaza area. As many cried ÔNo VC! No VC!Õ, Calley told soldier Paul
Meadlo ÔYou know what I want you to do with themÕ. When Calley returned
ten minutes later and found the Vietnamese still gathered in the plaza he
reportedly said to Meadlo, ÔHavenÕt you got rid of them yet? I want them
dead. Waste themÕ. Meadlo and Calley began firing into the group from a
distance of ten to fifteen feet. The few that survived did so because they
were covered by the bodies of those less fortunate.
What Captain Medina knew of these war crimes is not certain. It was a
chaotic operation. Gary Garfolo said, ÔI could hear shooting all the time.
Medina was running back and forth everywhere. This wasnÕt no organised
dealÕ. Medina would later testify that he didnÕt enter the village until 10 a.m.,
after most of the shooting had stopped, and did not personally witness a
single civilian being killed. Others put Medina in the village closer to 9 a.m.,
and close to the scene of many of the murders as they were happening.
As the third platoon moved into My Lai, it was followed by army
photographer Ronald Haeberle, there to document what was supposed to be
a significant encounter with a crack enemy battalion. Haeberle took many
pictures. He said he saw about thirty different GIs kill about 100 civilians.
Once Haeberle focused his camera on a young child about five feet away,
but before he could get his picture the kid was blown away. He angered
some GIs as he tried to photograph them as they fondled the breasts of a
fifteen-year-old Vietnamese girl.
Meanwhile, the rampage below continued. Calley was at the drainage ditch
on the eastern edge of the village, where about seventy to eighty old men,
women, and children not killed on the spot had been brought. Calley ordered
the dozen or so platoon members there to push the people into the ditch, and
three or four GIs did. Calley ordered his men to shoot into the ditch. Some
refused, others obeyed. One who followed CalleyÕs order was Paul Meadlo,
who estimated that he killed about twenty-five civilians. (Later Meadlo was
seen, head in hands, crying). Calley joined in the massacre. At one point,
a two-year-old child who somehow survived the gunfire began running
towards the hamlet. Calley grabbed the child, threw him back in the ditch,
then shot him.
In prior studies (1990) of massacres like the one in My Lai, the most prominent
hypothesis concerns what has been called Ôa forward panicÕ. This idea proposes
that any group in a highly emotional state, especially a state of fear, is capable of
massacre. The parallel upon which this idea is based is the behaviour of audiences
in theatre fires. In a panic to get out of the theatre, members of the audience may
trample on each other. Apanic state of this kind leads to unintentional, indeed
compulsive behaviour. Atelling detail from these accounts is that many audience
members seem to have no memory of the panic. In their desperation to flee the
theatre, they may have experienced an absence, which is French for temporarily
losing your mind.
The idea of panic seems to explain collective behaviour in theatre fires very
well. Apanic suggests flight behaviour driven entirely by a single emotion, fear,
and that it has no basis in the previous history of the members of the crowd.
Forward panic adds a new idea, that instead of flight, panic can also lead to fight.
In the case of massacres, fight would take the form of slaughter.
There are several studies of massacres by soldiers that strongly suggest forward
panics (Collins, 1990). Military units that had no history of earlier violence, under
conditions of great danger, have committed mayhem, either captive enemy soldiers
or helpless civilians. In CollinÕs forthcoming study of collective violence, he suggests
that the slaughter at My Lai may have been caused, at least in part, by forward panic.
While there are some indications of forward panic in the massacre at My Lai,
there are many indications that suggest other causes as well. The prior history of the
behaviour of the soldiers in Company C is rife with episodes of earlier violence
against civilians, suggesting a habitual pattern of behaviour as one of the causes of
My Lai. There are also many suggestions that point toward intentionality by Calley
and by his superior officers, including his immediate superior, Capt. Medina. Both
the orders from above and CalleyÕs actions themselves can be seen as intentional.
Although MedinaÕs orders are not completely unambiguous, certainly CalleyÕs
comments and actions suggest intention, rather than compulsive actions during
a panic.
Another, more obvious limitation of the forward panic hypothesis is that there
seem to have been other emotions involved, in addition to fear. It seems obvious
that fear was a part of the pattern. In the events leading up to My Lai, Company C
had been exposed to grave and constant danger. They were fighting an enemy that
was virtually invisible, attacking under thick forest cover, and in silence. The lives
of these soldiers had been on the line 24/7 for many days. Surely they were living
in fear of their lives.
But the account above suggests other emotions as well. The US soldiers found
the skilful tactics of their enemy frustrating, which is one of many vernacular ways
of implicating the emotion of anger. Anger is also implied in regard to the death of
one of their sergeants and the wounding of several of their fellows, only two days
before the arrival at My Lai: Ô[The] soldiers had revenge on their mindÕ. The idea
of revenge involves not only anger, since revenge implies a shame-anger sequence.
The inability of the men to even find, much less defeat the enemy appears to have
given rise not only to fear and anger, but also to the feeling of defeat and its
consequence, humiliation.
Neither CalleyÕs autobiographical statement (1971) nor his biographies are
sufficiently detailed to allow a clear analysis of his emotional life. With the excep-
tion of a temporary bond with his older sister, he appeared to have formed no close
bonds with anyone. Even though lacking in details, his biographies do uniformly
suggest conditions for one emotion, the emotion of shame. Judging from his history,
beginning as a high school student and extending into his life after leaving school,
he had encountered a long and virtually uninterrupted series of scornful treatments
from others and unremitting failures.
Calley failed many courses in high school and college, and failed at many jobs
after leaving school. By some monstrous error, when he enlisted in the Army, he
was chosen for OfficersÕ Candidate School. But his record both in OCS and in his
regular service was one of failure and scorn. The officer who was his immediate
superior in Vietnam, Capt. Medina, is recorded as never referring to him by his
name, but instead used only scornful epithets. For example, in front of his platoon,
Medina referred to Calley as ÔLt. ShitheadÕ.
Given this record of unremitting scorn and failure, it is instructive to read
CalleyÕs version of his life (as told to John Sacks, 1973). Calley was utterly silent
about his long history of failure and scorn. The difference between the biographies
and CalleyÕs version of his life would seem to support the idea that violent men
suppress their emotional lives.
CalleyÕs behaviour during the massacre itself provides a vivid image of the
silence/violence pattern. While ordering and participating in the murder of women
and children, he was emotionally silent. Note the details in the final paragraph
above (PBS, undated):
Calley was at the drainage ditch on the eastern edge of the village, where
about seventy to eighty old men, women, and children not killed on the spot
had been brought. Calley ordered the dozen or so platoon members there to
push the people into the ditch, and three or four GIs did. Calley ordered his
men to shoot into the ditch. Some refused, others obeyed. One who followed
CalleyÕs order was Paul Meadlo, who estimated that he killed about twenty-
five civilians. (Later Meadlo was seen, head in hands, crying.) Calley joined
in the massacre. At one point, a two-year-old child who somehow survived
the gunfire began running towards the hamlet. Calley grabbed the child,
threw him back in the ditch, then shot him.
It should be noted that some of his troops refused to obey CalleyÕs murderous
commands, and that one who did obey (Meadlo) was seen crying afterwards.
CalleyÕs behaviour stands out not only because of its violence, but because it was
so unemotional. There were undoubtedly many other massacres in Vietnam simi-
lar to the one at My Lai, some of them unreported. But even the reported ones
received little attention compared to My Lai. Perhaps CalleyÕs combination of
emotional silence and flagrant violence made it so inhuman and repugnant that
there was no way of avoiding it.
Many studies of battlefield behaviour have shown that to kill effectively, soldiersÕ
greatest struggle is with their own conscience. Their personal morality dictates it
wrong to kill other human beings, even enemy soldiers. But Calley came to battle
with the conscience problem long overcome: he had numbed out not only fear and
grief, but also feelings of shame, the basic ingredient of conscience.
The silence/violence pattern in HitlerÕs biographies
The evidence for unresolved grief is indirect: there is not a single mention of Hitler
crying, not even as a child. There are a host of indications, however, that he prized
manliness, strength, and fortitude in the face of adversity. All of these indications
run counter to placing any value on crying or other expressions of grief.
HitlerÕs ideal of iron strength was not merely ideological, since he had distin-
guished himself as a good soldier in World War I (see below). His courage under
fire may also suggest the numbing out of fear, since it is difficult to distinguish
between courage and the mere absence of fear.
The Swiss psychoanalyst Alice Miller (1983) has suggested a family origin of
HitlerÕs psychopathology, the conjunction of the fatherÕs physical/emotional vio-
lence and his motherÕs complicity in it. Miller argues that the rage and shame
caused by his fatherÕs treatment might have been completely repressed because of
his motherÕs complicity. Although she pampered Hitler and professed to love him,
she did not protect him from his fatherÕs wrath, or allow Adolf to express his
feelings about it.
HitlerÕs mother, Klara, as much as Adolf, was tyrannised by her husband, but
offered only obedience and respect in return. Because of his motherÕs ÔloveÕ for
him, as a young child, Adolf was required not only to suffer humiliation by his
father in silence, but also to respect him for it, a basic context for repression.
In later years Hitler (1927) was to gloss over his treatment by his parents,
which is congruent with repression. He described his father as stern but respected,
his childhood as that of a ÔmotherÕs darling living in a soft downy bedÕ(Bromberg
and Small, 1983: 40). However, AloisÕs son, Alois Jr, left home at 14 because of his
fatherÕs harshness. His son, William Patrick, reported that Alois, Sr. beat Alois, Jr.
with a whip. Alois Jr.Õs first wife, Brigid, reported that Alois Sr. frequently beat
the children, and on occasion his wife Klara (Bromberg and Small, 1983, 32–3).
It would appear that HitlerÕs early childhood constituted an external feeling trap
from which there was no escape. This external trap is the analogue to the internal
trap proposed by Lewis (1971): when shame is evoked but goes unacknowledged,
it generates intense symptoms of mental illness and/or violence towards self or
others. Under the conditions of complete repression that seem to have obtained,
HitlerÕs personality was grossly distorted. His biographies suggest that he was
constantly in a state of anger bound by shame.
One indication of HitlerÕs continual shame/rage was his temper tantrums.
Although in later life some of them may have been staged, there is no question
that in most of his tantrums he was actually out of control. His older stepbrother
reported (Gilbert, 1950, 18) that even before he was seven, ÔHitler was imperious
and quick to anger ... If he didnÕt get his way he got very angry. He would fly into
a rage over any trivialityÕ. In his teens, HitlerÕs rages were frequent and intense,
evoking such expressions as Ôred with rageÕ, Ôexceedingly violent and high-
strungÕ, and Ôlike a volcano eruptingÕ(Kubizek, 1955).
HitlerÕs compulsive anger is suggested by the slightness of provocation that
triggered rage. KubizekÕs memoir provides two examples: one occasion on
learning that he had failed to win a lottery, another when he saw ÔStephanieÕ with
other men. Stephanie was a girl who Hitler longed to meet, but never did. He
was infatuated with her, but never introduced himself (Bromberg and Small, 1983:
55–6).
The most obvious manifestations of HitlerÕs shame occurred after he became
Chancellor. Although easily the most powerful and admired man in Germany, he
was constantly apprehensive (Bromberg and Small, 1983: 183): ÔHis anxieties lest
he appear ridiculous, weak, vulnerable, incompetent, or in any way inferior are
indications of his endless battle with shame.Õ Further manifestations of chronic
shame states occurred in his relationships with women. In attempting to interest a
woman in himself,
even the presence of other persons would not prevent him from repulsive
grovelling. [He would] tell a lady that he was unworthy to sit near her or kiss
her hand but hoped she would look on him with favour ... one woman